Race, Racism, Stereotypes, and Crime: An Argument for Why Racism is Morally Wrong
2300 words
Introduction
(1) Crime is bad. (2) Racism causes crime. (C) Thus, racism is morally wrong. (1) is self-evident based on people not wanting to be harmed. (2) is known upon empirical examination, like the TAAO and it’s successful novel predictions. (C) then logically follows. In this article, I will give the argument in formal notation and show its validity while defending the premises and then show how the conclusion follows from the premises. I will then discuss two possible counter arguments and then show how they would fail. I will show that you can derive normative conclusions from ethical and factual statements (which then bypasses the naturalistic fallacy), and then I will give the general argument I am giving here. I will discuss other reasons why racism is bad (since it leads to negative physiological and mental health outcomes), and then conclude that the argument is valid and sound and I will discuss how stereotypes and self-fulfilling prophecies also contribute to black crime.
Defending the argument
This argument is obviously valid and I will show how.
B stands for “crime is bad”, C stands for “racism causes crime”, D stands for racism is objectively incorrect, so from B and C we derive D (if C causes B and B is bad, then D is morally wrong). So the argument is “(B ^ C) -> D”. B and C lead to D, proving validity.
Saying “crime is bad” is an ethical judgement. The term “bad” is used as a moral or ethical judgment. “Bad” implies a negative ethical assessment which suggests that engaging in criminal actions is morally undesirable or ethically wrong. The premise asserts a moral viewpoint, claiming that actions that cause harm—including crime—are inherently bad. It implies a normative stance which implies that criminal behavior is wrong or morally undesirable. So it aligns with the idea that causing harm, violating laws or infringing upon others is morally undesirable.
When it comes to the premise “racism causes crime”, this needs to be centered on the theory of African American offending (TAAO). It’s been established that blacks experiencing racism is causal for crime. So the premise implies that racism is a factor in or contributes to criminal behavior amongst blacks who experience racism. Discriminatory practices based on race (racism) could lead to social inequalities, marginalization and frustration which would then contribute to criminal behavior among the affected person. This could also highlight systemic issues where racist policies or structures create an environment conducive to crime. And on the individual level, experiences of racism could influence certain individuals to engage in criminal activity as a response or coping mechanism (Unnever, 2014; Unnever, Cullen, and Barnes, 2016). Perceived racial discrimination “indirectly predicted arrest, and directly predicted both illegal behavior and jail” (Gibbons et al, 2021). Racists propose that what causes the gap is a slew of psychological traits, genetic factors, and physiological variables, but even in the 1960s, criminologists and geneticists rejected the genetic hypothesis of crime (Wolfgang,1964). However we do know there is a protective effect when parents prepare their children for bias (Burt, Simons, and Gibbons, 2013). Even the role of institutions exacerbates the issue (Hetey and Eberhardt, 2014). And in my article on the Unnever-Gabbidon theory of African American offending, I wrote about one of the predictions that follows from the theory which was borne out when it was tested.
So it’s quite obvious that the premise “racism causes crime” has empirical support.
So if B and C are true then D follows. The logical connection between B and C leads to the conclusion that “racism is morally wrong”, expressed by (B ^ C) -> D. Now I can express this argument using modus ponens.
(1) If (B ^ C) then D. (Expressed as (B ^ C) -> D).
(2) (B ^ C) is true.
(3) Thus, D is true.
When it comes to the argument as a whole it can be generalized to harm is bad and racism causes harm so racism is bad.
Furthermore, I can generalize the argument further and state that not only that crime is bad, but that racism leads to psychological harm and harm is bad, so racism is morally wrong. We know that racism can lead to “weathering” (Geronimus et al, 2006, 2011; Simons, 2021) and increased allostatic load (Barr 2014: 71-72). So racism leads to a slew of unwanted physiological issues (of which microaggressions are a species of; Williams, 2021).
Racism leads to negative physiological and mental health outcomes (P), and negative physiological and mental health outcomes are undesirable (Q), so racism is morally objectionable (R). So the factual statement (P) establishes a link between negative health outcomes, providing evidence that racism leads to these negative health outcomes. The ethical statement (Q) asserts that negative health outcomes are morally undesirable which aligns with a common ethical principle that causing harm is morally objectionable. Then the logical connection (Q ^ P) combines the factual observation of harm caused by racism with the ethical judgment that harm is morally undesirable. Then the normative conclusion (R) follows, which asserts that racial is morally objectionable since it leads to negative health outcomes. So this argument is (Q ^ P) -> R.
Racism can lead to stereotyping of certain groups as more prone to criminal behavior, and this stereotype can be internalized and perpetuated which would then contribute to biased law enforcement and along with it unjust profiling. It can also lead to systemic inequalities like in education, employment and housing which are then linked to higher crime rates (in this instance, racism and stereotyping causes the black-white crime gap, as predicted by Unnever and Gabbidon, 2011 and then verified by numerous authors). Further, as I’ve shown, racism can negatively affect mental health leading to stress, anxiety and trauma and people facing these challenges would be more vulnerable to engage in criminal acts.
Stereotypes and self-fulfilling prophecies
In his book Concepts and Theories of Human Development, Lerner (2018: 298) discusses how stereotyping and self-fulfilling prophecies would arise from said stereotyping. He says that people, based on their skin color, are placed into an unfavorable category. Then negative behaviors were attributed to the group. Then these behaviors were associated with different experience in comparison to other skin color groups. These different behaviors then delimit the range of possible behaviors that could develop. So the group was forced into a limited number of possible behaviors, the same behaviors they were stereotyped to have. So the group finally develops the behavior due to being “channeled” (to use Lerner’s word) which is then “the end result of the physically cued social stereotype was a self-fulfilling prophecy” (Lerner, 2018: 298).
From the analysis of the example I provided and, as well, from empirical literature in support of it (e.g., Spencer, 2006; Spencer et al., 2015), a strong argument can be made that the people of color in the United States have perhaps experienced the most unfortunate effects of this most indirect type of hereditary contribution to behavior–social stereotypes. Thus, it may be that African Americans for many years have been involved in an educational and intellectual self-fulfilling prophecy in the United States. (Lerner, 2018: 299)
This is an argument about how social stereotypes can spur behavioral development, and it has empirical support. Lerner’s claim that perception influences behavior is backed by Spencer, Swanson and Harpalani’s (2015) article on the development of the self and Spencer, Dupree, and Hartman’s (1997) phenomenological variant of ecological systems theory (PVEST). (Also see Cunningham et al, 2023). Spencer, Swanson and Harpalani (2015: 764) write:
Whether it is with images of the super-athlete, criminal, gangster, or hypersexed male, it seems that most of society’s views of African Americans are defined by these stereotypes. The Black male has, in one way or another, captured the imagination of the media to such a wide extent that media representations create his image far more than reality does. Most of the images of the Black male denote physical prowess or aggression and downplay other characteristics. For example, stereotypes of Black athletic prowess can be used to promote the notion that Blacks are unintelligent (Harpalani, 2005). These societal stereotypes, in conjunction with numerous social, political, and economic forces, interact to place African American males at extreme risk for adverse outcomes and behaviors.
A -> B—So stereotypes can lead to self-fulfilling prophecies (if there are stereotypes, then they can result in self-fulfilling prophecies). B -> C—Self-fulfilling prophecies can increase the chance of crime for blacks (if there are self-fulfilling prophecies, then they can increase the chance of crime for blacks. So A -> C—Stereotypes can increase the chance of crime for blacks (if there are stereotypes, then they can increase the chance of crime for blacks). Going back to the empirical studies on the TAAO, we know that racism and stereotypes cause the black-white crime gap (Unnever, 2014; Unnever, Cullen, and Barnes, 2016; Herda, 2016, 2018; Scott and Seal, 2019), and so the argument by Spencer et al and Lerner is yet more evidence that racism and stereotypes lead to self-fulfilling prophecies which then cause black crime. Behavior can quite clearly be shaped by stereotypes and self-fulfilling prophecies.
Responses to possible counters
I think there are 3 ways that one could try to refute the argument—(1) Argue that B is false, (2) argue that C is false, or (3) argue that the argument commits the is-ought fallacy.
(1) Counter premise: B’: “Not all crimes are morally bad, some may be morally justifiable or necessary in certain contexts. So if not all crimes are morally bad, then the conclusion that racism is morally wrong based on the premises (B ^ C) isn’t universally valid.”
Premise B reflects a broad ethical judgment which is based on social norms that generally view actions that cause harm morally undesirable. My argument is based on consequences—that racism causes crime. The legal systems of numerous societies categorize certain actions as crimes since they are deemed morally reprehensible and harmful to individuals and communities. Thus, there is a broad moral stance against actions that cause harm which is reflected in the societal normative stance against actions which cause harm.
(2) Counter premise: C’: “Racism does not necessarily cause crime. Since racism does not necessarily cause crime, then the conclusion that racism is objectively wrong isn’t valid.”
Premise C states that racism causes crime. When I say that, it doesn’t mean that every instance of racism leads to an instance of crime. Numerous social factors contribute to criminal actions, but there is a relationship between racial discrimination (racism) and crime:
Experiencing racial discrimination increases the likelihood of black Americans engaging in criminal actions. How does this follow from the theory? TAAO posits that racial discrimination can lead to feelings of frustration and marginalization, and to cope with these stressors, some individuals may resort to commuting criminal acts as a way to exert power or control in response to their experiences of racial discrimination. (Unnever, 2014; Unnever, Cullen, and Barnes, 2016; Herda, 2016, 2018; Scott and Seal, 2019)
(3) “The argument commits the naturalistic fallacy by inferring an “ought” from an “is.” It appears to derive a normative conclusion from factual and ethical statements. So the transition from descriptive premises to moral judgments lacks a clear ethical justification which violates the naturalistic fallacy.” So this possible counter contends that normative statement B and the ethical statement C isn’t enough to justify the normative conclusion D. Therefore it questions whether the argument has good justification for an ethical transition to the conclusion D.”
I can simply show this. Observe X causing Y (C). Y is morally undesirable (B). Y is morally undesirable and X causes Y (B ^ C). So X is morally objectionable (D). So C begins with an empirical finding. B then is the ethical premise. The logical connection is then established with B ^ C (which can be reduced to “Harm is morally objectionable and racism causes harm”). This then allows me to infer the normative conclusion—D—allowing me to bypass the charge of committing the naturalistic fallacy. Thus, the ethical principle that harm is morally undesirable and that racism causes harm allows me to derive the conclusion that racism is objectively wrong. So factual statements can be combined with ethical statements to derive ethical conclusions, bypassing the naturalistic fallacy.
Conclusion
This discussion centered on my argument (B ^ C) -> D. The argument was:
(P1) Crime is bad (whatever causes harm is bad). (B)
(P2) Racism causes crime. (C)
(C) Racism is morally wrong. (D)
I defended the truth of both premises, and then I answered two possible objections, both rejecting B and C. I then defended my argument against the charge of it committing the naturalistic fallacy by stating that ethical statements can be combined with factual statements to derive normative conclusions. Addressing possible counters (C’ and B’), I argued that there is evidence that racism leads to crime (and other negative health outcomes, generalized as “harm”) in black Americans, and that harm is generally seen as bad, so it then follows that C’ and B’ fail. Spencer’s and Lerner’s arguments, furthermore, show how stereotypes can spur behavioral development, meaning that social stereotypes increase the chance of adverse behavior—meaning crime. It is quite obvious that the TAAO has strong empirical support, and so since crime is bad and racism causes crime then racism is morally wrong. So to decrease the rate of black crime we—as a society—need to change our negative attitudes toward certain groups of people.
Thus, my argument builds a logical connection between harm being bad, racism causing harm and moral undesirability. In addressing potential objections and clarifying the ethical framework I ren, So the general argument is: Harm is bad, racism causes harm, so racism is morally wrong.
The Rockefeller Foundation’s Failure in Finding a General Intelligence Factor in Dogs
2000 words
Introduction
Hereditarians have been trying to prove the existence of a genetic basis of intelligence for over 100 years. In this time frame, they have used everything from twin, family and adoption studies to tools from the molecular genetics era like GCTA and GWAS. Using heritability estimates, behavior geneticists claim that since intelligence is highly heritable, that there must thusly be a genetic basis to intelligence controlled by many genes of small effect, meaning it’s highly polygenic.
In his outstanding book Misbehaving Science, Panofsky (2014) discusses an attempt funded by the Rockefeller Foundation (RF) at showing a genetic basis to dog intelligence to prove that intelligence had a genetic basis. But it didn’t end up working out for them—in fact, it showed the opposite. The investigation which was funded by the RF showed quite the opposite result that they were looking for—while they did find evidence of some genetic differences between the dog breeds studied, they didn’t find evidence for the existence of a “general factor of intelligence” in the dogs. This issue was explored in Scott and Fuller’s 1965 book Genetics and the Social Behavior of the Dog. These researchers, though, outright failed in their task to discover a “general intelligence” in dogs. Modern-day research also corroborates this notion.
The genetic basis of dog intelligence?
This push to breed a dog that was highly intelligent was funded by the Rockefeller Foundation for ten years at the Jackson Laboratory. Panofsky (2014: 55) explains:
Over the next twenty years many scientists did stints at Jackson Laboratory working on its projects or attending its short courses and training programs. These projects and researchers produced dozens of papers, mostly concerning dogs and mice, that would form much of the empirical base of the emerging field. In 1965 Scott and John Fuller, his research partner, published Genetics and the Social Behavior of the Dog. It was the most important publication to come out of the Jackson Lab program. Scott and Fuller found many genetic differences between dog breeds; they did not find evidence for general intelligence or temperament. Dogs would exhibit different degrees of intelligence or temperamental characteristics depending on the situation. This evidence of interaction led them to question the high heritability of human intelligence—thus undermining a goal of the Rockefeller Foundation sponsors who had hoped to discredit the idea that intelligence was the product of education. Although the behavioral program at Jackson Laboratory declined after this point, it had been the first important base for the new field.
Quite obviously this was the opposite result of what they wanted—dog intelligence was based on the situation and therefore context-dependent.
Scott and Fuller (1965) discuss how they used to call their tests “intelligence tests” but then switched to calling them “performance tests”, “since the animals
seemed to solve their problems in many ways other than through pure thought or
intellect” (Scott and Fuller 1965: 37), while also writing that “no evidence was found for a general factor of intelligence which would produce good performance on all tests” (1965, 328). They also stated that they found nothing like the general intelligence factor in dogs like that is found in humans (1965: 472) while also stating that it’s a “mistaken notion” to believe in the general intelligence factor (1965: 512). They then conclude, basically, that situationism is valid for dogs, writing that their “general impression is that an individual from any dog breed will perform well in a situation in which he can be highly motivated and for which he has the necessary physical capacities” (1965: 512). Indeed, Scott noted that due to the heritability estimates of dog intelligence Scott came to the conclusion that human heritability estimates “are far too high” (quoted in Paul, 1998: 279). This is something that even Schonemann (1997) noted—and it’s “too high” due to the inflation of heritability due to the false assumptions of twin studies, which lead to the missing heritability crisis. One principle finding was that genetic differences didn’t appear early in development, which were then molded by further experience in the world. Behavior was highly variable between individuals and similar within breeds.
The results were quite unexpected but scientifically exciting. During the very early stages of development there was so little behavior observed that there was little opportunity for genetic differences to be expressed. When the complex patterns of behavior did appear, they did not show pure and uncontaminated effects of heredity. Instead, they were extraordinarily variable within an individual and surprisingly similar between individuals. In short, the evidence supported the conclusion that genetic differences in behavior do not appear all at once early in development, to be modified by later experience, but are themselves developed under the influence of environmental factors and may appear in full flower only relatively late in life. (Scott and Fuller, 1965)
The whole goal of this study by the Jackson Lab was to show that there was a genetic basis to intelligence in dogs and that they therefore could breed a dog that was intelligent and friendly (Paul, 1998). They also noted that there was no breed which was far and above the best at the task in question. Scott and Fuller found that performance on their tests was strongly affected by motivational and emotional factors. They also found that breed differences were strongly influenced by the environment, where two dogs from different breeds became similar when raised together. We know that dogs raised with cats showed more favorable disposition towards them (Fox, 1958; cf Feuerstein and Terkel, 2008, Menchetti et al, 2020). Scott and Fuller (1965: 333) then concluded that:
On the basis of the information we now have, we can conclude that all breeds show about the same average level of performance in problem solving, provided they can be adequately motivated, provided physical differences and handicaps do not affect the tests, and provided interfering emotional reactions such as fear can be eliminated. In short, all the breeds appear quite similar in pure intelligence.
The issue is that by believing that heritability shows anything about how “genetic” a trait is, one then inters that there has to be a genetic basis to the trait in question, and that the higher the estimate, the more strongly controlled by genes the trait in question is. However, we now know this claim to be false (Moore and Shenk, 2016). More to the point, the simple fact that IQ shows higher heritability than traits in the animal kingdom should have given behavioral geneticists pause. Nonetheless, it is interesting that this study that was carried out in the 1940s showed a negative result in the quest to show a genetic basis to intelligence using dogs, since dogs and humans quite obviously are different. Panofsky (2014: 65) also framed these results with that of rats that were selectively bred to be “smart” and “dumb”:
Further, many animal studies showed that strain differences in behavior were not independent of environment. R. M. Cooper and J. P. Zubek’s study of rats selectively bred to be “dull” and “bright” in maze-running ability showed dramatic differences between the strains in the “normal” environment. But in the “enriched” and especially the “restricted” developmental environments, both strains’ performance were quite similar. Scott and Fuller made a similar finding in their comparative study of dog breeds: “The behavior traits do not appear to be preorganized by heredity. Rather a dog inherits a number of abilities which can be organized in different ways to meet different situations.” Thus even creatures that had been explicitly engineered to embody racial superiority and inferiority could not demonstrate the idea in any simple way
Psychologist Robert Tryon (1940) devised a series of mazes, ran rats through them and then selected rats that learned quicker and slower (Innis, 1992). These differences then seemed to persists across these rat generations. Then Searle (1949) discovered that the so-called “dumb” rats were merely afraid of the mechanical noise of the maze, showing that Tryon selected for—unknowingly—emotional capacity. Marlowitz (1969) then concluded “that the labels “maze-bright” and “maze-dull” are inexplicit and inappropriate for use with these strains.”
Dogs and human races are sometimes said to be similar, in which a dog breed can be likened to a human race (see Norton et al, 2019). However, dog breeds are the result of conscious human selection for certain traits which then creates the breed. So while Scott and Fuller did find evidence for a good amount of genetic differences between the breeds they studied, they did not find any evidence of a genetic basis of intelligence or temperament. This is also good evidence for the claim that a trait can be heritable (have high heritability) but have no genetic basis. Moreover, we know that high levels of training improve dog’s problem solving ability (Marshall-Pescini et al, 2008, 2016). Further, perceived differences in trainability are due to physical capabilities and not cognitive ones (Helton, 2008). And in Labrador Retrievers, post-play training also improved training performance (Affenzeller, Palme, and Zulch, 2017; Affenzeller, 2020). Dogs’ body language during operant conditioning was also related to their success rate in learning (Hasegawa, Ohtani, and Ohta, 2014). We also know that dogs performed tasks better and faster the more experience they had with them, not being able to solve the task before seeing it demonstrated by the human administering the task (Albuquerque et al, 2021). Gnanadesikan et al (2020) state that cognitive phenotypes seem to vary by breed, and that these phenotypes have strong potential to be artificially selected, but we have seen that this is an error. Morrill et al (2022) found no evidence that the behavioral tendencies of certain breeds reflected intentional selection by humans but could not discount the possibility.
Conclusion
Dog breeds have been used by hereditarians for decades as a model for that of intelligence differences between human races. The analogy that dog breeds and human races are also similar has been used to show that there is a genetic basis for human race, and that human races are thusly a biological reality. (Note that I am a pluralist about race.) But we have seen that in the 40s the study which was undertaken to prove a hereditary basis to dog intelligence and then liken it to human intelligence quite obviously failed. This then led one of the authors to conclude—correctly—that human heritability estimates are inflated (which has led to the missing heritability problem of the 2000s).
Upon studying the dogs in their study, they found that there was no general factor of intelligence in these dogs, and that the situation was paramount in how the dog would perform on the task in question. This then led Scott to conclude that human heritability estimates are too high, a conclusion echoed by modern day researchers like Schonemann. The issue is, if dogs with their numerous breeds and genetic variation defy a single general factor, what would that mean for humans? This is just more evidence that “general intelligence” is a mere myth, a statistical abstraction. There was also no evidence for a general temperament, since breeds that were scared in one situation were confident in another (showing yet again that situationism held here). The failure of the study carried out by the RF then led to the questioning of the high heritability of human intelligence (IQ), which wasn’t forgotten as the decades progressed. Nonetheless, this study casted doubt on the claim that intelligence had a genetic basis.
Why, though, would a study of dogs be informative here? Well, the goal was to show that intelligence in dogs had a hereditary component and that thusly a kind of designer dog could be created that was friendly and intelligent, and this could then be likened to humans. But when the results were the opposite of what they desired, the project was quickly abandoned. If only modern-day behavioral geneticists would get the memo that heritability isn’t useful for what they want it to be useful for (Moore and Shenk, 2016)
NotPoliticallyCorrect 