1500 words

Introduction

For years HBDers like JayMan and hbdchick have insinuated that differences in culture are due to differences in genes. They basically reduce culture to genes (like the “good reductionists” they are). But if certain things are true about human culture and therefore thought and action, then that would throw a wrench into their insinuation here.

I will show that their ultimate claim—differences in culture are due to differences in genes—is unfounded and I will then show where culture DOES come from based on what we know about human culture, thought, and action. All in all, this will refute the reductionist HBD claim about culture and genes.

The argument

P1: All human expression is thought and action.
P2: Culture is human expression.
C: Therefore culture is thought and action.
P3: Thoughts are immaterial.
P4: Actions are products of thoughts.
C2: So human culture cannot be reduced to genes.

P1 claims that human expression can be broken down into cognitive processes (thought) and physical manifestations (the actions that lead to physical changes in the world based on the intention of the human’s thought). Every form of human expression begins with a thought and an action. P2 claims that culture encompasses beliefs, behaviors, values and symbols, which then define a cultural (ethnic) group. So since these elements are expressed by humans, then culture is inherently a form of human expression. C then logically follows.

P3 is then the dualist premise, which states that thoughts aren’t physical—they’re immaterial. Just refer to the Ross-Feser immaterial aspects of thought argument. Thoughts precede and cause actions – actions have purpose and intent derived from thought. If one acts, then they thought about it first (since actions are intentional) so P4 is true. So from 3 and 4, we understand that thoughts are immaterial and actions come from thoughts. So if culture is thought and action, and these elements are not material like genes, then it follows that culture cannot be reduced to genes.

But where DOES culture come from?

In a 2013 comment, JayMan (in his typical reductionist fashion) wrote:

First of all, let’s stop right here. Where does “culture” come from?

The answer: All human behavioral traits are heritable.

[And even on 12/27/24 writing on Twitter]

Culture *is* genetic. Where does culture come from? You know that all human behavioral traits are heritable, right?

Typical JayMan nonsense (see here for a refutation of the “laws of behavioral genetics“). Culture is an emergent property based on minds, socialization, and the immediate ecology that the group finds itself it. Of course the adaptability and diffusion of cultural change occurring so quickly, nowhere near the timeframe for genetic change, shows that culture isn’t merely (nor at all) due to the expression of genes, but is a dynamic, irreducible human construct. Since I have established that culture is thought and action due to it being an outcome of human expression, this sets the stage for the refutation of the claim that cultural differences are due to genetic differences. So culture is more about human agency, social interactions, and the physical ecology the human group finds themselves in.

The question “Where does culture come from?” is a loaded one, since the HBDers oversimplify culture as being due to genes and they also imply that since ethnies have genetic differences and also cultural differences that this can therefore be reduced to genetic differences between these groups.

The claim that culture is genetic could imply that genes would predispose groups of people to engage in certain kinds of culture. But this betrays an important point, namely that culture is highly dynamic, and influenced by numerous factors such as education, environment, historical context, and social interactions. So if we understand culture we being what is SOCIALLY TRANSMITTED across generations, then the JayMan/hbdchick question quickly crumbles. Culture is “human-created environment, artifacts, and practices” (Vasileva and Balyasnikova, 2019).

Under a Vygotskian conception, cultural practices and knowledge are passed down and developed through social—not genetic—means. Being that culture is transmitted through language, symbols, signs, and artifacts, they then mediate human cognitive processes and influence how people think and act. Thus, culture is constructed through the use of these specific tools, and is NOT an expression of a group’s genes. Since people internalize cultural patterns through social learning, what start as external and social activities then become internalized (think of the concept of private speech). Thus, this undermines the idea that culture is genetic, since it shows culture as something they’d learned, adapted, and integrated into one’s cognitive framework through social interactions (more specifically, social interactions with more knowledgeable others). Since human development is historically situated, this means that the cultural context that one grows and develops in shapes one’s cognitive and behavioral development. This shows how culture changes over time, too quickly for the genetic explanation to work.

The emphasis of social and cultural learning shows us that cultural traits cannot possible be “genetically encoded” (whatever that means). So if culture is learned through social interactions and mediated by cultural tools, then the diversity and change in cultures are better explained by social dynamics rather than genetic (pre-)dispositions. So variation in cultural practices across or within societies can be seen as the result of different social environments, educational systems and historical events rather than going the genetic reductionist/deterministic route. Using Vygotsky’s theory here allows us to focus on how people engage with their cultural environment. The theory also shows the role of human agency in cultural creation and change, which suggests that humans are active participants in cultural evolution.

With this, I am reminded of Gould’s argument in Full House (1996) where he argues that cultural phenomena should be considered on their own and not be considered mere extensions of biological processes and systems.

But human cultural change is an entirely distinct process operating under radically different principals that do allow for the strong possibility of a driven trend for what we may legitamately call “progress” (at least in a technological sense, whether or not the changes ultimately do us any good in a practical or moral way). In this sense, I deeply regret that common usage refers to the history of our artifacts and social orginizations as “cultural evolution.” Using the same term—evolution—for both natural and cultural history obfuscates far more than it enlightens. Of course, some aspects of the two phenomena must be similar, for all processes of genealogically constrained historical change must share some features in common. But the differences far outweigh the similarities in this case. Unfortunately, when we speak of “cultural evolution,” we unwittingly imply that this process shares essential similarity with the phenomenon most widely described by the same name—natural, or Darwinian, change. The common designation of “evolution” then leads to one of the most frequent and portentious errors in our analysis of human life and history—the overly reductionist assumption that the Darwinian natural paradigm will fully encompass our social and technological history as well. I do wish that the term “cultural evolution” would drop from use. Why not speak of something more neutral and descriptive—“cultural change,” for example?

Culture is directed and intentional, and thus cannot be due to genes. So the HBD question “Where does culture come from?” doesn’t lead to the answer they want—it leads to differences in environment, and human agency and social interactions between people.

Conclusion

From the premises that all human expression is thought and action, and that culture is human expression, I have established that culture is not merely due to genes (at all), but is a dynamically-shaped social process, driven by cognitive processes and the choices that people make in their groups and the environments they live in. The argument shows that the wishful thinking of HBDers like JayMan and hbdchick don’t have a basis in reality. So by showing that thoughts are immaterial and actions stem from thoughts, I’ve shown that cultural practices cannot be genetically inherited/caused, but are learned, adapted, and transmitted through social means.

We know that cultural development is a social process and transmitted and transformed through social interactions, language, and education which are external to genetics. Cultural learning also takes place in a zone of proximal development, where individuals internalize social interactions and cultural patterns and processes, which also shows that the JayMan/hbdchick claim is ridiculous. Adding in Gould’s critique, cultural change operates under different principles from biological evolution. Gould’s critique shows that while biological and cultural change do share certain features (historical change), the  mechanisms behind cultural shifts are unique, which supports the view that human culture is due to human agency, social dynamics and technological progress rather than being due to genes.

Like with all aspects mind, genes (physical) are NECESSARY for these things to happen, but they are not SUFFICIENT for them. Genetic reductionism is outright false. The claim that “Culture is genetic” is therefore refuted.