The Developmental Systems Argument Against Hereditarianism
2000 words
“Genetic determinism can be described as the attribution of the formation of traits to genes, where genes are ascribed more causal power than what scientific consensus suggests” Gerick et al (2017)
Defining hereditarianism and DST
Hereditarianism has many entailments, but a main one is that genes are necessary and sufficient for phenotypes. Hereditarianism can be defined succinctly as: the belief that human traits, behaviors, and capabilities are predominantly or solely caused by genetic inheritance, with the environment being negligible. So this belief implies that genes are necessary (without the specific genes, the trait wouldn’t appear) and sufficient (the genes in question can alone account for the appearance of the trait without significant environmental influence). So if genes are sufficient for phenotypes, then we could predict one’s phenotype from one’s genotype. (It’s also reductionist and deterministic). That a form of genetic determinism is taught in schools (Jamieson and Radick, 2017) is one reason why this hereditarian view must be fought.
But if development is understood as the dynamic interaction between genes, environment, and developmental products where no single factor dominates in the development of an organism (the DST view), then a view that assumes the primacy of one of the developmental resources (hereditarianism and it’s assumption about genes), then this leads to a logical incompatibility and incoherence. Since certain things are true about organismal development, then hereditarianism cannot possibly be true. I have made a similar argument to this before, but I have not formalized it in this way. Since we know that development is context-dependent, and we know that hereditarianism assumes the context-independence of genes, we can rightly assume that hereditarianism is false. Furthermore, since hereditarianism assumes no or negligible developmental plasticity, then that’s another reason to reject it. Here’s the argument:
(1) Hereditarianism (H) implies genetic determinism (GD).
(2) GD implies negligible developmental plasticity (DP).
(3) But DP isn’t negligible.
(C) Therefore H is false.
H=hereditarianism
GD=genetic determinism
D=developmental plasticity/environmental influence
(1) H->GD
(2) GD->¬D
(3) D
(C) ∴¬H
Under the assumption that hereditarianism is a species of genetic determinism, and DST is a context-dependent account of development: If DST is accurate, then hereditarianism is false. We know that traits aren’t genetically determined, so DST is accurate. Therefore, hereditarianism must be false.
Hereditarians have tried paying lip service to the interactionist/developmental systems view (as I showed here and here), but by definition, hereditarianism discounts interactionism since even their main tool (the heritability estimate) assumes no interaction between genes and environment (whereas the interaction between genes and environment is inherent in the DST philosophy).
We know that genes are not sole determinants of phenotypes, but they are one of many interacting developmental resources, which refutes the often unstated assumption that genes are blueprints or recipes for development. Hereditarianism doesn’t and can’t account for the fact that the environment can enable, contain, and alter genetic expression. Therefore, a holistic—and not reductionist—view of development is one we should accept. The hereditarian view of development is clearly untenable.
Below is an argument I’ve constructed that relies on the argument in Noble (2011) for genes as passive causes:
(1) If genes are passive information carriers, then they do not initiate biological processes independently.
(2) Genes do not initiate their own transcription or replication; they react to triggering signals within a biological system.
(3) Therefore, genes are passive information carriers.
(4) If something is a passive information carrier, it cannot be considered an active cause of biological processes.
(5) So if genes are passive information carriers, then genes cannot be considered an active cause of biological processes.
Noble’s biological relativity argument
Hereditarianism assumes a privileged level of causation (genes are the privileged resource of development). But we know—a priori—that there is no privileged level of causation in biological systems (Noble’s 2012 biological relativity argument). So hereditarianism must be false. Here’s the argument:
We know the biological systems are characterized by multiple interacting levels molecular, cellular, organismal, environmental) where each level can influence each other in a dynamic way. So no single level has a causal priority over another. In biological systems, causation is understood as the process by which one event or state leads to another. So for there to be a privileged level of causation in biological systems, one level would need to be inherently more deterministic or controlling of others, independent of the context that the developing organism is situated. But each level of biological organization (from genes to the ecosystem of the organisms) is interdependent where changes at one level can only be understood in relation to changes at other levels (genetic expression is influenced by cellular conditions, which are then affected by organismal health and environmental factors).
So no level of biological organization operates independently or can dictate outcomes without influence or interaction with other levels. Even what may seem like so-called “genetic causes” require the cell to read the context-dependent information in the gene. So there is a feedback loop where influences are not unidirectional but reciprocal. While genes can influence protein synthesis, the need for proteins can regulate gene expression through feedback mechanisms. Therefore, a priori, there is no privileged level of causation in biological systems, since each level is part of an integrated system where causation is distributed and context-dependent, not localized to any one of the levels of biological organization.
See these references for more on how genes are necessary, passive causes but not sufficient causes. These references attest to how genes are looked at today in systems biology, not using a reductionist viewpoint. Oyama, 2000; Moore, 2001; Shapiro, 2013; Kampourakis, 2017; Richardson, 2017, 2020, 2021, 2022; Baverstock, 2021; McKenna, Gawne, and Nijhout, 2022. But here is the gist:
“Active causation” is when X causes or initiates an event to occur, whereas “passive causation” is when X is causes to do something or forced to do something by something else or another situation/event. Both Baverstock and Noble argue that genes (DNA sequences) are passive causes, meaning they don’t initiate the causation of traits. Baverstock also argued that the phenotype plays an active role in morphogenesis and evolution, causing changes in processes (which is similar to West-Eberhard’s and Lerner’s views conceptualizing genes as followers, not leaders, in the evolutionary process).
Noble also argues that genes aren’t active, but rather passive causes, since they merely react to the signals from what is occurring in the developmental system and the environment (which, in this case is conceptualized differently in different contexts for the purpose of this argument like the uterine environment, the environments that get created through the interactions of gene products, gene and gene interactions and gene environment interactions which are ultimately caused by the physiological system). He then ultimately, using Shapiro’s “read write genome argument”, argued that the only kind of causation that can be attributed to genes is passive, in the same way that computer programs read and use databases.
Using Oyama’s concept of “information”, it’s not a property of biological things, but is a relational, contextual concept, arguing that is constructed by the history of the developmental system, while information then emerged through the irreducible interactions which are ultimately caused by the self-organizing developmental system; she calls this “constructive interactionism.”
Over the last 40 years since the publication of Oyama’s developmental systems theory and the subsequent strengthening of her view, we’ve come to find out that genes (and genotypes) aren’t causes in and of themselves, and that genes are mere inert molecules, outside of the living cell. So if the cell activates a gene, then the gene transcribes information (remembering how “information” is conceptualized in Oyama’s DST; this premise establishes a causal relationship between the cell and a gene, with the cell activating the gene since the cell is the active cause and the gene is the passive one). If the gene transcribes its information (of which then ontogeny of information is relational and contextual, emerging through the irreducible actions of the developmental resources), then it produces a protein. So if the cell activates a gene, then it produces a protein (the cell being the active cause and the gene and the protein being passive causes).
“But genes load the gun and environment pulls the trigger”
This is a phrase I’ve heard quite a bit, and I think it’s wrong due to what I’ve outlined above. It’s still deterministic and it looks at genes as active causes. The “genes load the gun” part of the phrase assumes that genes have an active role in initiating biological potentials. But we know that genes are acted on by cellular and environmental context, which then dictates genetic expression. It also assumes linear causation, in a one-way, cause-and-effect sequence.
The claim that the environment merely “pulls the trigger” assumes that there is already an inherent “information” that’s in the genes, which is why that’s a genetic determinist claim. It also minimizes the environment to an activator rather than a co-creator of biological outcomes. So using Oyama’s concept of information as something constructed through developmental interactions emphasizes that the environment doesn’t merely activate what’s already there, it also participates in the very construction of biological information and the ontogeny of traits. It also presumes that genes store all relevant information, but we know that it’s dynamically-shaped, using—but not limited to—genes as passive causes. Basically, biological information is an emergent property of biological systems, not a preexisting genetic code.
Furthermore, since we know that the phenotype plays an active role in morphogenesis and evolution, we know that the outcome (the phenotype) isn’t just a result of genetic loading followed by environmental activation. The phenotype actively contributes to shaping genetic expression and evolutionary trajectories. So if genes are activated by the cell and the broader physiological system, then the idea of genes loading anything independently falls apart. Genes are read or used by the physiological system to carry out certain processes in a context-dependent nanner, not setting the stage, but responding to it.
Conclusion
The role of genes in biological systems and causation as discussed by Noble, Richardson, Oyama, Moore, West-Eberhard, Baverstock, Shapiro and others directly refutes the hereditarian/genetic determinist view of what genes do in biological systems. Genes aren’t the primary architects of biological outcomes; instead genes are seen as passive components within a dynamic, interactive system.
By definition, hereditarianism assumes that genes are necessary and sufficient for causes for phenotypes (genes are the primary drivers of trait ontogeny and development). By definition, DST holds that development is an emergent property of a system where genes are just one component among many influencing factors. If development were primarily determined by genetics, then it would contradict the foundational tenet of DST, that development results from interdependent influences. So since hereditarianism and DST are mutually exclusive in their core assertions about the role of genetics in development, hereditarianism cannot be true since we know that a priori there is no privileged level of causation in biological systems.
So quite clearly hereditarianism fails on conceptual, logical, and empirical grounds. The work that’s been done over the past 50 years in biology—both conceptually and empirically—shows that the old way of viewing genes and their role in organismal development just doesn’t work anymore. Biological outcomes are not merely due to genetic blueprints but are dynamically-shaped outcomes, constructed through the irreducible interactions of multiple levels and resources, which then renders hereditarianism simplistic and outdated in the face of modern biological understanding. Noble’s biological relativity argument is a powerful argument that has direct implications for hereditarianism, and the strengthening of the argument from Baverstock and McKenna, Gawne, and Nijhout definitively show the emptiness in any kind of assumptions that genes are active cause of biological processes. Thus, we should ridicule hereditarian views of the gene and what it does in development. It’s simply an untenable view that one cannot logically defend in the face of the conceptual and empirical work on biological systems.
Therefore, to be a hereditarian in 2025 is to show that one does not understand current biological thinking.
Restricting Racist Speech: An Argument Against Free Speech
2250 words
Introduction
Speech should have limits. Growing up in America, this of course sounds like crazy talk. But the fact that we agree that actions that cause harm to others should be restricted then leads to a contradiction—and it’s due to this contradiction that we should—and in some cases do—not let anyone say whatever is on their minds without consequence. Think of defamation laws, harassment and violence-incitement. Social media amplifies hate speech—especially now where, although it’s not fully a “free speech platform”, Twitter has turned into a cesspool of hate speech (see here for examples). So if we agree that certain actions that cause harm to others should be restricted, then there is a logical contradiction—mainly that allowing speech that causes harm contradicts the principle that we should avoid harm causing actions. There is a moral imperative to restrict racist speech acts.
(1) We agree that certain actions that cause harm to others should be restricted.
Knowing this:
(2) Assume that we shouldn’t restrict any forms of speech.
(3) This implies that speech that causes harm shouldn’t be restricted.
(4) But we know that certain kinds of speech acts cause harm, leading to negative mental and physiological health outcomes and violence.
(5) But allowing speech that causes harm contradicts the principle that actions which cause harm should be restricted.
(6) So the assumption that speech should have no restrictions—including speech that causes harm—leads to a contradiction with (1), since actions that cause harm to others should be restricted.
(8) Therefore, some forms of speech—particularly speech that causes harm—should be restricted to prevent negative consequences.
Put simply: (1) Actions causing harm should be restricted. (2) Since some speech acts cause tangible harm, then unfettered speech acts contradict the principle that actions which cause harm should be restricted. (C) So speech restrictions are justified.
Or:
(1) If speech causes tangible harm, then it should be restricted to prevent that harm. (2) Some forms of speech—including incitement to violence, defamation, and true threats—cause tangible harm. Therefore, (C) these forms of speech should be restricted.
The argument I have constructed against free speech I have constructed is valid, and I will argue for it’s soundness. I will then discuss how we can identify racist speech (though I think it is pretty obvious), then I will argue that such speech causes tangible harm. I will show that then racist then is caught in a contradiction that he cannot see himself out of—namely that they presumably think that crime is bad based on talking about all types of racial crime differences but then contradict that by engaging in action which lead to crime.
Defending the argument
The argument assumes Mill’s harm principle (HP)—where Mills stated that “the only purpose for which power can be rightly exercised over any member if a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.” Even in America, where we have the First Amendment, certain speech acts are restricted—like defamation, incitement to violence and true threats. So while free expression is meaningful, it’s clearly not absolute, and I argue that we should extend that to hate speech, since hate speech causes tangible harm.
The HP also lines up with the ethical view that one’s actions should not infringe upon the well-being and rights of others. Therefore, speech should be judged on the impact it has towards others. We can then extend this to not only individual harm but broader, societal harm. Speech acts that promote systemic discrimination—like hate speech—can and should be restricted since they contribute to an environment in which certain groups are systematically disadvantaged or harmed which then gels well with the notion that harm would include social and psychological impacts.
We can then extend the HP to include psychological and emotional harm. Speech that systematically targets individuals or groups can cause significant emotional distress and could lead to significant mental health issues should be considered under the HP. Certain speech acts can contribute to systemic harm by perpetuating or reinforcing structures of oppression, like racist, sexist, or anti-same-sex speech.
Thus, the HP should be extended to include preventative measures against potential harm. So in cases where speech is likely to incite violence or discrimination, preventative restrictions should be in place, especially where there are historical or contemporary tensions.
For instance, look at the RFK’s idiotic view that vaccines cause autism. This is a view that should not be amplified, since it could lead to lower rates of vaccination and along with it, physical (and mental) harm. What RFK is saying is outright misinformation, since we have large trials which definitively show that vaccines do not cause autism (and the study that RFK is presumably referring to is even retracted; (Allen and Ivers, 2010; Eggertson, 2010, see Wakefield et al, 1998).
Identifying racist speech
To identify racist speech, we can just look at the language used. Racist speech denies the humanity, dignity or worth of individuals based on their race. It makes sweeping generalizations or assumptions about a group based on preconceived notions or biases. It demonizes a group, portraying them as evil, dangerous, or threatening. It excludes or ignores experiences or concerns of a group. It uses derogatory language like slurs and epithets which are intended to degrade and offend. It advocates for discrimination or violence against a group. And it perpetuates systemic racism by justifying discriminatory policies practices or institutions which exacerbate inequalities. So:
A speech act is a racist speech act, iff
(1) it dehumanizes, stereotypes, demonizes, marginalizes, or uses derogatory language against individuals or groups based on their race, ethnicity or national origin; or (2) it promotes hate, discrimination or harm against individuals based on their race, ethnicity, or national origin; or (3) it perpetuates systemic racism by reinforcing or justifying discriminatory practices, policies, or institutions that perpetuate racial inequalities.
Racist speech acts are those that dehumanize, demean, or discriminate aya7shr individuals or groups based on race. Language has both explicit and implicit meanings, and its racial B can be identified through the explicit use of racial slurs or derogatory terms which are historically and universally recognized as demeaning to specific racial groups. So the context in which words are used significantly influences their racist nature where one stereotypes and makes generalizations about racial groups including individualw to a set of prejudiced assumptions. The intent should also be considered, but the impact often outweighs good intentions.
Speech from those in positions of power or privilege which targets marginalized groups amplifies the racist impact due to the existing power balance in society. But even if the speech in question is intended to not be racist, if it reinforces racial hierarchies, promotes discrimination, or causes harm, then it could be considered racist in its effects (this is why I think the “HBD”-hereditarian movement is racist). So historical and cultural references also inform the racist nature of certain speech acts.
Thus, to identify racist speech acts, one must analyze not just the words one uses but the context in which they’re said, intent, impact, power dynamics, and the historical and cultural weight they carry. This goes beyond what is on the surface of the words that one speaks or writes and allows us to recognize when a speech act is a racist one.
The moral contradiction of the racist
Now we come to the issue of racist hate speech. We know that racism and stereotypes which lead to self-fulfilling prophecies cause the black-white crime gap (based on considerations of the theory of African American offending). We also know that racism causes “weathering” in black women (Geronimus et al 2006, 2011; Sullivan, 2015) So since we know that racism leads to crime in the black American population, and we know that it leads to differences in physical and mental health, we know that racism is morally wrong. So the HP should be extended to include racist speech acts, since they have tangible effects. Racist speech acts promote harmful stereotypes, and contribute to crime through marginalization which then cause physiological and psychological harm. In the argument that I made here, I showed that since crime is bad and racism causes crime then racism is bad—this is a simple, yet powerful argument. So since racist speech acts can lead to tangible harms, both directly (through incitement or psychological stress) and indirectly (contributing to systemic issues like crime rates in African Americans), such views should be restricted. I assume that racists think that crime is bad, but since we know that racism and stereotypes which lead to self-fulfilling prophecies cause crime for African Americans, it seems that their racist speech acts lead to a real-world contradiction.
The argument as I have constructed it is:
(1) Crime is bad. (2) Racism causes crime. (C) Thus, racism is morally wrong. (1) is self-evident based on people not wanting to be harmed. (2) is known upon empirical examination, like the TAAO and it’s successful novel predictions. (C) then logically follows.
…
B stands for “crime is bad”, C stands for “racism causes crime”, D stands for racism is objectively incorrect, so from B and C we derive D (if C causes B and B is bad, then D is morally wrong). So the argument is “(B ^ C) -> D”. B and C lead to D, proving validity.
So: (1) If actions causing harm should be restricted ((B ^ C) –> D), and racist speech acts cause harm both directly and indirectly, then racist speech acts should be restricted. (2) Actions causing harm should be restricted (B is true based on ethical principles) and racist speech acts cause harm (C is true based on empirical evidence). Therefore, (C) racist speech acts should be restricted (D is true).
This is the moral conundrum of the racist. Racists agree that crime is bad (which can be seen by there hyper-focus on black-on-white, black-on-black, and black-on-Asian crime). But their speech acts contribute to the very actions they condemn. This is a contradiction. If racists believe that crime is bad, and if we accept the evidence that racism and stereotypes contribute to crime for African Americans (and we should since the TAAO makes successful novel predictions), then by promoting racism through their speech acts, racists are inadvertently contributing to what they claim to despise! If one holds to the claim that crime is bad, then one should therefore have a moral responsibility to not contribute to its causes. So by promoting racism, racists are directly contributing to crime. Racists, then, have an inconsistency between their beliefs and actions.
Conclusion
Most agree that we shouldn’t have ultimate free speech, which I take to be saying whatever you want whenever you want to whomever you want. Of course, in private, two people could express views to each other that would be seen as negative to society at large, but they would not be harm-causing speech acts since they are only expressing such views to themselves and not going on social media and airing their racism for millions to see. Using and extending Mills’ harm principle then allows us to restrict certain speech that causes harm. So since we know that racist speech acts lead to psychological and physiological harm and since we know (based on TAAO studies) that racism and stereotypes which lead to self-fulfilling prophecies lead to crime in black Americans, such racist hate speech must be regulated.
I showed when a speech act is a racist speech act, by stating some conditions. Racists today distribute racism in the form of memes and “jokes” on social media. It is pretty obvious when speech is meant to convey a racist tone and be applied toward a group, and the conditions I have paid out pave the way for that.
I showed that racist hate speech leads to increased rates of ctime in black Americans. The TAAO not only shows how racism is linked to crime, it also shows how racist speech acts perpetuate harmful stereotypes which then lead to self-fulfilling prophecies which then cause crime among African Americans. So this suggests that since racism leads to crime (which is universally seen as bad) among African Americans, then racist speech (as a form of action) should then be seen as morally reprehensible and therefore potentially restrictable under the HP. And since we know that racist speech acts lead to weathering and increased allostatic load, this is yet another reason to restrict such speech. Such speech acts contribute to these health disparities by creating environments of chronic stress and marginalization. Thus, by recognizing these health outcomes as tangible harms, we can further justify applying the HP to racist speech.
The ethical flaw of the racist was discussed. They claim to oppose crime (as seen by their continual discussions of inter-racial and intra-racial crime), yet their speech promotes conditions which increase crime rates among the very groups they discriminate against. So the racist in fact contributes to crime, which then undermines their own moral stance against crime!
This is why we should not have a kind of free-reign free speech—because it’s quite cleat that racism leads to crime in the black American population and that racism leads to negative psychological and physiological health outcomes. Therefore, knowing this, “free speech” shouldn’t be a thing. We should restrict it not only for the societal health of the country but for the psychological and psychological health and well-being of groups and individuals.
NotPoliticallyCorrect 