A Critical Examination of Responses to Berka’s (1983) and Nash’s (1990) Philosophical Inquiries on Mental Measurement from Brand et al (2003)
2750 words
Introduction
What I term “the Berka-Nash measurement objection” is—I think—one of the most powerful arguments against not only the concept of IQ “measurement” but against psychological “measurement” as a whole—this also compliments my irreducibility of the mental arguments. (Although there are of course contemporary authors who argue that IQ—and other psychological traits—are immeasurable, the Berka-Nash measurement objection I think touches the heart of the matter extremely well). The argument that Karel Berka (1983) mounted in Measurement: Its Concepts, Theories, and Problems is a masterclass in defining what “measurement” means and the rules needed for what designates X is a true measure and Y as a true measurement device. Then Roy Nash (1990) in Intelligence and Realism: A Materialist Critique of IQ brought Berka’s critique of extraphysical (mental) measurement to a broader audience, simplifying some of the concepts that Berka discussed and likened it to the IQ debate, arguing that there is no true property that IQ tests measure, therefore IQ tests aren’t a measurement device and IQ isn’t a measure.
I have found only one response to this critique of mental measurement by hereditarians—that of Brand et al (2003). Brand et al think they have shown that Berka’s and Nash’s critique of mental measurement is consistent with IQ, and that IQ can be seen as a form of “quasi-quantification.” But their response misses the mark. In this article I will argue how it misses the mark and it’s for these reasons: (1) they didn’t articulate the specified measured object, object of measurement and measurement unit for IQ and they overlooked the challenges that Berka discussed about mental measurement; (2) they ignored the lack of objectively reproducible measurement units; (3) they misinterpreted what Berka meant by “quasi-quantification” and then likening it to IQ; and (4) they failed to engage with Berka’s call for precision and reliability.
IQ, therefore, isn’t a measurable construct since there is no property being measured by IQ tests.
Brand et al’s arguments against Berka
The response from Brand et al to Berka’s critiques of mental measurement in the context of IQ raises critical concerns of Berka’s overarching analysis on measurement. So examining their arguments against Berka reveals a few shortcomings which undermine the central tenets of Berka’s thesis of measurement. From failing to articulate the fundamental components of IQ measurement, to overlooking the broader philosophical issues that Berka addressed, Brand et al’s response falls short in providing a comprehensive rebuttal to Berka’s thesis, and in actuality—despite the claims from Brand et al—Berka’s argument against mental measurement doesn’t lend credence to IQ measurement—it effectively destroys it, upon a close, careful reading of Berka (and then Nash).
(1) The lack of articulation of a specified measured object, object of measurement and measurement unit for IQ
This is critical for any claim that X is a measure and that Y is a measurement device—one needs to articulate the specified measured object, object of measurement and measurement unit for what they claim to be measuring. To quote Berka:
“If the necessary preconditions under which the object of measurement can be analyzed on a higher level of qualitative aspects are not satisfied, empirical variables must be related to more concrete equivalence classes of the measured objects. As a rule, we encounter this situation at the very onset of measurement, when it is not yet fully apparent to what sort of objects the property we are searching for refers, when its scope is not precisely delineated, or if we measure it under new conditions which are not entirely clarified operationally and theoretically. This situation is therefore mainly characteristic of the various cases of extra-physical measurement, when it is often not apparent what magnitude is, in fact, measured, or whether that which is measured really corresponds to our projected goals.” (Berka, 1983: 51)
“Both specific postulates of the theory of extraphysical measurement, scaling and testing – the postulates of validity and reliability – are then linked to the thematic area of the meaningfulness of measurement and, to a considerable extent, to the problem area of precision and repeatability. Both these postulates are set forth particularly because the methodologists of extra-physical measurement are very well aware that, unlike in physical measurement, it is here often not at all clear which properties are the actual object of measurement, more precisely, the object of scaling or counting, and what conclusions can be meaningfully derived from the numerical data concerning the assumed subject matter of investigation. Since the formulation, interpretation, and application of these requirements is a subject of very vivid discussion, which so far has not reached any satisfactory and more or less congruent conclusions, in our exposition we shall limit ourselves merely to the most fundamental characteristics of these postulates.” (Berka, 1983: 202-203)
“At any rate, the fact that, in the case of extraphysical measurement, we do not have at our disposal an objectively reproducible and significantly interpretable measurement unit, is the most convincing argument against the conventionalist view of a measurement, as well as against the anti-ontological position of operationalism, instrumentalism, and neopositivism.” (Berka, 1983: 211)
One glaring flaw—and I think it is the biggest—in Brand et al’s response is their failure to articulate the specified measured object, object of measurement and measurement unit for IQ. Berka’s insistence on precision in measurement requires a detailed conception of what IQ tests aim to measure—we know this is “IQ” or “intelligence” or “g“, but they then of course would have run into how to articulate and define it in a physical way. Berka emphasized that the concept of measurement demands precision in defining what is being measured (the specified measured object), the entity being measured (the object of measurement), and the unit applied for measurement (the measurement unit). Thus, for IQ to be a valid measure and for IQ tests to be a valid measurement device, it is crucial to elucidate exactly what the tests measure the nature of the mental attribute which is supposedly under scrutiny, and the standardized unit of measurement.
Berka’s insistence on precision aligns with a fundamental aspect of scientific measurement—the need for a well defined and standardized procedure to quantify a particular property. This is evidence for physical measurement, like the length of an object being measured using meters. But when transitioning to the mental, the challenge lies in actually measuring something that lacks a unit of measurement. (And as Richard Haier (2014) even admits, there is no measurement unit for IQ like inches, liters or grams.) So without a clear and standardized unit for mental properties, claims of measurement are therefore suspect—and impossible. Moreover, by sidestepping this crucial aspect of what Berka was getting at, their argument remains vulnerable to Berka’s foundational challenge regarding the essence of what is being measured along with how it is quantified.
Furthermore, Brand et al failed to grapple with what Berka wrote on mental measurement. Brand et al’s response would have been more robust if it had engaged with Berka’s exploration of the inherent intracacies and nuances involved in establishing a clear object of measurement for IQ, and any mental attributes.
Measurement units have to be a standardized and universally applicable quantity or physical property while allowing for standardized comparisons across different measures. And none exists for IQ, nor any other psychological trait. So we can safely argue that psychometrics isn’t measurement, even without touching contemporary arguments against mental measurement.
(2) Ignoring the lack of objectively reproducible measurement units
A crucial aspect of Berka’s critique involves the absence of objectively reproducible measurement units in the realm of measurement. Berka therefore contended that in the absence of such a standardized unit of measurement, the foundations for a robust enterprise of measurement are compromised. This is yet another thing that Brand et al overlooked in their response.
Brand et al’s response lacks a comprehensive examination of how the absence of objectively reproducible measurement units in mental measurement undermines the claim that IQ is a measure. They do not engage with Berka’s concern that the lack of such units in mental measurement actually hinders the claim that IQ is a measure. So the lack of attention to the absence of objectively reproducible measurement units in mental measurement actually weakens, and I think destroys, Brand et al’s response. They should have explored the ramifications of a so-called measure without a measurement unit. So this then brings me to their claims that IQ is a form of “quasi-quantification.”
(3) Misinterpretation of “quasi-quantification” and its application to IQ
Brand et al hinge their defense of IQ on Berka’s concept of “quasi-quantification”, which they misinterpret. Berka uses “quasi-quantification” to describe situations where the properties being measured lack the clear objectivity and standardization found in actual physical measurements. But Brand et al seem to interpret “quasi-quantification” as a justification for considering IQ as a valid form of measurement.
Brand et al’s misunderstanding of Berka’s conception of “quasi-quantification” is evidence in their attempt to equate it with a validation of IQ as a form of measurement. Berka was not endorsing it as a fully-fledged form of measurement, but he highlighted the limitations and distinctiveness compared to traditional quantification and measurement. Berka distinguishes between quantification, pseudo-quantification, and quasi-quantification. Berka explicitly states that numbering and scaling—in contrast to counting and measurement—cannot be regarded as kinds of quantification. (Note that “counting” in this framework isn’t a variety of measurement, since measurement is much more than enumeration, and counted elements in a set aren’t magnitudes.) Brand et al fail to grasp this nuanced difference, while mischaracterizing quasi-quantification as a blanket acceptance of IQ as a form of measurement.
Berka’s reservations of quasi-quantification are rooted in the challenges and complexities associated with mental properties, acknowledging that they fall short of the clear objectivity found in actual physical measurements. So Brand et al’s interpretation overlooks this critical aspect, which leads them to erroneously argue that accepting IQ as quasi-quantification is sufficient to justify its status as measurement.
Brand et al’s arguments against Nash
Nash’s book, on the other hand, is a much more accessible and pointed attack on the concept of IQ and it’s so-called “measurement.” He spends the book talking about the beginnings of IQ testing to the Flynn Effect, Berka’s argument and then ends with talking about test bias. IQ doesn’t have a true “0” point (like temperature, which IQ-ists have tried to liken to IQ, and the thermometer to IQ tests—there is no lawful property like the relation between mercury and temperature in a thermometer and IQ and intelligence, so again the hereditarian claim fails). But most importantly, Nash made the claim that there is actually no property to be measured by IQ tests—what did he mean by this?
Nash of course doesn’t deny that IQ tests rank individuals on their performance. So the claim that IQ is a metric property is already assumed in IQ theory. But the very fact that people are ranked doesn’t justify the claim that people are then ranked according to a property revealed by their performance (Nash, 1990: 134). Moreover, if intelligence/”IQ” were truly quantifiable, then the difference between 80 and 90 IQ and 110 and 120 IQ would represent the same cognitive difference between both groups of scores. But this isn’t the case.
Nash is a skeptic of the claim that IQ tests measure some property. (As I am.) So he challenges the idea that there is a distinct and quantifiable property that can be objectively measured by IQ tests (the construct “intelligence”). Nash also questions whether intelligence possesses the characteristics necessary for measurement—like a well-defined object of measurement and measurement unit. Nash successfully argued that intelligence cannot be legitimately expressed in a metric concept, since there is no true measurement property. But Brand et al do nothing to attack the arguments of Berka and Nash and they do not at all articulate the specified measured object, object of measurement and measurement unit for IQ, which was the heart of the critique. Furthermore, a precise articulation of the specified measured object when it comes to the metrication of X (any psychological trait) is necessary for the claim that X is a measure (along with articulating the object of measurement and measurement unit). But Brand et al did not address this in their response to Nash, which I think is very telling.
Brand et al do rightly note Nash’s key points, but they fall far, far from the mark in effectively mounting a sound argument against his view. Nash argues that IQ test results can only, at best, be used for ordinal comparisons of “less than, equal to, greater than” (which is also what Michell, 2022 argues, and the concludes the same as Nash). This is of course true, since people take a test and their performance is based on the type of culture they are exposed to (their cultural and psychological tools). Brand et al failed to acknowledge this and grapple with its full implications. But the issue is, Brand et al did not grapple at all with this:
The psychometric literature is full of plaintive appeals that despite all the theoretical difficulties IQ tests must measure something, but we have seen that this is an error. No precise specification of the measured object, no object of measurement, and no measurement unit, means that the necessary conditions for metrication do not exist. (Nash, 1990: 145)
All in all, a fair reading of both Berka and Nash will show that Brand et al slithered away from doing any actual philosophizing on the phenomena that Berka and Nash discussed. And, therefore, that their “response” is anything but.
Conclusion
Berka’s and Nash’s arguments against mental measurement/IQ show the insurmountable challenges that the peddlers of mental measurement have to contend with. Berka emphasized the necessity of clearly defining the measured object, object of measurement and measurement unit for a genuine quantitative measurement—these are the necessary conditions for metrication, and they are nonexistent for IQ. Nash then extended this critique to IQ testing, then concluding that the lack of a measurable property undermines the claim that IQ is a true measurement.
Brand et al’s response, on the other hand, was pitiful. They attempted to reconcile Berka’s concept of “quasi-quantification” with IQ measurement. Despite seemingly having some familiarity with both Berka’s and Nash’s arguments, they did not articulate the specified measured object, object of measurement and measurement unit for IQ. If Berka really did agree that IQ is “quasi-quantification”, then why did Brand et al not articulate what needs to be articulated?
When discussing Nash, Brand et al failed to address Nash’s claim that IQ can only IQ can only allow for ordinal comparisons. Nash emphasized numerous times in his book that an absence of a true measurement property challenges the claim that IQ can be measured. Thus, again, Brand et al’s response did not successfully and effectively engage with Nash’s key points and his overall argument against the possibility of intelligence/IQ (and mental measurement as a whole).
Berka’s and Nash’s critiques highlight the difficulties of treating intelligence (and psychological traits as a whole) as quantifiable properties. Brand et al did not adequately address and consider the issues I brought up above, and they outright tried to weasle their way into having Berka “agree” with them (on quasi-quantification). So they didn’t provide any effective counterargument against them, nor did they do the simplest thing they could have done—which was articulate the specified measured object, object of measurement and measurement unit for IQ. The very fact that there is no true “0” point is devestating for claims that IQ is a measure. I’ve been told on more than one occasion that “IQ is a unit-less measure”—but they doesn’t make sense. That’s just trying to cover for the fact that there is no measurement unit at all, and consequently, no specified measured object and object of measurement.
For these reasons, the Berka-Nash measurement objection remains untouched and the questions raised by them remain unanswered. (It’s simple: IQ-ists just need to admit that they can’t answer the challenge and that psychological traits aren’t measurable like physical traits. But then their whole worldview would crumble.) Maybe we’ll wait another 40 and 30 years for a response to the Berka-Nash measurement objection, and hopefully it will at least try harder than Brand et al did in their failure to address these conceptual issues raised by Berka and Nash.
Jensen’s Default Hypothesis is False: A Theory of Knowledge Acquisition
2000 words
Introduction
Jensen’s default hypothesis proposes that individual and group differences in IQ are primarily explained genetic factors. But Fagan and Holland (2002) question this hypothesis. For if differences in experience lead to differences in knowledge, and differences in knowledge lead to differences in IQ scores, then Jensen’s assumption that blacks and whites have the same opportunity to learn the content is questionable, and I’d think it false. It is obvious that there are differences in opportunity to acquire knowledge which would then lead to differences in IQ scores. I will argue that Jensen’s default hypothesis is false due to this very fact.
In fact, there is no good reason to accept Jensen’s default hypothesis and the assumptions that come with it. Of course different cultural groups are exposed to different kinds of knowledge, so this—and not genes—would explain why different groups score differently on IQ tests (tests of knowledge, even so-called culture-fair tests are biased; Richardson, 2002). I will argue that we need to reject Jensen’s default hypothesis on these grounds, because it is clear that groups aren’t exposed to the same kinds of knowledge, and so, Jensen’s assumption is false.
Jensen’s default hypothesis is false due to the nature of knowledge acquisition
Jensen (1998: 444) (cf Rushton and Jensen, 2005: 335) claimed that what he called the “default hypothesis” should be the null that needs to be disproved. He also claimed that individual and group differences are “composed of the same stuff“, in that they are “controlled by differences in allele frequencies” and that these differences in allele frequencies also exist for all “heritable” characters, and that we would find such differences within populations too. So if the default hypothesis is true, then it would suggest that differences in IQ between blacks and whites are primarily attributed to the same genetic and environmental influences that account for individual differences within each group. So this implies that genetic and environmental variances that contribute to IQ are therefore the same for blacks and whites, which supposedly supports the idea that group differences are a reflection of individual differences within each group.
But if the default hypothesis were false, then it would challenge the assumption that genetic and environmental influences in IQ between blacks and whites are proportionally the same as seen in each group. Thus, this allows us to talk about other causes of variance in IQ between blacks and whites—factors other than what is accounted for by the default hypothesis—like socioeconomic, cultural, and historical influences that play a more substantial role in explaining IQ differences between blacks and whites.
Fagan and Holland (2002) explain their study:
In the present study, we ensured that Blacks and Whites were given equal opportunity to learn the meanings of relatively novel words and we conducted tests to determine how much knowledge had been acquired. If, as Jensen suggests, the differences in IQ between Blacks and Whites are due to differences in intellectual ability per se, then knowledge for word meanings learned under exactly the same conditions should differ between Blacks and Whites. In contrast to Jensen, we assume that an IQ score depends on information provided to the learner as well as on intellectual ability. Thus, if differences in IQ between Blacks and Whites are due to unequal opportunity for exposure to information, rather than to differences in intellectual ability, no differences in knowledge should obtain between Blacks and Whites given equal opportunity to learn new information. Moreover, if equal training produces equal knowledge across racial groups, than the search for racial differences in IQ should not be aimed at the genetic bases of IQ but at differences in the information to which people from different racial groups have been exposed.
There are reasons to think that Jensen’s default hypothesis is false. For instance, since IQ tests are culture-bound—that is, culturally biased—then they are biased against a group so they therefore are biased for a group. Thus, this introduces a confounding factor which challenges the assumption of equal genetic and environmental influences between blacks and whites. And since we know that cultural differences in the acquisition of information and knowledge vary by race, then what explains the black-white IQ gap is exposure to information (Fagan and Holland, 2002, 2007).
The Default Hypothesis of Jensen (1998) assumes that differences in IQ between races are the result of the same environmental and genetic factors, in the same ratio, that underlie individual differences in intelligence test performance among the members of each racial group. If Jensen is correct, higher and lower IQ individuals within each racial group in the present series of experiments should differ in the same manner as had the African-Americans and the Whites. That is, in our initial experiment, individuals within a racial group who differed in word knowledge should not differ in recognition memory. In the second, third, and fourth experiments individuals within a racial group who differed in knowledge based on specific information should not differ in knowledge based on general information. The present results are not consistent with the default hypothesis.(Fagan and Holland, 2007: 326)
Historical and systematic inequalities could also lead to differences in knowledge acquisition. The existence of cultural biases in educational systems and materials can create disparities in knowledge acquisition. Thus, if IQ tests—which reflect this bias—are culture-bound, it also questions the assumption that the same genetic and environmental factors account for IQ differences between blacks and whites. The default hypothesis assumes that genetic and environmental influences are essentially the same for all groups. But SES/class differences significantly affect knowledge acquisition, so if challenges the default hypothesis.
For years I have been saying, what if all humans have the same potential but it just crystallizes differently due to differences in knowledge acquisition/exposure and motivation? There is a new study that shows that although some children appeared to learn faster than others, they merely had a head start in learning. So it seems that students have the same ability to learn and that so-called “high achievers” had a head start in learning (Koedinger et al, 2023). They found that students vary significantly in their initial knowledge. So although the students had different starting points (which showed the illusion of “natural” talents), they had more of a knowledge base but all of the students had a similar rate of learning. They also state that “Recent research providing human tutoring to increase student motivation to engage in difficult deliberate practice opportunities suggests promise in reducing achievement gaps by reducing opportunity gaps (63, 64).”
So we know that different experiences lead to differences in knowledge (it’s type and content), and we also know that racial groups for example have different experiences, of course, in virtue of their being different social groups. So these different experiences lead to differences in knowledge which are then reflected in the group IQ score. This, then, leads to one raising questions about the truth of Jensen’s default hypothesis described above. Thus, if individuals from different racial groups have unequal opportunities to be exposed to information, then Jensen’s default hypothesis is questionable (and I’d say it’s false).
Intelligence/knowledge crystalization is a dynamic process shaped by extensive practice and consistent learning opportunities. So the journey towards expertise involves iterative refinement with each practice opportunity contribute to the crystallization of knowledge. So if intelligence/knowledge crystallizes through extensive practice, and if students don’t show substantial differences in their rates of learning, then it follows that the crystalization of intelligence/knowledge is more reliant on the frequency and quality of learning opportunities than on inherent differences in individual learning rates. It’s clear that my position enjoys some substantial support. “It’s completely possible that we all have the same potential but it crystallizes differently based on motivation and experience.” The Fagan and Holland papers show exactly that in the context of the black-white IQ gap, showing that Jensen’s default hypothesis is false.
I recently proposed a non-IQ-ist definition of intelligence where I said:
So a comprehensive definition of intelligence in my view—informed by Richardson and Vygotsky—is that of a socially embedded cognitive capacity—characterized by intentionality—that encompasses diverse abilities and is continually shaped by an individual’s cultural and social interactions.
So I think that IQ is the same way. It is obvious that IQ tests are culture-bound and tests of a certain kind of knowledge (middle-class knowledge). So we need to understand how social and cultural factors shape opportunities for exposure to information. And per my definition, the idea that intelligence is socially embedded aligns with the notion that varying sociocultural contexts do influence the development of knowledge and cognitive abilities. We also know that summer vacation increases educational inequality, and that IQ decreases during the summer months. This is due to the nature of IQ and achievement tests—they’re different versions of the same test. So higher class children will return to school with an advantage over lower class children. This is yet more evidence in how knowledge exposure and acquisition can affect test scores and motivation, and how such differences crystallize, even though we all have the same potential (for learning ability).
Conclusion
So intelligence is a dynamic cognitive capacity characterized by intentionality, cultural context and social interactions. It isn’t a fixed trait as IQ-ists would like you to believe but it evolves over time due to the types of knowledge one is exposed to. Knowledge acquisition occurs through repeated exposure to information and intentional learning. This, then, challenges Jensen’s default hypothesis which attributes the black-white IQ gap primarily to genetics.Since diverse experiences lead to varied knowledge, and there is a certain type of knowledge in IQ tests, individuals with a broad range of life experiences varying performance on these tests which then reflect the types of knowledge one is exposed to during the course of their lives. So knowing what we know about blacks and whites being different cultural groups, and what we know about different cultures having different knowledge bases, then we can rightly state that disparities in IQ scores between blacks and whites are suggested to be due to environmental factors.
Unequal exposure to information creates divergent knowledge bases which then influence the score on the test of knowledge (IQ test). And since we now know that despite initial differences in initial performance that students have a surprising regularity in learning rates, this suggests that once exposed to information, the rate of knowledge acquisition remains consistent across individuals which then challenges the assumption of innate disparities in learning abilities. So the sociocultural context becomes pivotal in shaping the kinds of knowledge that people are exposed to. Cultural tools environmental factors and social interactions contribute to diverse cognitive abilities and knowledge domains which then emphasize the contextual nature of not only intelligence but performance in IQ tests. So what this shows is that test scores are reflective of the kinds of experience the testee was exposed to. So disparities in test scores therefore indicate differences in learning opportunities and cultural contexts
So a conclusive rejection of Jensen’s default hypothesis asserts that the black-white IQ gap is due to exposure to different types of knowledge. Thus, what explains disparities in not only blacks and whites but between groups is unequal opportunities to exposure of information—most importantly the type of information found on IQ tests. My sociocultural theory of knowledge acquisition and crystalization offers a compelling counter to hereditarian perspectives, and asserts that diverse experiences and intentionality learning efforts contribute to cognitive development. The claim that all groups or individuals are exposed to similar types of knowledge as Jensen assumes is false. By virtue of being different groups, they are exposed to different knowledge bases. Since this is true, and IQ tests are culture-bound and tests of a certain kind of knowledge, then it follows that what explains group differences in IQ and knowledge would therefore be differences in exposure to information.
What If Charles Darwin Never Existed and the Theory of Natural Selection Was Never Formulated?
2200 words
Introduction
Let’s say that we either use a machine to teleport to another reality where Darwin didn’t exist or one where he died early, before formulating the theory of natural selection (ToNS). Would our evolutionary knowledge suffer? Under what pretenses could we say that our evolutionary knowledge wouldn’t suffer? Well, since Darwin humbly stated that what he said wasn’t original and that he just assembled numerous pieces of evidence to cohere to make his ToNS, then obviously we know that species changed over time. That’s what evolution is—change over time—and Darwin, in formulating his ToNS, attempted to prove that it was a mechanism of evolutionary change. But if Darwin never existed or if the ToNS was never formulated by him, I don’t think that our evolutionary knowledge would suffer. This is because people before Darwin observed that species change over time, like Lamarck and Darwin’s grandfather, Erasmus Darwin.
So in this article I will argue that had Darwin not existed or died young and had not formulated the ToNS, we would still have adequate theories of speciation, trait fixation and evolutionary change and processes, since naturalists at the time knew that species changed over time. I will discuss putative mechanisms of evolutionary change and show that without Darwin or the ToNS that we would still be able to have coherent theories of speciation events and trait fixation. Mechanisms like genetic drift, mutation and neutral evolution, environmental constraints, Lamarckian mechanisms, epigenetic factors, and ecological interactions would have been some plausible mechanisms sans Darwin and his ToNS even in the modern day as our scientific knowledge advanced without Darwin.
What if Darwin never existed?
For years I have been critical of Darwin’s theory of natural selection as being a mechanism for evolutionary change since it can’t distinguish between causes and correlates of causes. I was convinced by Fodor’s (2008) argument and Fodor and Piattelli-Palmarini’s (2010) argument in What Darwin Got Wrong that Darwin was wrong about natural selection being a mechanism of evolutionary change. I even recently published an article on alternatives to natural selection (which will be the basis of the argument in this article).
So, if Darwin never existed, how would the fact that species can change over time (due to, for instance, selective breeding) be explained? Well, before Charles Darwin, we had his grandfather Erasmus Darwin and Jean Baptiste Lamarck, of Lamarckian inheritance fame. So if Charles Darwin didn’t exist, there would still be enough for a theory of evolution had Darwin not been alive to formulate the ToNS.
We now know that Charles did read Erasmus’ The Temple of Nature (TToN) (1803) due to the annotations in his copy, and that the TOnF bore resemblance not to Darwin’s On the Origin of Species, but to The Descent of Man (Hernandez-Avilez and Ruiz-Guttierez, 2023). So although it is tentative, we know that Charles had knowledge of Erasmus’ writings on evolution. But before TToN, Erasmus wrote Zoonomia (1794), where he proposed a theory of common descent and also speculated on the transmutation of species over time. Being very prescient for the time he was writing in, he also discussed how the environment can influence the development of organisms, and how variations in species can arise due to the environment (think directed mutations). Erasmus also discussed the concept of use and disuse—where traits that an organism would use more would develop while traits they would use less would diminish over time—which was then a pre-cursor to Lamarck’s thoughts.
An antecedent to the “struggle for existence” is seen in Erasmus’ 1794 work Zoonomia (p. 503) (which Darwin underlined in his annotations, see Hernandez-Avilez and Ruiz-Guttierez, 2023):
The birds, which do not carry food to their young, and do not therefore marry, are armed with spurs for the purpose of fighting for the exclusive possession of the females, as cocks and quails. It is certain that these weapons are not provided for their defence against other adversaries, because the females of these species are without this armour. The final cause of this contest amongst the males seems to be, that the strongest and most active animal should propagate the species, which should thence become improved.
Jean Baptiste Lamarck wrote Philosophie Zoologique (Philosophical Zoology) in 1809. His ideas on evolution were from the same time period as Erasmus’, and they discussed similar subject matter. Lamarck believed that nature could explain species differentiation, and that behavioral changes which were environmentally induced could explain changes in species eventually leading to speciation. Lamarck’s first law was that use or disue would cause appendages to enlarge or shrink while his second law was that the changes in question were heritable. We also know that in many cases that development precedes evolution (West-Eberhard, 2005; Richardson, 2017) so these ideas in the modern day along with the observations to show they’re true also lend credence to Lamarck’s ideas.
First Law: In every animal that has not reached the end of its development, the more frequent and sustained use of any organ will strengthen this organ little by little, develop it, enlarge it, and give to it a power proportionate to the duration of its use; while the constant disuse of such an organ will insensibly weaken it, deteriorate it, progressively diminish its faculties, and finally cause it to disappear.
Second Law: All that nature has caused individuals to gain or lose by the influence of the circumstances to which their race has been exposed for a long time, and, consequently, by the influence of a predominant use or constant disuse of an organ or part, is conserved through generation in the new individuals descending from them, provided that these acquired changes are common to the two sexes or to those which have produced these new individuals (Lamarck 1809, p. 235). [Quoted in Burkhardt Jr., 2013]
Basically, Lamarck’s idea was that acquired traits during an organism’s lifetime could be passed onto descendants. If an organism developed a particular trait in response to its environment, then that trait could be inherited by its descendants. He was also one of the first—along with Erasmus—to go against the accepted wisdom of the time and propose that species could change over time and that they weren’t fixed. Basically, I think that Lamarck’s main idea was that the environment could have considerable effects on the evolution of species, and that these environmentally-induced changes could be heritable.
Well today, we have evidence that Lamarck was right, for example with the discovery and experiments showing that directed mutation is a thing. There was a lot that Lamarck got right and which has been integrated into the current evolutionary theory. We also know that there is evidence that “parental environment-induced epigenetic alterations are transmitted through both the maternal and paternal germlines and exert sex-specific effects” (Wang, Liu, and Sun, 2017). So we can then state Lamarck’s dictum: environmental change leads to behavioral change which leads to morphological change (Ward, 2018) (and with what we know about how the epigenetic regulation of the transposable elements regulates punctuated equilibrium, see Zeh, Zeh, and Ishida, 2009, we have a mechanism that can lead to this). And since we know that environmental epigenetics and transgenerational epigenetic provides mechanisms for Lamarck’s proposed process (Skinner, 2015), it seems that Lamarck has been vindicated. Indeed, Lamarckian inheritance is now seen as a mechanism of evolutionary change today (Koonin, 2014).
So knowing all of this, what if Charles Darwin never existed? How would the course of evolutionary theory be changed? We know that Darwin merely put the pieces of the puzzle together (from animal breeding, to the thought that transmutation could occur, etc.), but I won’t take anything away from Darwin, since even though I think he was wrong on a mechanism of evolution being natural selection, he did a lot of good work to put the pieces of the puzzle together into a theory of evolution that—at the time—could explain the fixation of traits and speciation (though I think that there are other ways to show that without relying on natural selection). The components of the theory that Darwin proposed were all there, but he was the one that coalesced them into a theory (no matter if it was wrong or not). Non-Darwinian evolution obviously was “the in thing” in the 19th century, and I don’t see how or why it would change. But Bowler (2013) argues that Alfred Russell Wallace would have articulated a theory of nature selection based on competition between varieties, not individuals as Darwin did. He argues that an equivalent of Darwin’s ToNS wouldn’t have been articulated until one recognized the similarities between what would become natural selection and artificial selection (where humans attempt to consciously select for traits) (Bowler, 2008). Though I do think that the ToNS is wrong, false, and incoherent, I do recognize how one would think that it’s a valid theory in explaining the evolution of species and the fixation of traits in biological populations. (Though I do of course think that my proposed explanation in linking saltation, internal physiological mechanisms and decimationism would have played a part in a world without Charles Darwin in explaining what we see around us.)
Now I will sketch out how I think our understanding of evolutionary theory would go had Charles Darwin not existed.
Although Lamarckism was pretty much discredited when Darwin articulated the ToNS (although Darwin did take to some of Lamarck’s ideas), the Lamarckian emphasis of the role of the environment shaping the traits of organisms would have persisted and remained influential. Darwin was influenced by many different observations that were known before he articulated his theory, and so even if Darwin didn’t exist to articulate the ToNS, the concept that species changed over time (that is, the concept that species evolved) was persistent before Darwin’s observations which led to his theory, along with the numerous lines of evidence that led Darwin to formulating the ToNS after his voyage on The Beagle. So while Darwin’s work did accelerate the exceptance of evolution, it is therefore very plausible that other mechanisms that don’t rely on selection would have been articulated. Both Erasmus and Lamarck had a kind of teleology in their thinking, which is alive today in modern conceptions of the EES like in that of arguments forwarded by Denis Noble (Noble and Noble, 2020, 2022) Indeed, Lamarck was one of the first to propose a theory of change over time.
Punctuated equilibrium (PE) can also be integrated with these ideas. PE is where rapid speciation events occur and then there is a period of stasis, and this can then be interpreted as purposeful evolutionary change based on the environment (similar to directed mutations). So each punctuated episode could align with Lamarck’s idea that organisms actively adapt to specific conditions, and it could also play a role in explaining the inheritance of acquired characters. So organisms could rapidly acquire traits due to environmental cues thsg the embryo’s physiology detects (since physiology is homeodynamic), there would be a response to the environmental change, and this would then contribute to the bursts of evolutionary change. Further, in periods of stasis, it could be inferred that there would be really no changing in the environment—not enough anyway, to lead to the change in the traits of a species—and so organisms would have been in equilibrium with their environment minting the traits until a new change in the environmental challenges triggered a burst of evolutionary change which would kick the species out of stasis and lead to punctuated events of evolutionary change. Therefore, this model (which is a holistic approach) would allow for a theory of evolution in which it is responsive, directed, and linked with the striving of organisms in their environmental context.
Conclusion
So in a world without Charles Darwin, the evolutionary narrative would have been significantly shaped by Erasmus and Lamarck. This alternative world would focus on Lamarckian concepts, the idea of transmutation over time, purposeful adaptation over time along with directed mutations and the integration of PE with these other ideas to give us a fuller and better understanding of how organisms change over time—that is, how organisms evolve. The punctuated episodic bursts of evolutionary change can be interpreted as purposeful evolutionary change based on Lamarckian concepts. Environmental determinism and stability shape the periods between bursts of change. And since we know that organisms in fact can adapt to complex, changing environments due to their physiology (Richardson, 2020), eventually as our scientific knowledge advanced we would then come to this understanding.
Therefore, the combination of Erasmus’ and Lamarck’s ideas would have provided a holistic, non-reductive narrative to explain the evolution of species. While I do believe that someone would have eventually articulated something similar to Darwin’s ToNS, I think that it would have been subsumed under the framework of built off of Erasmus and Lamarck. So there was quite obviously enough evolutionary thought and ideas before Darwin for there to be a relevant and explanatory theory of evolution had Darwin not been alive to formulate the ToNS, and this shows how such mechanisms to explain the origin of life, speciation, and trait fixation would have occurred, even in the absence of Darwin.
NotPoliticallyCorrect 