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The Conceptual Impossibility of Hereditarian Intelligence
3650 words
Introduction
For more than 100 years—from Galton and Spearman to Burt, Jensen, Rushton, Lynn and today’s polygenic score enthusiasts—hereditarian thinkers have argued that general intelligence is a unitary, highly heritable biological trait and that observed individual and group level differences in IQ and it’s underlying “g” factor primarily reflect genetic causation. The Bell Curve brought such thinking into the mainstream from obscure psychology journals, and today hereditarian behavioral geneticists claim that 10 to 20 percent of the variance in education and cognitive performance has been explained by GWA studies (see Richardson, 2017). The consensus is that intelligence within and between populations is largely genetic in nature.
While hereditarianism is empirically contested and morally wrong, the biggest kill-shot is that it is conceptually impossible, and one can use many a priori arguments from philosophy of mind to show this. Donald Davidson’s argument against the possibility of psychophysical laws, Kripke’s reading of Wittgenstein, and Nagel’s argument from indexicality can be used to show that hereditarianism is a category error. Ken Richardson’s systems theory can then be used to show that g is an artifact of dynamic systems (along with test construction), and Vygotsky’s cultural-historical psychology shows that higher mental functions (which hereditarians try to explain biologically) originate as socially scaffolded, inter-mental processes mediated by cultural tools and interactions with more knowledgeable others, not individual genetic endowment.
Thus, these metaphysical, normative, systemic, developmental and phenomenological refutations show that hereditarianism is based on a category mistake. Ultimately, what hereditarianism lacks is a coherent object to measure—since psychological traits aren’t measurable at all. I will show here how hereditarianism can be refuted with nothing but a priori logic, and then show what really causes differences in test scores within and between groups. Kripke’s Wittgenstein and the argument against the possibility of psychophysical laws, along with a Kim-Kripke normativity argument against hereditarianism show that hereditarianism just isn’t a logically tenable position. So if it’s not logically tenable, then the only way to explain gaps in IQ is an environmental one.
I will begin with showing that no strict psychophysical laws can link genes/brain states to mental kinds, then demonstrating that even the weaker functional-reduction route collapses at the very first step because no causal-role definition of intentionality (intelligence) is possible. After that I will add the general rule following considerations from Kripke’s Wittgenstein and then add it to my definition of intelligence, showing that rule-following is irreducibly normative and cannot be fixed by any internal state and that no causal-functional definition is possible. Then I will show that the empirical target of hereditarianism—the g factor—is nothing more than a statistical artifact of historically contingent, culturally-situated rule systems and not a biological substrate. These rule systems do not originate internally, but they develop as inter-mental relations mediated by cultural tools. Each of these arguments dispenses with attempted hereditarian escapes—the very notion of a genetically constituted, rank-orderable general intelligence is logically impossible.
We don’t need “better data”—I will demonstrate that the target of hereditarian research does not and cannot exist as a natural, measurable, genetically-distributed trait. IQ scores are not measurements of a psychological magnitude (Berka, 1983; Nash, 1990); no psychophysical laws exist that can bridge genes to normative mental kinds (Davidson, 1979), and the so-called positive manifold is nothing more than a cultural artifact due to test construction (Richardson, 2017). Thus, what explains IQ variance is exposure to the culture in which the right rules are used regarding the IQ test.
Psychophysical laws don’t exist
Hereditarianism implicitly assumes a psychophysical law like “G -> P.” Psychophysical laws are universal, necessary mappings between physical states and mental states. To reduce the mental to the physical, you need lawlike correlations—whenever physical state P occurs, mental state M occurs. These laws must be necessary, not contingent. They must bridge the explanatory gap from the third-personal to the first-personal. We have correlations, but correlations don’t entail identity. If correlations don’t entail identity, then the correlations aren’t evidence of any kind is psychophysical law. So if there are no psychophysical laws, there is no reduction and there is no explanation of the mental.
Hereditarianism assumes type-type psychophysical reduction. Type-type identity posits that all instances of a mental type correspond to all instances of a physical type. But hereditarians need bridge laws—they imply universal mappings allowing reduction of the mental to the measurable physical. But since mental kinds are anomalous, type-type reduction is impossible.
Hereditarians claim that genes cause g which then cause intelligence. This requires type-type reduction. Intelligence kind = g kind = physical kind. But g isn’t physical—it’s a mathematical construct, the first PC. Only physical kinds can be influenced by genes;nonphysical kinds cannot. Even if g correlates with brain states, correlation isn’t identity. Basically, no psychophysical laws means no reduction and therefore no mental explanation.
If hereditarianism is true, then intelligence is type-reducible to g/genes. If type-reduction holds, then strict psychophysical laws exist. So if hereditarianism is true, then strict psychophysical laws exist. But no psychophysical laws exist, due to multiple realizablilty and Davidson’s considerations. So hereditarianism is false.
We know that the same mental kind can be realized in different physical kinds, meaning that no physical kind correlates one-to-one necessarily with a mental kind. Even if we generously weaken the demand from strict identity to functional laws, hereditarian reduction still fails (see below).
The Kim-Kripke normativity argument
Even the only plausible route to mind-body reduction that most physicalists still defend collapses a priori for intentional/cognitive states because no causal-functional definition can ever capture the normativity of meaning and rule following (Heikenhimo, 2008). Identity claims like water = h2O only work because the functional profile is already reducible. Since the functional profile of intentional intelligence is not reducible, there is no explanatory bridge from neural states to the normativity of thought. So identity claims fail—this just strengthens Davidson’s conclusions. Therefore, every reductionist strategy that could possibly license the move from “genetic variance -> variation in intelligence” is blocked a priori.
(1) If hereditarianism is true, then general intelligence as a real cognitive capacity must be reducible to the physical domain (genes, neural states, etc).
(2) The only remaining respectable route to mind-body reduction of cognitive/intentional processes is Kim’s three-step functional-reduction model.
(C1) So if hereditarianism is true, then general intelligence must he reducible to Kim’s three-step functional-reduction model.
(3) Kim-style reduction requires—as its indispensable first step—an adequate causal-functional definition of the target property (intelligence, rule-following, grasping meaning, etc) that preserves the established normative meaning of the concept without circularly using mental/intentional vocabulary in the definiens.
(4) Any causal-functional definition of intentional/cognitive states necessarily obliterates the normative distinction between correct and incorrect application (Kripke’s normativity argument applied to mental content).
(C2) Therefore, no adequate causal-functional definition of general intelligence is possible, even in principle.
(5) If no adequate causal-functional definition is possible, then Kim-style functional reduction of general intelligence is impossible.
(C3) So Kim-style functional reduction of general intelligence is impossible.
(C4) So hereditarianism is false.
A hereditarian can resist Kim-Kripke in 4 ways but each fails. (1) They can claim intelligence need not be reducible, but then genes cannot causally affect it, dissolving hereditarianism into mere correlation. (2) They can reject Kim-style reduction in factor of non-reductive or mechanistic physicalism, but these views still require functional roles and collapse under Kim’s causal exclusion argument. (3) They can insist that intelligence has a purely causal-functional definition (processing efficiency or pattern recognition), but such definitions omit the normativity of reasoning and therefore do no capture intelligence at all. (4) They can deny that normativity matters, but removing correctness conditions eliminates psychological content and makes “intelligence” unintelligible, destroying the very trait hereditarianism requires. Thus, all possible routes collapse into contradiction or eliminativism.
The rule-following argument against hereditarianism
Imagine a child who is just learning to add. She adds 68+57=125. We then say that she is correct. Why is 125 correct and 15 incorrect? It isn’t correct because she feels sure, because someone who writes 15 could be just as sure. It isn’t correct because her brain lit up in a certain way, because the neural pattern could also belong to someone following a different rule. It isn’t correct because all of her past answers, because all past uses were finite and are compatible with infinitely many bizzare rules that only diverge now. It isn’t correct because of her genes or any internal biological state, because DNA is just another finite physical fact inside of her body.
There is nothing inside of her head, body or genome that reaches out and touches the difference between correct and incorrect. But the difference is real. So where does it lie? It lives outside of her in the shared community practices. Correctness is a public status, not a private possession. Every single thing that IQ tests reward—series completion, analogies, classification, vocabulary, matrix reasoning—is exactly this kind of going on correctly. So every single point on an IQ test is an act whose rightness is fixed in the space of communal practice. What we call “intelligence” exists only between us—between the community, society and culture in which an individual is raised.
Intelligence is a normative ability. To be intelligent is to go on in the same way, to apply concepts correctly, to get it right when solving new problems, reasoning, understanding analogies, etc. So intelligence = rule-following (grasping and correctly applying abstract patterns).
Rule following is essentially normative—there is a difference between seeming right and being right. Any finite set of past performances is compatible with an infinite set of many rules. No fact about an individual—neither physical nor mental content—uniquely determines the rule they are following. So no internal state fixes the norm. Thus, rule following cannot be constituted by internal/genetic states. No psychophysical law can connect G to correct rule following (intelligence).
Therefore rule-following is set by participation in a social practice. Therefore, normative abilities (intelligence, reasoning, understanding) are socially, not genetically, constituted. So hereditarianism is logically impossible.
At its core, intelligence is the ability to get it right. Getting it right is a social status conferred by participation in communal practices. No amount of genetic or neural causation can confer that status—because no internal state can fix the normative fact. So the very concept of “genetically constituted general intelligence” is incoherent. Therefore, hereditarianism is logically impossible.
(1) H -> G -> P
Hereditarianism -> genes/g -> normative intelligence
(2) P -> R
Normative intelligence -> correct rule-following.
(3) R -> ~G
Rule following cannot be fixed by internal physical/mental states.
So ~(G -> P)
So ~H.
The Berka-Nash measurement objection
This is a little-known critique of psychology and IQ. First put forth in Karel Berka’s 1983 book Measurement: It’s Concepts, Theories, and Problems, and then elaborated on in Roy Nash’s (1990) Intelligence and Realism: A Materialist Critique of IQ.
If hereditarianism is true, then intelligence must be a measurable trait (with additive structure, object, and units) that genes can causally influence via g. If intelligence is measurable, then psychophysical laws must exist to map physical causes to mental kinds. But no such measurability or laws exist. Thus, hereditarianism is false.
None of the main, big-name hereditarians have ever addressed this type of argument. (Although Brand et al, 2003 did attempt to, their critique didn’t work and they didn’t even touch the heart of the matter.) Clearly, the argument shows that hereditarian psychology is weak to such critique. The above argument shows that IQ is quasi-quantification, without an empirical object, no structure, or lawful properties
The argument for g is circular
“Subtests within a battery of intelligence tests are included n the basis of them showing a substantial correlation with the test as a whole, and tests which do not show such correlations are excluded.” (Tyson, Jones, and Elcock, 2011: 67)
g is defined as the common variance of pre-selected subtests that must correlate. Subtests are included only if they correlate. A pattern guaranteed by construction cannot be evidence of a pre-existing biological unity. So g is a tautological artifact, not a natural kind that genes can cause.
Hereditarians need g to be a natural kind trait that genes can act upon. But g is an epiphenomenal artifact due to test construction produced by current covariation of culturally specific cognitive tasks in modern school societies. Artifacts of historically contingent cultural ecologies are not natural kind traits. So g is not a natural kind. So hereditarianism is false.
The category error argument
Intelligence is a first-person indexical act. g is a third-person statistical abstraction. There can be no identity between a phenomenonal act and a statistical abstraction. So g cannot be intelligence—no reduction is possible.
There is no such thing as genetically constituted general intelligence since intelligence is a rational normative competence, the g factor is an epiphenomenal artifact of a historically contingent self-organizing cultural-cognitive ecology, and higher psychological functions originate as social relations mediated by cultural tools which only later appear individual. Hereditarianism tries to explain a normative status with causal mechanisms, a dynamic cultural artifact with a fixed trait, and an inter-mental function with intra-cranial genetics.
g is a third-person statistical construct. Intelligence, as a psychological trait, consists of first-person indexical cognitive acts. Category A – third-person, impersonal (g, PGS, allele frequencies, brain scans). Category B – first-person, subjective, experiential).
Genetic claims assert that differences in g (category A) are caused by differences in genes and that this then explains differences in intelligence (category B). For such claims to be valid, g (category A) must be identical to intelligence (category B). But g has no first-person phenomenology meaning no one experiences using g, while intelligence does. So g (category A) cannot be identical to intelligence (category B).
Thus, claiming genes cause differences in g which then explain group differences in intelligence commits a category error, since a statistical artifact is equated with a lived, psychological reality.
A natural-kind trait must be individuated independent of the measurement procedure. g is individuated only by the procedure (PC1 extracted from tests chosen for their intercorrelations). Therefore, g is not a natural-kind trait. Only natural kinds can plausibly be treated as biological traits. Thus, g is not a biological trait.
Combining this argument with the Kim-Kripke normativity argument shows that hereditarians don’t just reify a statistical abstraction, they try to reduce a normative category into a descriptive one.
Vygotsky’s social genesis of higher functions
Higher psychological functions originate as social relations mediated by cultural tools which only later appear individual. If hereditarianism is true, then higher psychological functions originate as intra-individual genetic endowments. A function cannot originate both as inter-mental social relations and as intra-individual genetic endowments. So hereditarianism is false.
Intelligence is not something a sole individual possesses—it is something a person achieves within a cultural-historical scaffold. Intelligence is not an individual possession that cab be ranked by genes, it is a first-person indexical act that is performed within, and made possible by, that social scaffold.
Ultimately, Vygotsky’s claim is ontological, not merely developmental. Higher mental functions are constituted by social interaction and cultural tools. Thus, their ontological origin cannot be genetic because the property isn’t intrinsic, it’s relational. No amount of intra-individual genetic variation can produce a relational property.
Possible counters
“We don’t need reduction, we only need prediction/causal inference. We’re only showing genes -> brains -> test scores.” If genes or polygenic scores causally explain the intentional-level fact that someone got question 27 right, there must be a strict law covering the relation. There is none. All they have is physical-physical causation—DNA -> neural firing -> finger movement. The normative fact that the movement was the correct one is never touched by any physical law.
“Intelligence is just “whatever enables success on complex cognitive tasks—we can functionalize it that way and avoid normativity.” This is the move that Heikenhimo (2008) takes out. Any causal-role description of “getting it right on complex tasks” obliterates the distinction between getting it right and merely producing behavior that happens to match. The normativity argument shows you can’t define “correct application” in purely causal terms without eliminativism or circularity.
“g is biologically real because it correlates with brain volume, reaction time, PGSs, etc.” Even if every physical variable perfectly correlated with getting every Raven item right, it still wouldn’t explain why one pattern is normatively correct and another isn’t. The normative status is anomalous and socially constituted. Correlation isn’t identity and identity is impossible.
“Heritability is just a population statistic.” Heritability presupposes that the trait is well-defined and additive in the relevant population. The Berka-Nash measurement objection shows that IQ (and any psychological trait) is not quantitatively-structured trait with a conjoint measurement structure. Without that, h2 is either undefined or meaningless.
Even then, the hereditarian can agree with the overall argument I’ve mounted here and say something like: “Psychometrics and behavioral genetics have replaced the folk notion of intelligence with a precise, operational successor concept: general cognitive ability as indexed by the first principle component of cognitive test variance. This successor concept is quantitative, additive, biologically real and has non-zero heritability. We aren’t measuring the irreducibly normative thing you’re talking about; we’re measuring something else that is useful and genetically influenced.” Unfortunately, this concept fails once you ask what justifies treating the first PC as a causal trait. As soon as you claim it causes anything at the intentional-level (higher g causes better reasoning, generic variance causes higher g which causes higher life success), they are back to needing psychophysical laws or a functional definition that bridges the normative gap. If they then retreat to pure physical prediction, they have then abandoned the claim that genes cause intelligence differences. Therefore, this concept is either covertly normative (and therefore irreducible), or purely descriptive/physical (therefore being irrelevant to intelligence.)
A successor concept can replace a folk concept if and only if it preserves the explanatorily relevant structure. But replacing “intelligence” with “PC1 of test performance” destroys the essential normative structure of the concept. Therefore, g cannot serve as a scientific successor to the concept of intelligence.
“We don’t need laws, identity, or functional definitions. Intelligence is a real pattern in the data. PGSs, brain volume, reaction time, educational attainment and job performance all compress onto a single and robust predictive dimension. That dimension is ontologically real in exactly the same way as temperature is real in statistical mechanics even before we had microphysical reduction. The heritability of the pattern is high. Therefore genes causally contribute to the pattern. g, the single latent variable, compresses performance across dozens of cognitive tests, predicts school grades, job performance, reaction time, brain size, PGSs with great accuracy. This compression is identical across countries, decades, and test batteries. So g is as real as temperature.” This “robust, predictive pattern” is real only as conformity to culturally dominant rule systems inside modern test-taking societies. The circularity of g still rears its head.
Conclusion
Hereditarianism rests on the unspoken assumption that general intelligence is a natural-kind, individual-level, biologically-caused property that can be lawfully tied to, or functionality defined in terms of, genes and brain states. Davidson shows there are no psychophysical laws; Kim-Kripke show even functional definitions are impossible; Kripke-Wittgenstein show that intelligence is irreducibly normative and holistic; Richardson/Vygotsky show that g is a cultural artifact and that higher mental faculties are born inter-mental;
Because IQ doesn’t measure any quantitatively-structured psychological trait (Berka-Nash), and no psychophysical laws exist (Davidson), the very notion of additive genetic variance contributing to variance in IQ is logically incoherent – h2 is therefore 0.
Hereditarianism requires general intelligence to be (1) a natural-kind trait located inside the skull (eg Jensen’s g), (2) quantitatively-structured so that genetic variance components are meaningful, (3) reducible—whether by strict laws or functional definition—to physical states that genes can modulate, and (4) the causal origin of correct rule-following on IQ tests. Every one of these requirements is logically impossible: no psychophysical laws exist (Davidson), no functional definitions of intentional states is possible (Heikenhimo), rule-following is irreducibly normative and socially constituted (Kripke-Wittgenstein), IQ lacks additive quantitative structure (Berka, Nash, Michell, Richardson) higher mental functions originate as social relations (Vygotsky).
Now I can say that: Intelligence is the dynamic capacity of individuals to engage effectively with their sociocultural environment, utilizing a diverse range of cognitive abilities (psychological tools), cultural tools, and social interactions, and realized through rule-governed pra gives that determine the correctness of reasoning, problem solving and concept application.
Differences in IQ, therefore, aren’t due to differences in genes/biology (no matter what the latest PGS/neuroimaging study tells you). They show an individual’s proximity to the culturally and socially defined practices on the test. So from a rule-following perspective, each test item has a normatively correct solution, determined by communal standards. So IQ scores show the extent to which someone has internalized the relevant, culturally-mediated rules, not a fixed, heritable mental trait.
So the object that hereditarians have been trying to measure and rank by race doesn’t and cannot exist. There is no remaining, respectable position for the hereditarian to turn to. They would all collapse into the same category error: trying to explain a normative, inter-mental historically contingent status with intra-cranial causation.
No future discovery—no better PGSs, no perfect brain scan, no new and improved test battery—can ever rescue the core hereditarian claim. Because the arguments here are conceptual. Hereditarianism is clearly a physicalist theory, but because physicalism cannot accommodate the normativity and rule following that constitute intelligence, the hereditarian position inherits physicalism’failure, making it untenable. Hereditarianism needs physicalism to be true. But since physicalism is false, so is hereditarianism.
(1) If hereditarianism is true then general intelligence must be a quantitatively-structured, individual-level, natural-kind trait that is either (a) linked by strict psychophysical laws or (b) functionally reducible to physical states genes can modulate.
(2) No such trait is possible since no psychophysical laws exist (Davidson), no functional reduction of intentional/normative states is possible (Kim-Kripke normativity argument), and rule-following correctness is irreducibly social and non-quantitative (Wittgenstein/Kripke, Berka, Nash, Michell, Richardson, Vygotsky).
(C) Therefore, hereditarianism is false.
People Shouldn’t Be Proud of Things They Don’t Accomplish
1500 words
Pride in one’s group seems like it should be valid to have. After all, some (all?) groups have been through some heinous things, and so most may think that it follows that they should be proud of their group, like their race or ethnicity. Take, for example, white pride, Asian price, black pride, Jewish pride, etc. None of them make any sense. They don’t make sense because they aren’t actual accomplishments. They are, in fact, proud of a lucky accident. Something they they themselves don’t choose at all. I will construct an argument I call “the agency-based price argument” to show that it’s nonsense to be proud of something you didn’t accomplish. While it may seem understandable that people may feel pride in their group, I will try to argue that this doesn’t make sense because ones race/ethnicity isn’t an accomplishment.
The argument
(P1) You should only be proud of things you accomplish.
(P2) Your race/ethnicity isn’t an accomplishment.
(C) So you shouldn’t be proud of your race/ethnicity.
The argument is clearly valid (modus ponens), but is it sound? I think so. And while I think there some ways a proponent of racial/ethnic pride (REP) could try to attack the argument, I will focus on the defense of the first premise.
P1 asserts that pride should normatively be tied to personal agency and effort, implying that only accomplishments—outcomes of deliberate actions—justify pride. Quite clearly, this is a merit-based definition of pride. While of course, people do feel pride in their group, that doesn’t make it a rational thing to hold pride about. Some defenses that could possibly be made against premise one fall short.
P1 makes a normative claim about what pride should be. P2 needs no defending since it’s a straightforward observation—one’s race or ethnicity isn’t something they themselves choose or accomplished, it’s just a lucky accident of birth. Since the argument is valid, if all of the premises are true then the argument is sound. Thus, the REP proponent would need to reject P1.
The way I am conceptualizing and defining “pride” in this argument is simple—a positive emotion of self-satisfaction or esteem derived from one’s personal accomplishments, which are outcomes derived from deliberate effort, agency, or responsibility. Thus, pride is warranted if and only if it is tied to actions or results and individual has actively contributed to excluding unchosen circumstances. Pride should be rooted in accomplishments that reflect an individual’s effort, skills, or intentional actions. One must have played a direct causal role in the outcome through their choices or actions, which ensures that pride is earned rather than passively received. So pride is a rational response to merit based on what one does not what one is. This is an agency-based definition of pride, so what matters here are outcomes. Pride requires agency and being born a certain way isn’t agentic.
Clearly, the definition of “pride” I am operating under is an agency-merit one. One may say “That’s just your definition, RR, so what?” But if I can be proud of anything that’s outside of my control, what power does the word even have? My definition preserves the only reason why pride was considered admirable.
So if the word “pride” is removed here when discussing race/ethnicity, which positive emotion are they referring to when they express feeling about their unchosen group status? They are referring to gratitude, belonging/solidarity, happiness, relief at no longer feeling shame, appreciation for their ancestors who have suffered. But none of those emotions requires using the pride concept.
When someone says they are proud of their race, what about other things outside of their control? Would it make sense to say they are proud of any other things that were outside of their control? Why should one feel pride in an unchosen trait?
Defending racial pride means one of two things: (A) membership in their group is itself an achievement or (B) their group is superior and they deserve credit for belonging to it. Let’s say tomorrow it was found out that race X’s achievements had actually been found to have had a worse track record than one who is proud of their race—fewer inventions, more atrocities, less resilience—would they feel less proud? If the answer is “yes” then the individual has admitted that their pride is just basically tribal score keeping, not personal achievement. If the answer is “no”, then pride has nothing to do with the group’s merits at all, so why should the group be brought into it?
The linguistic habit of calling unchosen traits a source of pride is not a harmless linguistic quirk; it is a surrender of the individual to the collective. Pride is one of the only positive emotions that signals personal responsibility. Allowing pride to be triggered by unchosen traits strips the word of its meaning. It no longer means “I earned this”, it then collapses to mean “I like having this.”
Certain other actions and choices people make are not sources of such pride. We treat other actions with shame at worst or neutrality at best. So if pride and shame are to remain to coherent moral emotions, they must track the boundary of agency. Things outside of my control can neither be pride-making or shame-making. Thus, extending pride to unchosen positives while rejecting it for unchosen negatives is arbitrary special pleading.
Pride refers to “I did”, not “I am.” We have words for appreciating unchosen things, like gratitude, contentment, joy, celebration. So why does it make sense to take the one word that uniquely means “I earned this”, and apply it to luck? Therefore, pride must remain tethered to merit. Being proud of your race is like feeling guilty for the weather, feeling jealous of your own possessions.
This is why pride without accomplishment doesn’t make any sense and is a logical contradiction; if asserts a causal responsibility that just does not exist. The emotion doesn’t make any sense when used for things an individual did not accomplish. The REP proponent—no matter if white, black, Asian, or any ethny—has no where to go. This argument holds for any racio-ethnic pride. Although some have argued that racial pride is a valid emotion in response to historical injustices, arguing that it fosters solidarity and resilience, but Frederick Douglas stated that the whole concept of racial pride is ridiculous (Fischer, 2021), and I of course would be included to agree with him.
Why would or should one be proud of their ancestor’s achievements? Would they be proud of the accomplishments of an individual of their same race that is alive at the same time as them? Or is it only for, say, the Roman Empire or the British Empire. Or the Revolutionary War? If one has ancestors from those time periods who were at those events and played pivotal roles in the events, should they be proud of it? No, they shouldn’t. Because there is no causal agency on their part. There is just a causal disconnect. The link between one’s ancestors and racial compatriots is their DNA and phenotype. If your great-great-grandfather signed the Declaration of Independence, should you feel proud? Should the descendants of Benedict Arnold feel shame? Should the grandchildren of SS officers hang their heads in shame? Should Italians feel pride for Caesar but disavow responsibility for Mussolini?
Having pride in historical achievements is like a cafeteria buffet, you’re only choosing what you want and ignoring everything else. Taking pride in the good but ignoring the bad. It’s like a British nationalist taking pride in their great British Empire that they were born into through nothing but luck but disowning slavery, genocide, and conquest. They’re just picking and choosing what to “feel pride for” when it comes to their ancestor’s achievements.
A parent who raises a child can feel proud of their children’s accomplishments because they had a hand in their own development. If a parent helped to create the conditions in which their child’s accomplishments occurred, then the parent is justified in taking pride in their children’s accomplishments, since they have the agency that necessitates such pride. This would be second-order pride, if the parent can point to specific costly actions they took, they grant the child primary ownership of the achievement, and they would have accepted proportionate responsibility had their child failed. Therefore, under these conditions a parent has a right to say that they are proud of their children and the accomplishments they made, since they had a direct hand in it.
Conclusion
Clearly, the argument I’ve mounted here shows that agency is intertwined with pride. Pride belongs only to the hands that did something and the mind that made the choices, not the blood and the luck that made one have the same race or be born in the same place as individuals from the past. One can admire their ancestor’s achievements and study them, but feeling pride for them? That’s obviously ridiculous.
As I’ve shown, pride is the emotion for personal accomplishments. Nothing else qualifies, not genes, skin color, ancestors, empires, co-racial strangers, and no child who’s success is on their own. The only exception is the parent who’s years of deliberate shaping helped the child become successful, but the pride must remain modest and cede the bulk to the child. But everything outside of this is gratitude, admiration, joy, or solidarity.
Why Heritability Estimates are Flawed: A Conceptual Account
1200 words
Introduction
Heritability estimates have been used as a cornerstone and psychology and genetic research. They are designed to quantify the proportion of phenotypic variance in a population that can be attributed to genetic differences among individuals. We’ve known for a while now that heritability isn’t a measure of genetic strength (Moore and Shenk, 2016), but it’s a population-specific estimate of variance. Here I will provide two a priori arguments (one methodological on twins and the EEA and one theoretical based on Noble’s biological relativity argument). The twin critique shows that the twin researcher’s main assumption (equal environments) does not hold while the biological relativity critique shows that h2 is conceptually invalid. This is why there is a missing heritability problem—it never existed in the first place, and the assumptions twin researchers have are false.
The classical twin method
The CTM compares MZ and DZ twins to attempt to quantify the relative contributions of genes and environment in relation to the origin of trait differences between individuals. Perhaps the biggest assumption of the twin researcher is the equal environments assumption (EEA). The EEA assumes that MZ and DZ twins experience equivalent shared environments.
The EEA seems plausible enough: twins reared together should experience compatible environments, regardless of zygosity. But since DZ twins are more genetically similar than DZ twins so they’ll be more phenotypically similar as well. MZ twins are dressed alike, mistaken for one another, or placed in similar social roles compared to DZ twins which leads to more similar environments. So the shared environmental variance for MZ twins exceeds that for DZ twins, violating the EEA.
Clearly this violation throws a wrench into the logic of the CTM. The formula assumes that the greater similarity in MZ twins stems solely from their genetic identity. But if MZ twins experience more similar environments due to their phenotypic similarity (Fosse, Joseph and Richardson, 2015; Joseph et al, 2015), the difference in correlations between MZs and DZs captures genetic variance and excess environmental similarity. Thus, heritability is overestimated (see eg Bingley, Cappellari, and Tatsiramos, 2023) increasing the effect of genes while masking the effects of the environment—in effect, environment is made to look like genes. Thus, h2 fails to isolate genetic influence as intended. (Note that Grayson 1989 explains this as well, but it seems that it’s just ignored.) Here’s the argument:
(1) The classical twin method assumes that its heritability (h2) estimate (Falconer’s formula) isolates the proportion of phenotypic variance due solely to genetic variance.
(2) For the h2 estimate to isolate genetic variance, the shared environmental variance must be equal for MZ and DZ twins.
(3) MZ twins are more genetically similar than DZ twins.
(4) Genetic similarity between individuals leads to greater similarity in their expressed phenotypic traits, and this phenotypic similarity results in greater similarity in their environmental experiences.
(5) Because MZ twins have greater genetic similarity than DZ twins, and genetic similarity leads to phenotypic similarity, which in turn results in environmental similarity, the shared environmental variance is greater for MZ twins compared to DZ twins.
(6) If the shared environmental variance for MZ twins is greater than that for DZ twins, then the EEA is false because it requires that shared environmental variance be equal for both twin types.
(7) If the EEA is false, then we cannot logically infer genetic conclusions from h2, and thus h2 reflects shared environmental variance (c2), rather than genetic variance.
(8) Any method that relies on an assumption that’s logically inconsistent with the principles governing it’s variables – like the relationship between genetic similarity, environmental similarity and phenotypic similarity – cannot accurately isolate its intended causal component and is therefore conceptually untenable.
(9) Thus, the classical twin method is conceptually and logically untenable since it depends on the EEA which, when false, renders h2 a measure of environmental—not genetic—variance.
The biological relativity critique against h2
This argument is theoretical as opposed to methodological, and it relies on Noble’s (2012) biological relativity argument, where there is no privileged level of causation in biological systems. Genes, cells, tissues, organs, organisms, and the environment form an interdependent network where each level influences and is influenced by the other levels. Phenotypes arise from the interaction between all of these levels, not just due to the independent action of any one of the resources.
Heritability rests on a reductionist assumption—that phenotypic variance can be neatly partitioned into genetic and environmental components with genetic effects isolated as a distinct and quantifiable entity. This framework, clearly, privileges the genetic level treating it as separate from the broader biological and ecological context. But Noble’s argument directly contradicts this view. Genes don’t operate in a vacuum and do nothing on their own.
So by attempting to isolate genetic variance, heritability imposed an artificial simplicity on a complex reality (Rose, 2006). Noble’s principle suggests that separation isn’t just an approximation but a fundamental conceptual flaw. Phenotypic variation emerges from the integrated functioning of all biological levels, which then makes it impossible to assign causation to genes alone.
Thus, h2 is conceptually flawed, since it seeks to measure a genetic contribution that cannot be meaningfully disentangled from the holistic system in which it operates. Obviously the conceptual foundation of h2 contradicts the principle of biological relativity. Since h2 attempts to assign a specific portion of trait variance to genes alone, h2 implicitly privileges the genetic level, suggesting that it can be disentangled from the broader biological system. Noble’s argument denies that this is possible while emphasizing holism and rejecting reductionism. Thus, a priori, h2 estimates are fundamentally flawed because they rest on a reductionist framework which assumes a separability of causes which is incompatible with the holistic, relativistic nature of biological causation. Here’s the argument:
(1) Biological relativity holds that there is no privileged level of causation in biological systems: all levels (genes, cells, tissues, organs, organisms, environments) are interdependent in producing phenotypes.
(2) h2 assumes that genetic variance can be isolated and quantified as a distinct contributor to phenotypic variance.
(C) Since biological relativity rejects the isolation of genetic effects, h2 is conceptually invalid as a measure of genetic influence.
Conclusion
Both of these arguments show the same thing—h2 is a deeply flawed concept. The EEA critique exposes a methodological weakness: since MZ twins experience more similar environments than DZ twins, the excess environmental similarity experienced by MZs masquerades as genetic influence, leaving h2 incapable of isolating genetic variance.
But Noble’s biological relativity argument strikes at a deeper conceptual flaw in this practice, since it challenges the theoretical aspects of h2 itself. Since it highlights the interdependence of biological systems, it dismantles the reductionist notion that genetic effects can be separated from other levels of causation. The gene-centric assumption is at ends with the reality of phenotypes being emergent properties of multi-level interactions, which then renders the concept of h2 conceptually incoherent. Therefore, h2 isn’t only empirically questionable but it is theoretically untenable. The conceptual model is just not sound due to how genes really work (Burt and Simon, 2015)
Thus, again, hereditarianism fails conceptually. Even their main “tool” fails for a modicum of reasons not least the main theoretical killshot for heritability estimates—the principle of biological relativity. The reductionist hereditarian paradigm is conceptually and logically untenable, it’s time to throw it away, it’s time to throw it to the dustbin of history.
Sabermetrics > Psychometrics
1500 words
Introduction
Spring training is ramping up to prepare MLB players for the beginning of the season at the end of the month. (Go Yankees, Yankee fan for 30+ years.) To celebrate, I’m going to discuss sabermetrics and psychometrics and why sabermetrics > psychometrics. The gist is this: Sabermetrics and sabermetricians are actually measuring aspects of baseball performance (since there are observable physical events that occur, and then the sabermetricians think of what they want to measure and then use tangible values) while psychometricians aren’t measuring anything since there is no specified measured object, object of measurement and measurement unit for IQ or any psychological trait. I will mount the argument that sabermetricians are actually measuring aspects of baseball performance while psychometricians aren’t actually measuring aspects of human psychology.
Sabermetrics > psychometrics
Psychometrics is the so-called science of the mind. The psychometrician claims that they can measure the mind and specific attributes of individuals. But without a specified measured object, object of measurement and measurement unit for any psychological trait, then a science of the mind just isn’t possible. Psychometrics fails as true measurement since it doesn’t meet the basic requirements for measurement. When something physical is measured—like the length of a stick or a person’s weight—three things are needed: a clear object (a person or stick); a specific property (length or weight); and a standard unit (inches or kilograms). But unlike physical traits, mental traits aren’t directly observable and therefore, psychometricians just assume that they are measuring what they set out to. People think they because numbers are assigned to things, that psychometrics is measurement.
Sabermetrics was developed in the 1980s, pioneered by Bill James. The point of sabermetrics is to used advanced stats to analyze baseball performance to understand player performance and how a manager should build their team. We now have tools like Statcast where the exit velocity is measured once a player hits a ball, and we can also see the launch angle of the ball after it leaves the bat. It clearly focuses on measurable, tangible events which can then be evaluated more in depth when we want to understand more about a certain player.
For instance, take OBP, SLG, and OPS.
OBP (on-base percentage) is the frequency by which a player reaches base. This could be due to getting a hit, drawing a walk or being hit by a pitch. The OBP formula is: OBP = hits + walks + hit by pitch / at bats + walks + hit by pitch + sac flies. While batting average (BA) tells us how often we would expect a hitter to get a hit during a plate appearance, OBP incorporates walks which are of course important for scoring opportunities.
SLG (slugging) measures the total bases a player earns per at bat, while giving extra weight to a double, triple and homerun. SLG shows how well a batter can hit for extra bases, which is basically an aspect of their batting power. (That’s is also isolated power or ISO which is SLG – BA.) The formula for SLG is total bases / at bats.
OPS (on-base plus slugging) is a sum of OBP and SLG. It combines a player’s ability to get on base with their power through their SLG. There is also OPS+ which takes into account the ballpark’s dimensions and the altitude of the stadium to compare players without variables that would influence their performance in either direction.
When it comes to balls and strikes there is a subjective element there since different umpires have different strike zones and therefore, one umpire’s strike zone will be different from another’s. However, the MLB is actually testing an automated ball-strike system which would then take out subjectivity.
There is also wOBA (weighted on base average) which accounts for how a player got on base. Homeruns are weighted more than triples, doubles, or singles since they contribute fully to a run. Thus, wOBA is calculated from observable physical events. wOBA predicts run production and is testable against actual scoring.
We also have DRS (defensive runs saved) which attempts to quantify how many runs a particular defenders defense saved which takes into account the defender’s range of his throw, errors and double play ability. It basically is a measure of how many runs a defender cost or saved his team. So a SS who prevents 10 runs in a season has a DRS of +10. (This is similar to the ultimate zone rating—UZR—stat.) Both stats are derived from measurable physical events.
Each of the stats I discussed measure specific and countable actions which are verifiable through replay/Statcast which then tie directly to the game’s result (runs scored/prevented). Advanced baseball stats now have tools like Statcast which analyzes player and ball data during the game. Statcast takes out a lot of subjectivity in certain measurements, and it makes these measurements more reliable. Statcast captures things like exit velocity, launch angle, sprint speed and pitch spin rate. It can also track how far a ball is hit.
The argument that sabermetrics > psychometrics
(P1) If a field relies on quantifiable, observable data (physical events), then its analyses are more accurate.
(P2) If a field’s analyses are more accurate, then it is better for measurement.
(C) So if a field relies on quantifiable, observable data (physical events), then it is better for measurement.
Premise 1
Sabermetrics uses concrete numbers like hits, RBIs and homeruns. BA = hits / at bats, so a player who has 90 hits out of 300 at bats has a .300 average. When it comes to psychometrics mental traits cannot be observed/seen or counted like the physical events in baseball. So sabermetrics satisfies P1 since it relies on quantifiable, observable data while psychometrics fails since it’s data isn’t directly observable nor is it consistently quantifiable in a verifiable way. It should be noted that counting right or wrong answers on a test isn’t the same. A correct answer on a so-called intelligence test doesn’t directly measure intelligence, it’s supposedly a proxy which is influenced by test design and exposure to the items in question.
Premise 2
A player’s OBP can reliably indicate their runs scored contribution which can then be validated by the outcomes in the game. Psychometrics on the other hand has an issue here—one’s performance on a so-called psychometric test can be influenced by time or test type. So sabermetrics satisfies P2, since it’s accurate analyses enhance its measurement strength while psychometrics does not less accurate analyses along with not having the basic requirements for measurement then mean that it’s not measurement proper, at all.
Conclusion
Sabermetrics relies on quantifiable, observable data (P1 is true), and this leads to accurate analyses making it better for measurement (P2 is true), so sabermetrics > psychometrics since there are actual, quantifiable, observable physical events to be measured and analyzed by sabermetricians while the same is not true for psychometrics.
Since only counting and measurement qualify for quantification because they provide meaningful representations of quantities, then sabermetrics excels as a true quantitative field by directly rallying observable physical events. The numbers used in sabermetrics reflect real physical events and not interpretations. Batting average and on-base percentage are calculated directly from counts without introducing arbitrary scaling, meaning that a clear link to the original quantifiable events are maintained.
Conclusion
Rooted in data and observable, physical events, sabermetrics comes out the clear winner in this comparison. Fields that use quantifiable, observable evidence yield better, clearer insights and these insights then allow a field to gauge its subject accurately. This clearly encompasses sabermetrics. The data used in sabermetrics are based on quantifiable, observable data (physical events).
On the other hand, psychometrics fails where sabermetrics flourishes. Psychometrics lacks observable, quantifiable substance that true measurement demands. There is no specified measured object, object of measurement and measurement unit for IQ or any psychological trait. Therefore, psychometrics can’t satisfy the premises in the argument that I have constructed.
Basically, psychometricians render “mere application of number systems to objects” (Garrison, 2004: 63). Therefore, there is an illusion of measurement for psychometrics. The psychometrician claims they can assess abstract constructs that cannot be directly observed while also using indirect proxies like answers to test questions—which are not the trait themselves. There is no standardized unit in psychometrics and, for example for IQ, not true “0” point. Psychometricians order people from high to low, without using true countable units.
If there is physical event analysis then there is quantifiable data. If there is quantifiable data, then there is better measurement. So if there is physical event analysis, then there is better measurement. Thus, if there is no physical event analysis, then there is no measurement. It’s clear which field holds for each premise. The mere fact that baseball is a physical event and we can then count and average out certain aspects of player performance means that sabermetrics is true measurement (since there is a specified measured object, object of measurement and measurement unit) while psychometrics isn’t (no specified measured object, object of measurement and measurement unit).
Thus, sabermetrics > psychometrics.
Gould’s Argument Against the “General Factor of Intelligence”
2050 words
Introduction
In his 1981 book The Mismeasure of Man, Stephen Jay Gould mounted a long, historical argument, against scientific racism and eugenics. A key point to the book was arguing against the so-called “general factor of intelligence” (GFI). Gould argued that the GFI was a mere reification—an abstraction treated as a concrete entity. In this article, I will formalize Gould’s argument from the book (that g is a mere statistical abstraction), and that we, therefore, should reject the GFI. Gould’s argument is one of ontology—basically what g is or isn’t. I have already touched on Gould’s argument before, but this will be a more systematic approach in actually formalizing the argument and defending the premises.
Spearman’s g was falsified soon after he proposed it. Jensen’s g is an unfalsifiable tautology, a circular construct where test performance defines intelligence and intelligence explains performance. Geary’s g rests on an identity claim: that g is identical to mitochondrial functioning and can be localized to ATP, but it lacks causal clarity and direct measurability to elevate it beyond a mere correlation to a real, biologically-grounded entity.
Gould’s argument against the GFI
In Mismeasure, Gould attacked historical hereditarian figures as reifying intelligence as a unitary, measurable entity. Mainly attacking Spearman’s Burt, Gould argued that since Spearman saw positive correlations between tests that, therefore, there must be a GFI to explain test intercorrelations. Spearman’s GFI is the first principle component (PC1), which Jensen redefined to be g. (We also know that Spearman saw what he wanted to see in his data; Schlinger, 2003.) Here is Gould’s (1981: 252) argument against the GFI:
Causal reasons lie behind the positive correlations of most mental tests. But what reasons? We cannot infer the reasons from a strong first principal component any more than we can induce the cause of a single correlation coefficient from its magnitude. We cannot reify g as a “thing” unless we have convincing, independent information beyond the fact of correlation itself.
Using modus tollens, the argument is:
(P1) If g is a real, biologically-grounded entity, then it should be directly observable or measurable independently of statistical correlations in test performance.
(P2) But g is not directly observable or measurable as a distinct entity in the brain or elsewhere; it is only inferred from factor analysis of test scores.
(C) So g is not a real biologically-grounded entity—it is a reification, an abstraction mistaken for a concrete reality.
(P1) A real entity needs a clear, standalone existence—not just a shadow in data.
(P2) g lacks this standalone evidence, it’s tied to correlations.
(C) So g isn’t real; it’s reified.
Hereditarians treat g as quantifiable brainstuff. That is, they assume that it can already be measured. For g to be more than a statistical artifact, it would need to have an independent, standalone existence—like an actual physical trait—and not merely just be a statistical pattern in data. But Gould shows that no one has located where in the brain this occurs—despite even Jensen’s (1999) insistence about g being quantifiable brainstuff:
g…[is] a biological [property], a property of the brain
The ultimate arbiter among various “theories of intelligence” must be the physical properties of the brain itself. The current frontier of g research is the investigation of the anatomical and physiological features of the brain that cause g.
…psychometric g has many physical correlates…[and it] is a biological phenomenon.
Just like in Jensen’s infamous 1969 paper, he wrote that “We should not reify g as an entity…since it is only a hypothetical construct“, but then he contradicted himself 10 pages later writing that g (“intelligence”) “is a biological reality and not just a figment of social conventions.” However, here are the steps that Jensen uses to infer that g exists:
(1) If there is a general intelligence factor “g,” then it explains why people perform well on various cognitive tests.
(2) If “g” exists and explains test performance, the absence of “g” would mean that people do not perform well on these tests.
(3) We observe that people do perform well on various cognitive tests (i.e., test performance is generally positive).
(4) Therefore, since “g” would explain this positive test performance, we conclude that “g” exists.
Put another way, the argument is: If g exists then it explains test performance; we see test performance; therefore g exists. Quite obviously, it seems like logic wasn’t Jensen’s strong point.
But if g is reified as a unitary, measurable entity, then it must be a simple, indivisible capacity which uniformly underlies all cognitive abilities. So if g is a simple, indivisible capacity that uniform underlies all cognitive abilities, then it must be able to be expressed as a single, consistent property unaffected by the diversity of cognitive tasks. So if g is reified as a unitary, real entity, then it must be expressed as a single cognitive property unaffected by the diversity of cognitive tasks. But g cannot be expressed as a single, consistent property unaffected by the diversity of cognitive tasks, so g cannot be reified as a unitary, real entity. We know, a priori, that a real entity must have a nature that can be defined. Thus, if g is real then it needs to be everything (all abilities) and one thing (a conceptual impossibility). (Note that step 4 in my steps is the rectification that Gould warned about.) The fact of the matter is, the existence of g is circularly tied to the test—which is where P1 comes into play.
“Subtests within a battery of intelligence tests are included n the basis of them showing a substantial correlation with the test as a whole, and tests which do not show such correlations are excluded.” (Tyson, Jones, and Elcock, 2011: 67)
This quote shows the inherent circularity in defining intelligence from a hereditarian viewpoint. Since only subtests that correlate are chosen, there is a self-reinforcing loop, meaning that the intercorrelations merely reflect test design. Thus, the statistical analysis merely “sees” what is already built into the test which then creates a false impression of a unified general factor. So using factor analysis to show that a general factor arises is irrelevant—since it’s obviously engineered into the test. The claim that “intelligence is what IQ tests measure” (eg Van der Maas, Kan, and Borsboom, 2014) but the tests are constructed to CONFIRM a GFI. Thus, g isn’t a discovered truth, it’s a mere construct that was created due to how tests themselves are created. g emerges from IQ tests designed to produce correlated subtest scores, since we know that subtests are included on the basis of correlation. The engineering of this positive manifold creates g, not as a natural phenomenon, but as a human creation. Unlike real entities which exist independently of how we measure them, g’s existence hinges on test construction which then stripes it of its ontological autonomy.
One, certainly novel, view on the biology supposedly underlying g is Geary’s (2018, 2019, 2020, 2021) argument that mitochondrial functioning—specifically the role of mitochondrial functioning in producing ATP through oxidative phosphorylation—is the biological basis for g. Thus, since mitochondria fuel cellular processes including neuronal activity, Geary links that efficiency to cognitive performance across diverse tasks which then explains the positive manifold. But Geary relies on correlations between mitochondrial health and cognitive outcomes without causal evidence tying it to g. Furthermore, environmental factors like pollutants affect mitochondrial functioning which means that external influences—and not an intrinsic g—could drive the observed patterns. Moreover, Schubert and Hagemann (2020) showed that Geary’s hypothesis doesn’t hold under scrutiny. Again, g is inferred from correlational outcomes, and not observed independently. Since Geary identifies g with mitochondrial functioning, he assumes that the positive manifold reflects a single entity, namely ATP efficiency. Thus, without proving the identity, Geary reifies a correlation into a thing, which is what Gould warned about not doing. Geary also assumes that the positive manifold demands a biological cause, making it circular (much like Jensen’s g). My rejection of Geary’s hypothesis hinges on causality and identity—mitochondrial functioning just isn’t identical with the mythical g.
The ultimate claim I’m making here is that if psychometricians are actually measuring something, then it must be physical (going back to what Jensen argued about g having a biological basis and being a brain property). So if g is what psychometricians are measuring, then g must be a physical entity. But if g lacks a physical basis or the mental defies physical reduction, then psychometrics isn’t measuring anything real. This is indeed why psychometrics isn’t measurement and, therefore, why a science of the mind is impossible.
For something to exist as a real, biological entity, it must exhibit real verifiable properties, like hemoglobin and dopamine, and it must exhibit specific, verifiable properties: a well-defined structure or mechanism; a clear function; and causal powers that can be directly observed and measured independently of the tools used to detect it. Clearly, these hallmarks distinguish real entities from mere abstractions/statistical artifacts. As we have seen, g doesn’t meet the above criteria, so the claim that g is a biologically-grounded entity is philosophically untenable. Real biological entities have specific, delimited roles, like the role of hemoglobin in the transportation of oxygen. But g is proposed as a single, unified factor that explains ALL cognitive abilities. So the g concept is vague and lacks the specificity expected of real biological entities.
Hemoglobin can be measured in a blood sample but g can’t be directly observed or quantified outside of the statistical framework of IQ test correlations. Factor analysis derives g from patters of test performance, not from an independent biological substrate. Further, intelligence encompasses distinct abilities, as I have argued. g cannot coherently unify the multiplicity of what makes up intelligence, without sacrificing ontological precision. As I argued above, real entities maintain stable, specific identities—g’s elasticity, which is stretched to explain all cognition—undermines it’s claims to be a singular, real thing.
Now I can unpack the argument like this:
(P1) A concept is valid if, and only if, it corresponds to an independently verifiable reality.
(P2) If g corresponds to an independently verifiable reality, then it must be directly measurable or observable beyond the correlations of IQ test scores.
(P3) But g is not directly observable beyond the correlations of IQ test scores; it is constructed through the deliberate selection of subtests that correlate with the overall test.
(C1) Thus g does not correspond to an independently verifiable reality.
(C2) Thus, g is not a valid concept.
Conclusion
The so-called evidence that hereditarians have brought to the table to infer the existence of g for almost 100 years since Spearman clearly fails. Even after Spearman formulated it, it was quickly falsified (Heene, 2008). Even then, for the neuroreductionist who would try to argue that MRI or fMRI would show a biological basis to the GFI, they would run right into the empirical/logical arguments from Uttal’s anti-neuroreduction arguments.
g is not a real, measurable entity in the brain or biology but a reified abstraction shaped by methodological biases and statistical convenience. g lacks the ontological coherence and empirical support of real biological entities. Now, if g doesn’t exist—especially as an explanation for IQ test performance—then we need an explanation, and it can be found in social class.
(P1) If g doesn’t exist then psychometricians are showing other sources of variation.
(P2) The items on the test are class-dependent.
(P3) If psychometricians are showing other sources of variation and the items on the tests are class-dependent, then IQ score differences are mere surrogates for social class.
(C) Thus, if g doesn’t exist then IQ score differences are mere surrogates for social class.
We don’t need a mysterious factor to explain the intercorrelations. What does explain it is class—exposure to the item content of the test. We need to dispense with a GFI, since it’s conceptual incoherence and biological implausibility undermine it’s validity as a scientific construct. Thus, g will remain a myth. This is another thing that Gould got right in his book, along with his attack on Morton.
Gould was obviously right about the reification of g.
The Developmental Systems Argument Against Hereditarianism
2000 words
“Genetic determinism can be described as the attribution of the formation of traits to genes, where genes are ascribed more causal power than what scientific consensus suggests” Gerick et al (2017)
Defining hereditarianism and DST
Hereditarianism has many entailments, but a main one is that genes are necessary and sufficient for phenotypes. Hereditarianism can be defined succinctly as: the belief that human traits, behaviors, and capabilities are predominantly or solely caused by genetic inheritance, with the environment being negligible. So this belief implies that genes are necessary (without the specific genes, the trait wouldn’t appear) and sufficient (the genes in question can alone account for the appearance of the trait without significant environmental influence). So if genes are sufficient for phenotypes, then we could predict one’s phenotype from one’s genotype. (It’s also reductionist and deterministic). That a form of genetic determinism is taught in schools (Jamieson and Radick, 2017) is one reason why this hereditarian view must be fought.
But if development is understood as the dynamic interaction between genes, environment, and developmental products where no single factor dominates in the development of an organism (the DST view), then a view that assumes the primacy of one of the developmental resources (hereditarianism and it’s assumption about genes), then this leads to a logical incompatibility and incoherence. Since certain things are true about organismal development, then hereditarianism cannot possibly be true. I have made a similar argument to this before, but I have not formalized it in this way. Since we know that development is context-dependent, and we know that hereditarianism assumes the context-independence of genes, we can rightly assume that hereditarianism is false. Furthermore, since hereditarianism assumes no or negligible developmental plasticity, then that’s another reason to reject it. Here’s the argument:
(1) Hereditarianism (H) implies genetic determinism (GD).
(2) GD implies negligible developmental plasticity (DP).
(3) But DP isn’t negligible.
(C) Therefore H is false.
H=hereditarianism
GD=genetic determinism
D=developmental plasticity/environmental influence
(1) H->GD
(2) GD->¬D
(3) D
(C) ∴¬H
Under the assumption that hereditarianism is a species of genetic determinism, and DST is a context-dependent account of development: If DST is accurate, then hereditarianism is false. We know that traits aren’t genetically determined, so DST is accurate. Therefore, hereditarianism must be false.
Hereditarians have tried paying lip service to the interactionist/developmental systems view (as I showed here and here), but by definition, hereditarianism discounts interactionism since even their main tool (the heritability estimate) assumes no interaction between genes and environment (whereas the interaction between genes and environment is inherent in the DST philosophy).
We know that genes are not sole determinants of phenotypes, but they are one of many interacting developmental resources, which refutes the often unstated assumption that genes are blueprints or recipes for development. Hereditarianism doesn’t and can’t account for the fact that the environment can enable, contain, and alter genetic expression. Therefore, a holistic—and not reductionist—view of development is one we should accept. The hereditarian view of development is clearly untenable.
Below is an argument I’ve constructed that relies on the argument in Noble (2011) for genes as passive causes:
(1) If genes are passive information carriers, then they do not initiate biological processes independently.
(2) Genes do not initiate their own transcription or replication; they react to triggering signals within a biological system.
(3) Therefore, genes are passive information carriers.
(4) If something is a passive information carrier, it cannot be considered an active cause of biological processes.
(5) So if genes are passive information carriers, then genes cannot be considered an active cause of biological processes.
Noble’s biological relativity argument
Hereditarianism assumes a privileged level of causation (genes are the privileged resource of development). But we know—a priori—that there is no privileged level of causation in biological systems (Noble’s 2012 biological relativity argument). So hereditarianism must be false. Here’s the argument:
We know the biological systems are characterized by multiple interacting levels molecular, cellular, organismal, environmental) where each level can influence each other in a dynamic way. So no single level has a causal priority over another. In biological systems, causation is understood as the process by which one event or state leads to another. So for there to be a privileged level of causation in biological systems, one level would need to be inherently more deterministic or controlling of others, independent of the context that the developing organism is situated. But each level of biological organization (from genes to the ecosystem of the organisms) is interdependent where changes at one level can only be understood in relation to changes at other levels (genetic expression is influenced by cellular conditions, which are then affected by organismal health and environmental factors).
So no level of biological organization operates independently or can dictate outcomes without influence or interaction with other levels. Even what may seem like so-called “genetic causes” require the cell to read the context-dependent information in the gene. So there is a feedback loop where influences are not unidirectional but reciprocal. While genes can influence protein synthesis, the need for proteins can regulate gene expression through feedback mechanisms. Therefore, a priori, there is no privileged level of causation in biological systems, since each level is part of an integrated system where causation is distributed and context-dependent, not localized to any one of the levels of biological organization.
See these references for more on how genes are necessary, passive causes but not sufficient causes. These references attest to how genes are looked at today in systems biology, not using a reductionist viewpoint. Oyama, 2000; Moore, 2001; Shapiro, 2013; Kampourakis, 2017; Richardson, 2017, 2020, 2021, 2022; Baverstock, 2021; McKenna, Gawne, and Nijhout, 2022. But here is the gist:
“Active causation” is when X causes or initiates an event to occur, whereas “passive causation” is when X is causes to do something or forced to do something by something else or another situation/event. Both Baverstock and Noble argue that genes (DNA sequences) are passive causes, meaning they don’t initiate the causation of traits. Baverstock also argued that the phenotype plays an active role in morphogenesis and evolution, causing changes in processes (which is similar to West-Eberhard’s and Lerner’s views conceptualizing genes as followers, not leaders, in the evolutionary process).
Noble also argues that genes aren’t active, but rather passive causes, since they merely react to the signals from what is occurring in the developmental system and the environment (which, in this case is conceptualized differently in different contexts for the purpose of this argument like the uterine environment, the environments that get created through the interactions of gene products, gene and gene interactions and gene environment interactions which are ultimately caused by the physiological system). He then ultimately, using Shapiro’s “read write genome argument”, argued that the only kind of causation that can be attributed to genes is passive, in the same way that computer programs read and use databases.
Using Oyama’s concept of “information”, it’s not a property of biological things, but is a relational, contextual concept, arguing that is constructed by the history of the developmental system, while information then emerged through the irreducible interactions which are ultimately caused by the self-organizing developmental system; she calls this “constructive interactionism.”
Over the last 40 years since the publication of Oyama’s developmental systems theory and the subsequent strengthening of her view, we’ve come to find out that genes (and genotypes) aren’t causes in and of themselves, and that genes are mere inert molecules, outside of the living cell. So if the cell activates a gene, then the gene transcribes information (remembering how “information” is conceptualized in Oyama’s DST; this premise establishes a causal relationship between the cell and a gene, with the cell activating the gene since the cell is the active cause and the gene is the passive one). If the gene transcribes its information (of which then ontogeny of information is relational and contextual, emerging through the irreducible actions of the developmental resources), then it produces a protein. So if the cell activates a gene, then it produces a protein (the cell being the active cause and the gene and the protein being passive causes).
“But genes load the gun and environment pulls the trigger”
This is a phrase I’ve heard quite a bit, and I think it’s wrong due to what I’ve outlined above. It’s still deterministic and it looks at genes as active causes. The “genes load the gun” part of the phrase assumes that genes have an active role in initiating biological potentials. But we know that genes are acted on by cellular and environmental context, which then dictates genetic expression. It also assumes linear causation, in a one-way, cause-and-effect sequence.
The claim that the environment merely “pulls the trigger” assumes that there is already an inherent “information” that’s in the genes, which is why that’s a genetic determinist claim. It also minimizes the environment to an activator rather than a co-creator of biological outcomes. So using Oyama’s concept of information as something constructed through developmental interactions emphasizes that the environment doesn’t merely activate what’s already there, it also participates in the very construction of biological information and the ontogeny of traits. It also presumes that genes store all relevant information, but we know that it’s dynamically-shaped, using—but not limited to—genes as passive causes. Basically, biological information is an emergent property of biological systems, not a preexisting genetic code.
Furthermore, since we know that the phenotype plays an active role in morphogenesis and evolution, we know that the outcome (the phenotype) isn’t just a result of genetic loading followed by environmental activation. The phenotype actively contributes to shaping genetic expression and evolutionary trajectories. So if genes are activated by the cell and the broader physiological system, then the idea of genes loading anything independently falls apart. Genes are read or used by the physiological system to carry out certain processes in a context-dependent nanner, not setting the stage, but responding to it.
Conclusion
The role of genes in biological systems and causation as discussed by Noble, Richardson, Oyama, Moore, West-Eberhard, Baverstock, Shapiro and others directly refutes the hereditarian/genetic determinist view of what genes do in biological systems. Genes aren’t the primary architects of biological outcomes; instead genes are seen as passive components within a dynamic, interactive system.
By definition, hereditarianism assumes that genes are necessary and sufficient for causes for phenotypes (genes are the primary drivers of trait ontogeny and development). By definition, DST holds that development is an emergent property of a system where genes are just one component among many influencing factors. If development were primarily determined by genetics, then it would contradict the foundational tenet of DST, that development results from interdependent influences. So since hereditarianism and DST are mutually exclusive in their core assertions about the role of genetics in development, hereditarianism cannot be true since we know that a priori there is no privileged level of causation in biological systems.
So quite clearly hereditarianism fails on conceptual, logical, and empirical grounds. The work that’s been done over the past 50 years in biology—both conceptually and empirically—shows that the old way of viewing genes and their role in organismal development just doesn’t work anymore. Biological outcomes are not merely due to genetic blueprints but are dynamically-shaped outcomes, constructed through the irreducible interactions of multiple levels and resources, which then renders hereditarianism simplistic and outdated in the face of modern biological understanding. Noble’s biological relativity argument is a powerful argument that has direct implications for hereditarianism, and the strengthening of the argument from Baverstock and McKenna, Gawne, and Nijhout definitively show the emptiness in any kind of assumptions that genes are active cause of biological processes. Thus, we should ridicule hereditarian views of the gene and what it does in development. It’s simply an untenable view that one cannot logically defend in the face of the conceptual and empirical work on biological systems.
Therefore, to be a hereditarian in 2025 is to show that one does not understand current biological thinking.
Restricting Racist Speech: An Argument Against Free Speech
2250 words
Introduction
Speech should have limits. Growing up in America, this of course sounds like crazy talk. But the fact that we agree that actions that cause harm to others should be restricted then leads to a contradiction—and it’s due to this contradiction that we should—and in some cases do—not let anyone say whatever is on their minds without consequence. Think of defamation laws, harassment and violence-incitement. Social media amplifies hate speech—especially now where, although it’s not fully a “free speech platform”, Twitter has turned into a cesspool of hate speech (see here for examples). So if we agree that certain actions that cause harm to others should be restricted, then there is a logical contradiction—mainly that allowing speech that causes harm contradicts the principle that we should avoid harm causing actions. There is a moral imperative to restrict racist speech acts.
(1) We agree that certain actions that cause harm to others should be restricted.
Knowing this:
(2) Assume that we shouldn’t restrict any forms of speech.
(3) This implies that speech that causes harm shouldn’t be restricted.
(4) But we know that certain kinds of speech acts cause harm, leading to negative mental and physiological health outcomes and violence.
(5) But allowing speech that causes harm contradicts the principle that actions which cause harm should be restricted.
(6) So the assumption that speech should have no restrictions—including speech that causes harm—leads to a contradiction with (1), since actions that cause harm to others should be restricted.
(8) Therefore, some forms of speech—particularly speech that causes harm—should be restricted to prevent negative consequences.
Put simply: (1) Actions causing harm should be restricted. (2) Since some speech acts cause tangible harm, then unfettered speech acts contradict the principle that actions which cause harm should be restricted. (C) So speech restrictions are justified.
Or:
(1) If speech causes tangible harm, then it should be restricted to prevent that harm. (2) Some forms of speech—including incitement to violence, defamation, and true threats—cause tangible harm. Therefore, (C) these forms of speech should be restricted.
The argument I have constructed against free speech I have constructed is valid, and I will argue for it’s soundness. I will then discuss how we can identify racist speech (though I think it is pretty obvious), then I will argue that such speech causes tangible harm. I will show that then racist then is caught in a contradiction that he cannot see himself out of—namely that they presumably think that crime is bad based on talking about all types of racial crime differences but then contradict that by engaging in action which lead to crime.
Defending the argument
The argument assumes Mill’s harm principle (HP)—where Mills stated that “the only purpose for which power can be rightly exercised over any member if a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.” Even in America, where we have the First Amendment, certain speech acts are restricted—like defamation, incitement to violence and true threats. So while free expression is meaningful, it’s clearly not absolute, and I argue that we should extend that to hate speech, since hate speech causes tangible harm.
The HP also lines up with the ethical view that one’s actions should not infringe upon the well-being and rights of others. Therefore, speech should be judged on the impact it has towards others. We can then extend this to not only individual harm but broader, societal harm. Speech acts that promote systemic discrimination—like hate speech—can and should be restricted since they contribute to an environment in which certain groups are systematically disadvantaged or harmed which then gels well with the notion that harm would include social and psychological impacts.
We can then extend the HP to include psychological and emotional harm. Speech that systematically targets individuals or groups can cause significant emotional distress and could lead to significant mental health issues should be considered under the HP. Certain speech acts can contribute to systemic harm by perpetuating or reinforcing structures of oppression, like racist, sexist, or anti-same-sex speech.
Thus, the HP should be extended to include preventative measures against potential harm. So in cases where speech is likely to incite violence or discrimination, preventative restrictions should be in place, especially where there are historical or contemporary tensions.
For instance, look at the RFK’s idiotic view that vaccines cause autism. This is a view that should not be amplified, since it could lead to lower rates of vaccination and along with it, physical (and mental) harm. What RFK is saying is outright misinformation, since we have large trials which definitively show that vaccines do not cause autism (and the study that RFK is presumably referring to is even retracted; (Allen and Ivers, 2010; Eggertson, 2010, see Wakefield et al, 1998).
Identifying racist speech
To identify racist speech, we can just look at the language used. Racist speech denies the humanity, dignity or worth of individuals based on their race. It makes sweeping generalizations or assumptions about a group based on preconceived notions or biases. It demonizes a group, portraying them as evil, dangerous, or threatening. It excludes or ignores experiences or concerns of a group. It uses derogatory language like slurs and epithets which are intended to degrade and offend. It advocates for discrimination or violence against a group. And it perpetuates systemic racism by justifying discriminatory policies practices or institutions which exacerbate inequalities. So:
A speech act is a racist speech act, iff
(1) it dehumanizes, stereotypes, demonizes, marginalizes, or uses derogatory language against individuals or groups based on their race, ethnicity or national origin; or (2) it promotes hate, discrimination or harm against individuals based on their race, ethnicity, or national origin; or (3) it perpetuates systemic racism by reinforcing or justifying discriminatory practices, policies, or institutions that perpetuate racial inequalities.
Racist speech acts are those that dehumanize, demean, or discriminate aya7shr individuals or groups based on race. Language has both explicit and implicit meanings, and its racial B can be identified through the explicit use of racial slurs or derogatory terms which are historically and universally recognized as demeaning to specific racial groups. So the context in which words are used significantly influences their racist nature where one stereotypes and makes generalizations about racial groups including individualw to a set of prejudiced assumptions. The intent should also be considered, but the impact often outweighs good intentions.
Speech from those in positions of power or privilege which targets marginalized groups amplifies the racist impact due to the existing power balance in society. But even if the speech in question is intended to not be racist, if it reinforces racial hierarchies, promotes discrimination, or causes harm, then it could be considered racist in its effects (this is why I think the “HBD”-hereditarian movement is racist). So historical and cultural references also inform the racist nature of certain speech acts.
Thus, to identify racist speech acts, one must analyze not just the words one uses but the context in which they’re said, intent, impact, power dynamics, and the historical and cultural weight they carry. This goes beyond what is on the surface of the words that one speaks or writes and allows us to recognize when a speech act is a racist one.
The moral contradiction of the racist
Now we come to the issue of racist hate speech. We know that racism and stereotypes which lead to self-fulfilling prophecies cause the black-white crime gap (based on considerations of the theory of African American offending). We also know that racism causes “weathering” in black women (Geronimus et al 2006, 2011; Sullivan, 2015) So since we know that racism leads to crime in the black American population, and we know that it leads to differences in physical and mental health, we know that racism is morally wrong. So the HP should be extended to include racist speech acts, since they have tangible effects. Racist speech acts promote harmful stereotypes, and contribute to crime through marginalization which then cause physiological and psychological harm. In the argument that I made here, I showed that since crime is bad and racism causes crime then racism is bad—this is a simple, yet powerful argument. So since racist speech acts can lead to tangible harms, both directly (through incitement or psychological stress) and indirectly (contributing to systemic issues like crime rates in African Americans), such views should be restricted. I assume that racists think that crime is bad, but since we know that racism and stereotypes which lead to self-fulfilling prophecies cause crime for African Americans, it seems that their racist speech acts lead to a real-world contradiction.
The argument as I have constructed it is:
(1) Crime is bad. (2) Racism causes crime. (C) Thus, racism is morally wrong. (1) is self-evident based on people not wanting to be harmed. (2) is known upon empirical examination, like the TAAO and it’s successful novel predictions. (C) then logically follows.
…
B stands for “crime is bad”, C stands for “racism causes crime”, D stands for racism is objectively incorrect, so from B and C we derive D (if C causes B and B is bad, then D is morally wrong). So the argument is “(B ^ C) -> D”. B and C lead to D, proving validity.
So: (1) If actions causing harm should be restricted ((B ^ C) –> D), and racist speech acts cause harm both directly and indirectly, then racist speech acts should be restricted. (2) Actions causing harm should be restricted (B is true based on ethical principles) and racist speech acts cause harm (C is true based on empirical evidence). Therefore, (C) racist speech acts should be restricted (D is true).
This is the moral conundrum of the racist. Racists agree that crime is bad (which can be seen by there hyper-focus on black-on-white, black-on-black, and black-on-Asian crime). But their speech acts contribute to the very actions they condemn. This is a contradiction. If racists believe that crime is bad, and if we accept the evidence that racism and stereotypes contribute to crime for African Americans (and we should since the TAAO makes successful novel predictions), then by promoting racism through their speech acts, racists are inadvertently contributing to what they claim to despise! If one holds to the claim that crime is bad, then one should therefore have a moral responsibility to not contribute to its causes. So by promoting racism, racists are directly contributing to crime. Racists, then, have an inconsistency between their beliefs and actions.
Conclusion
Most agree that we shouldn’t have ultimate free speech, which I take to be saying whatever you want whenever you want to whomever you want. Of course, in private, two people could express views to each other that would be seen as negative to society at large, but they would not be harm-causing speech acts since they are only expressing such views to themselves and not going on social media and airing their racism for millions to see. Using and extending Mills’ harm principle then allows us to restrict certain speech that causes harm. So since we know that racist speech acts lead to psychological and physiological harm and since we know (based on TAAO studies) that racism and stereotypes which lead to self-fulfilling prophecies lead to crime in black Americans, such racist hate speech must be regulated.
I showed when a speech act is a racist speech act, by stating some conditions. Racists today distribute racism in the form of memes and “jokes” on social media. It is pretty obvious when speech is meant to convey a racist tone and be applied toward a group, and the conditions I have paid out pave the way for that.
I showed that racist hate speech leads to increased rates of ctime in black Americans. The TAAO not only shows how racism is linked to crime, it also shows how racist speech acts perpetuate harmful stereotypes which then lead to self-fulfilling prophecies which then cause crime among African Americans. So this suggests that since racism leads to crime (which is universally seen as bad) among African Americans, then racist speech (as a form of action) should then be seen as morally reprehensible and therefore potentially restrictable under the HP. And since we know that racist speech acts lead to weathering and increased allostatic load, this is yet another reason to restrict such speech. Such speech acts contribute to these health disparities by creating environments of chronic stress and marginalization. Thus, by recognizing these health outcomes as tangible harms, we can further justify applying the HP to racist speech.
The ethical flaw of the racist was discussed. They claim to oppose crime (as seen by their continual discussions of inter-racial and intra-racial crime), yet their speech promotes conditions which increase crime rates among the very groups they discriminate against. So the racist in fact contributes to crime, which then undermines their own moral stance against crime!
This is why we should not have a kind of free-reign free speech—because it’s quite cleat that racism leads to crime in the black American population and that racism leads to negative psychological and physiological health outcomes. Therefore, knowing this, “free speech” shouldn’t be a thing. We should restrict it not only for the societal health of the country but for the psychological and psychological health and well-being of groups and individuals.
Culture Is a Product of Mind, Not Genes
1500 words
Introduction
For years HBDers like JayMan and hbdchick have insinuated that differences in culture are due to differences in genes. They basically reduce culture to genes (like the “good reductionists” they are). But if certain things are true about human culture and therefore thought and action, then that would throw a wrench into their insinuation here.
I will show that their ultimate claim—differences in culture are due to differences in genes—is unfounded and I will then show where culture DOES come from based on what we know about human culture, thought, and action. All in all, this will refute the reductionist HBD claim about culture and genes.
The argument
P1: All human expression is thought and action.
P2: Culture is human expression.
C: Therefore culture is thought and action.
P3: Thoughts are immaterial.
P4: Actions are products of thoughts.
C2: So human culture cannot be reduced to genes.
P1 claims that human expression can be broken down into cognitive processes (thought) and physical manifestations (the actions that lead to physical changes in the world based on the intention of the human’s thought). Every form of human expression begins with a thought and an action. P2 claims that culture encompasses beliefs, behaviors, values and symbols, which then define a cultural (ethnic) group. So since these elements are expressed by humans, then culture is inherently a form of human expression. C then logically follows.
P3 is then the dualist premise, which states that thoughts aren’t physical—they’re immaterial. Just refer to the Ross-Feser immaterial aspects of thought argument. Thoughts precede and cause actions – actions have purpose and intent derived from thought. If one acts, then they thought about it first (since actions are intentional) so P4 is true. So from 3 and 4, we understand that thoughts are immaterial and actions come from thoughts. So if culture is thought and action, and these elements are not material like genes, then it follows that culture cannot be reduced to genes.
But where DOES culture come from?
In a 2013 comment, JayMan (in his typical reductionist fashion) wrote:
First of all, let’s stop right here. Where does “culture” come from?
The answer: All human behavioral traits are heritable.
[And even on 12/27/24 writing on Twitter]
Culture *is* genetic. Where does culture come from? You know that all human behavioral traits are heritable, right?
Typical JayMan nonsense (see here for a refutation of the “laws of behavioral genetics“). Culture is an emergent property based on minds, socialization, and the immediate ecology that the group finds itself it. Of course the adaptability and diffusion of cultural change occurring so quickly, nowhere near the timeframe for genetic change, shows that culture isn’t merely (nor at all) due to the expression of genes, but is a dynamic, irreducible human construct. Since I have established that culture is thought and action due to it being an outcome of human expression, this sets the stage for the refutation of the claim that cultural differences are due to genetic differences. So culture is more about human agency, social interactions, and the physical ecology the human group finds themselves in.
The question “Where does culture come from?” is a loaded one, since the HBDers oversimplify culture as being due to genes and they also imply that since ethnies have genetic differences and also cultural differences that this can therefore be reduced to genetic differences between these groups.
The claim that culture is genetic could imply that genes would predispose groups of people to engage in certain kinds of culture. But this betrays an important point, namely that culture is highly dynamic, and influenced by numerous factors such as education, environment, historical context, and social interactions. So if we understand culture we being what is SOCIALLY TRANSMITTED across generations, then the JayMan/hbdchick question quickly crumbles. Culture is “human-created environment, artifacts, and practices” (Vasileva and Balyasnikova, 2019).
Under a Vygotskian conception, cultural practices and knowledge are passed down and developed through social—not genetic—means. Being that culture is transmitted through language, symbols, signs, and artifacts, they then mediate human cognitive processes and influence how people think and act. Thus, culture is constructed through the use of these specific tools, and is NOT an expression of a group’s genes. Since people internalize cultural patterns through social learning, what start as external and social activities then become internalized (think of the concept of private speech). Thus, this undermines the idea that culture is genetic, since it shows culture as something they’d learned, adapted, and integrated into one’s cognitive framework through social interactions (more specifically, social interactions with more knowledgeable others). Since human development is historically situated, this means that the cultural context that one grows and develops in shapes one’s cognitive and behavioral development. This shows how culture changes over time, too quickly for the genetic explanation to work.
The emphasis of social and cultural learning shows us that cultural traits cannot possible be “genetically encoded” (whatever that means). So if culture is learned through social interactions and mediated by cultural tools, then the diversity and change in cultures are better explained by social dynamics rather than genetic (pre-)dispositions. So variation in cultural practices across or within societies can be seen as the result of different social environments, educational systems and historical events rather than going the genetic reductionist/deterministic route. Using Vygotsky’s theory here allows us to focus on how people engage with their cultural environment. The theory also shows the role of human agency in cultural creation and change, which suggests that humans are active participants in cultural evolution.
With this, I am reminded of Gould’s argument in Full House (1996) where he argues that cultural phenomena should be considered on their own and not be considered mere extensions of biological processes and systems.
But human cultural change is an entirely distinct process operating under radically different principals that do allow for the strong possibility of a driven trend for what we may legitamately call “progress” (at least in a technological sense, whether or not the changes ultimately do us any good in a practical or moral way). In this sense, I deeply regret that common usage refers to the history of our artifacts and social orginizations as “cultural evolution.” Using the same term—evolution—for both natural and cultural history obfuscates far more than it enlightens. Of course, some aspects of the two phenomena must be similar, for all processes of genealogically constrained historical change must share some features in common. But the differences far outweigh the similarities in this case. Unfortunately, when we speak of “cultural evolution,” we unwittingly imply that this process shares essential similarity with the phenomenon most widely described by the same name—natural, or Darwinian, change. The common designation of “evolution” then leads to one of the most frequent and portentious errors in our analysis of human life and history—the overly reductionist assumption that the Darwinian natural paradigm will fully encompass our social and technological history as well. I do wish that the term “cultural evolution” would drop from use. Why not speak of something more neutral and descriptive—“cultural change,” for example?
Culture is directed and intentional, and thus cannot be due to genes. So the HBD question “Where does culture come from?” doesn’t lead to the answer they want—it leads to differences in environment, and human agency and social interactions between people.
Conclusion
From the premises that all human expression is thought and action, and that culture is human expression, I have established that culture is not merely due to genes (at all), but is a dynamically-shaped social process, driven by cognitive processes and the choices that people make in their groups and the environments they live in. The argument shows that the wishful thinking of HBDers like JayMan and hbdchick don’t have a basis in reality. So by showing that thoughts are immaterial and actions stem from thoughts, I’ve shown that cultural practices cannot be genetically inherited/caused, but are learned, adapted, and transmitted through social means.
We know that cultural development is a social process and transmitted and transformed through social interactions, language, and education which are external to genetics. Cultural learning also takes place in a zone of proximal development, where individuals internalize social interactions and cultural patterns and processes, which also shows that the JayMan/hbdchick claim is ridiculous. Adding in Gould’s critique, cultural change operates under different principles from biological evolution. Gould’s critique shows that while biological and cultural change do share certain features (historical change), the mechanisms behind cultural shifts are unique, which supports the view that human culture is due to human agency, social dynamics and technological progress rather than being due to genes.
Like with all aspects mind, genes (physical) are NECESSARY for these things to happen, but they are not SUFFICIENT for them. Genetic reductionism is outright false. The claim that “Culture is genetic” is therefore refuted.
An A Priori Argument for Accepting the Theory of African American Offending
1000 words
Introduction
The theory of African American (TAAO) has strong empirical support and predictive power. The predictions are derived from the main premise that there is a unique—peerless—worldview that African Americans (AAs) in which the unique combination of historical, contemporary, and cultural experiences shape experiences of racial discrimination and social marginalization. From this main premise, the predictions are then derived (and have substantial empirical support).
I have shown that, compared to hereditarian explanations of crime, the TAAO is a stronger theory and that we should accept it over any other theory of crime that does not make any successful novel predictions. Here, I will make an a priori argument for why we should accept the TAAO, and why it’s logically necessary to have a race-centric theory of crime.
The argument
If a group is systemically disadvantaged in terms of socioeconomic opportunities education, housing, and legal treatment then this group will have a higher chance of engaging in criminal activities due to strain or necessity. Racial discrimination, as part of systemic disadvantage, leads to feelings of frustration, alienation, and limited legal avenues for social mobility which can be criminogenic. Basically, if AAs have been subjected to centuries of systemic racism (like slavery, Jim Crow laws, segregation and contemporary discrimination), then this history would logically lead to distinct social conditions.
Systemic racism leads to social exclusion and economic deprivation. Social exclusion and economic deprivation increase the likelihood of strain which, per general strain theory, can lead to crime as individuals seek to cope with or escape these conditions. The unique experiences of African Americans, including slavery, segregation, and ongoing discrimination, shapes a distinct worldview and reality which influences behavior.
Knowing this, we could argue that: If African Americans face unique forms of racial subordination, then they would experience unique pressures that could lead to higher rates of offending as a means to navigate or resist said pressures. If African American offending is significantly influenced by historical and contemporary systemic facial discrimination, then a theory that accounts for these dynamics would be inherently more plausible and necessary to explain time patters in the population.
Thus, it follows logically that a theory like the TAAO which incorporates the specific socio-historical context of African Americans would be a priori more relevant than theories which do not consider such factors (nor the predictions that, for example, the TAAO generates) or which rely on universal explanations of human behavior without accounting for racial and cultural nuances.
How is this argument a priori? It starts from the premise that AAs have been subjected to systemic racism, which is of course a historical (and contemporary) fact which isn’t derived from the observation of crime differences between groups but from known discrimination in the US from the arrival of blacks to America. So from this premise, it logically follows that systemic disadvantages would lead to specific social, psychological, and economic pressures which could influence criminal behavior. Systemic racism could cause strain which can then lead to crime and this is deduced from an existing theoretical framework (strain theory). We can also make similar logical connections with other theories (like social control theory and social disorganization theory) which would then suggest that the effects of racial subordination would naturally lead to weakened school bonds, and increased disorganization which is of course correlated with crime.
So if the premises about racial discrimination and historical subordination are true (and they are), then it logically follows that a theory explaining crime must account for such conditions. So the TAAO is necessary a priori because no GENERAL theory of crime can account for the specific historical and social context of AAs without considering racial discrimination and historical subordination. Therefore the argument is consistent with logical principles, it doesn’t contradict itself, and it’s coherent. The premises lead to conclusions about crime that follow logically from what we know about the social history of AAs. So the logical structure of the argument suggests that certain outcomes would follow from the premises of racial discrimination and historical subordination. What the argument does is use established knowledge on the history of AAs in the US to logically deduce why crime is higher in the group.
Thus, the TAAO is more relevant than race-neutral theories of crime. The a priori argument shows the necessity for a race-centric theory of crime, and why we need one to explain crime rates for AAs. Race-neutral and hereditarian theories of crime do not account for what the TAAO does, therefore, any theory of crime that does not account for the above factors should be discarded as an explanation for the phenomenon in question. So if criminal behavior is influenced by unique socio-historical and cultural factors specific to racial groups, then a general theory of crime that does not account for these factors will fail to explain and predict crime accurately for that group. We know that socio-historical and cultural factors, racial identity and community socialization are unique to different racial groups, and have been shown to influence behavior (see the TAAO full and partial tests). Therefore, a race-centric theory of crime is necessary to explain and predict crime for certain groups. So if a race-centric theory of crime is necessary to explain crime for certain groups, then we need to the TAAO to explain why blacks commit more crime in America than other races.
Conclusion
Clearly, race-centric theories of crime are essential for a thorough understanding and prediction of crime. The a priori argument above shows the necessity of such a framework, and also why we should accept a theory that accounts for the above over a theory that does not account for the above. So general theories of crime are insufficient to explain crime in all demographics, and specific theories of crime are needed. It is clear that, since the TAAO makes successful novel predictions that it therefore explains the black-white crime gap. If a theory makes successful novel predictions about a phenomenon, then the theory provides an explanation for that phenomenon. The TAAO makes successful novel predictions about black crime. Therefore, the TAAO provides an explanation of the black-white crime gap and we thusly should accept the theory. It’s only logical to accept a theory that makes successful novel predictions.
Answering Common “Criticisms” of the Theory of African American Offending
4150 words
Introduction
Back in September I published an article arguing that since the theory of African American offending (TAAO) makes successful novel predictions and hereditarian explanations don’t, that we should accept the TAAO over hereditarian explanations. I then published a follow-up arguing that crime is bad and racism causes crime so racism is bad (and I also argued that stereotypes lead to self-fulfilling prophecies which then cause the black-white crime gap). The TAAO combines general strain theory, social control theory, social disorganization theory, learning theory, and low self control theory in order to better explain and predict crime in black Americans (Unnever, 2014).
For if a theory makes successful novel predictions, therefore that raises the probability that the theory is true. Take T1 and T2. T1 makes successful novel predictions. T2 doesn’t. So if T1 and T2 both try to explain the same things, then it’s only logical to accept T1 over T2. That’s the basis of the argument against hereditarian explanations of crime—the main ones all fail. Although some attempt at a theory has been made integrating hereditarian explanations (Ellis’ 2017 evolutionary neuroandrogenic theory), it doesn’t make any novel predictions. I’ve recently argued that that’s a death knell for hereditarian theories—there are no novel predictions of any kind for hereditarianism.
But since I published my comparison of the successes of the TAAO over hereditarian explanations, I’ve come across a few “responses” and they all follow the same trend: “What about Africa, Britain, and other places where blacks commit more crime? Why doesn’t racism cause other groups to commit more crime?” or “So blacks don’t have agency?” or “Despite what you argued against hereditarian explanations what about as-of-yet-to-be-discovered genes or hormonal influences that lead to higher crime in blacks compared to whites?” or “What about IQ and it’s relationship to crime?” or “What control groups are there for TAAO studies?” or “The black-white crime gap was lower during Jim Crow, how is this possible if the TAAO is true?” or “Unnever and Gabbidon are just making excuses for blacks with their TAAO” or “The so-called ‘novel predictions’ you reference aren’t novel at all.” I will answer these in turn and then provide a few more novel predictions of the TAAO.
“What about Africa, Britain, and other places where blacks commit more crime? Why doesn’t racism cause other groups to commit more crime?“
For some reason, TAAO detractors think these are some kind of knock-down questions for the TAAO and think that they disprove it. These are easily answered and they don’t threaten the theory at all.
For one, the theory of AFRICAN AMERICAN offending is irrelevant places that… Aren’t America. It’s a specific theory to explain why blacks commit crime at a higher rate IN AMERICA, therefore other countries are irrelevant. There would need to be a specific theory of crime for each of those places and contexts. So this question doesn’t hurt the theory. So going off of the first question, the answer to the second question also addresses it—it’s a theory that’s specifically formulated to explain and predict crime in a certain population in a certain place.
For two, why would a theory that’s specifically formulated to explain crime using the unique experiences of black Americans matter for other American groups? Blacks went through 400 years of slavery and then after that went through segregation and Jim Crow, so why would it mean anything that other groups face discrimination but then don’t have higher rates of crime compared to the average? Since the theory has specific focus on understanding the unique experiences and dynamics of crime in the black American population, it’s obvious that asking about other groups is just irrelevant. Other racial and ethnic groups aren’t the primary focus—since it aims to address historical and contemporary factors that lead to higher crime in the black American population. It’s in the name of the theory—so why would other racial groups matter? Unnever and Gabbidon (2011: 37) even explicitly addressed this point:
Our work builds upon the fundamental assumption made by Afrocentists that an understanding of black offending can only be attained if their behavior is situated within the lived experiences of being African American in a conflicted, racially stratified society. We assert that any criminological theory that aims to explain black offending must place the black experience and their unique worldview at the core of its foundation. Our theory places the history and lived experiences of African American people at its center. We also fully embrace the Afrocentric assumption that African American offending is related to racial subordination. Thus, our work does not attempt to create a “general” theory of crime that applies to every American; instead, our theory explains how the unique experiences and worldview of blacks in America are related to their offending. In short, our theory draws on the strengths of both Afrocentricity and the Eurocentric canon.
“So blacks don’t have agency?”
The theory doesn’t say that blacks lack agency (the capacity to make decisions and choices) at all. What the theory does say is that systemic factors like racism, socioeconomic disparities, and historical and contemporary marginalization can influence one’s choices and opportunities. So while individuals have agency, their choices are shaped by the social context they find themselves in. So if one has a choice to do X or ~X but they physical CAN’T do X, then they do not have a choice—they have an illusion of choice. The TAAO acknowledges that choices are constrained by poverty, racism, and social inequity. So while blacks—as all humans do—have agency, some “choices” are constrained, giving the illusion of choice. Thus, constraints should also be considered while analyzing why blacks offend more. This, too, is not a knock-down question.
“Despite what you argued against hereditarian explanations what about as-of-yet-to-be-discovered genes or hormonal influences that lead to higher crime in blacks compared to whites?”
Over the years I’d say I’ve done a good job of arguing against hereditarian theories of crime. (Like testosterone increasing aggression and blacks having higher levels of testosterone, the AR gene, and MAOA.) They’re just not tenable. The genetic explanation makes no sense. (Talk about disregarding agency…) But one response is that we could find some as-of-yet-to-be-discovered genes, gene networks, or neurohormonal influences which explain the higher crime rates in black Americans. This is just like the “five years away” claim that hereditarians love to use. We just need to wait X amount of years for the magic evidence, yet five years never comes since five years away is always five years away.
“What about IQ and it’s relationship to crime?”
Of course the IQ-ists love this question. The assumption is that lower IQ people are more likely to commit crime. So low is means more crime and high IQ means less crime. Ignoring the fact that IQ is not a cause of anything but an outcome of one’s life experiences, we know that the correlation between IQ and crime is -0.01 within family (Frisell, Pawitan, and Langstrom, 2012). So that, too, is an irrelevant question. The relationship just isn’t there.
“What control groups are there for TAAO studies?”
Other than the first question about why don’t other groups who experience racism commit more crime and what about blacks in other countries, this one takes the cake. The TAAO doesn’t need control groups in TAAO tests since it focuses specifically on understanding the unique factors that contribute to crime in America. So instead of comparing different racial or ethnic groups, the TAAO seeks to identify and analyze specific historical, social, and systemic factors which shape the experiences and behaviors of black Americans within the context of American society.
“The black-white crime gap was lower during Jim Crow, why? How is this possible if the TAAO is true?”
Between 1950 and 1963, non-whites made up 11 percent of the US population, 90 percent of which were black. In 1950 for whites the murder rate was 2 to 3 deaths per 100,000 while for non-whites the rate was 28 deaths per 100,000 (28 times the US average) which then fell to 21 per 100,000 in 1961 which was still about 8 times that of the white murder rate while the rate raised again between 1962 and 1964 (Langberg, 1967). Langan (1992) showed a steady increase in the incarcerated black population from 1926 (21 percent) to 1986 (44 percent). But demographic factors account for this, like increases in the sentencing of blacks, the increase in the black population, and increase on black arrest rates—furthermore, there is evidence for increased discrimination between 1973 and 1982 that would explain the 70s-80s incarceration rates (Harding and Winship, 2016). Harding and Winship also showed that differential population growth can account for one-third of the increase in the prison population difference while the rest can be accounted for by differences in sentencing and arrest rates between 1960 and 1980. So the black population increased more in states that had higher incarceration rates. Nonetheless, the TAAO isn’t supposed to retroactively explain trends.
Therefore, the disparity between whites and blacks remained, even pre-1964. This question, too, isn’t a knockdown for the TAAO either. These questions that are asked when one is provided with the successful novel predictions of the TAAO are just cope since hereditarian explanations don’t make novel predictions and their explanations fail (like the ENA theory).
“Unnever and Gabbidon are just making excuses for blacks with their TAAO.”
This is not what they’re doing with their theory at all. A theory is a well-substantiated explanation of some aspect of the natural word that’s based on observation, empirical data, and evidence. They provide testable hypotheses that can be empirically tested. They also make predictions based on their proposed explanations. Predictive capacity is a hallmark of scientific theories. And it’s clear and I’ve shown that the TAAO makes successful novel predictions. Therefore the ability of a theory to make predictions—especially risky and novel ones—lends credibility to the validity of the theory.
The claim that the TAAO is a mere excuse for black crime is ridiculous. Because if that’s true, then all theories of crime are excuses for criminal activity. The TAAO should be evaluated on its predictive power—it’s ability to make successful novel predictions. Claims that the theory is a mere “excuse” for black crime is ridiculous, especially since the theory makes successful novel predictions. It’s clearly a valuable framework for understanding black crime in America.
“The so-called ‘novel predictions’ you reference aren’t novel at all”
We need to understand what the TAAO actually is. It’s a theory of crime that considers the African American “peerless” worldview. “Peerless” means “incomparable.” They have the worldview they do due to the 400 years of slavery and oppression like Jim Crow laws and segregation. Therefore, to explain black crime we need to understand the peerless African American experience. That’s a main premise of the theory. So the TAAO has one main premise, and it’s from this premise that the predictions of the TAAO are derived.
The peerless worldview of African Americans This premise recognizes the unique historical, contemporary, social, and cultural experiences of African Americans including their experiences of racial discrimination, social marginalization, and racial identity. This premise, then, lays the key groundwork for understanding black crime. This core premise of the TAAO then centers the theory within the context of the African American experience. Each of the predictions below are derived from the core premise of the TAAO—that of the peerless worldview of African Americans without relying on the predictions as premises used for the construction of the theory. Each of the predictions follows from the core premise, and they reflect how the African American experiences of racial discrimination, social marginalization and racial identity influence their likelihood of experiencing racial discrimination. Unnever and Gabbidon gave many arguments and references that this is indeed the case. The predictions, then, weren’t used as premise to construct the TAAO but they indeed are derived from—indeed they emerge from—the foundational experiences of African Americans and then serve as testable hypotheses which are derived from that understanding.
Thus, the predictions follow from the TAAO and they are derived from the foundational premise of the TAAO, without being used in the construction of the theory itself, qualifying as novel predictions according to Musgrave (1988): “a predicted fact is a novel fact for a theory if it was not used to construct that theory — where a fact is used to construct a theory if it figures in the premises from which that theory was deduced” and Beerbower: “the purpose of science is to enable accurate predictions and that, in fact, science cannot actually achieve more than that...The test of an explanatory theory, therefore, is its success at prediction, at forecasting. This view need not be limited to actual predictions of future, yet to happen events; it can accommodate theories that are able to generate results that have already been observed or, if not observed, have already occurred...it must have some reach beyond the data used to construct the theory“
More novel predictions of the TAAO
Therefore, since the TAAO has success in its predictions and hereditarian ones don’t (they don’t even make any novel predictions), it’s only rational to accept the theory that makes successful novel predictions over the one that doesn’t. The only reason one would accept the hereditarian explanations over the TAAO is due to bias and ignorance (racism), since the TAAO is a much more robust theory that actually has explanatory AND predictive power. So the issue here is quite clear—since we know the causes of black crime due to the successful novel predictions that the TAAO generates, then there are clear and actionable things we can do to try to mitigate the crime rate. This is something that hereditarian theories don’t do, most importantly because they don’t make any novel predictions. Since the TAAO makes successful risky novel predictions—predictions that, if they didn’t hold, they would then refute the theory—and since the predictions hold, then the theory is more likely to be true than not. The TAAO not only accommodates, but it makes predictions, and we can’t say the same for hereditarianism.
The issue is that so-called “race-neutral” theories of crime need to assume that racial discrimination isn’t a cause of black American offending because this would then limit it only to black Americans. Therefore race-neutral theories of crime don’t have the same predictive and explanatory power as a race-centric theory of crime—which is what the TAAO is. It’s clear that: the TAAO makes successful novel predictions, the predictions aren’t used as premises in the TAAO, the TAAO is a race-centric, country-specific theory of crime (and not a general theory of crime), racism and stereotypes don’t explain offending for non-African Americans, the theory doesn’t say that blacks lack agency, IQ doesn’t explain crime within families, and cope from hereditarians that one day we will find genes or neurohormonal influences which lead to crime in black Americans is just cope. It’s clear that the TAAO is the superior theory of crime because it does what scientific theories are supposed to do: successfully predict novel facts of the matter, something that hereditarianism just does not do which is why I’m justified in calling it a racist movement. Basically since there are unique characters of a demographic that require perspectives that are solely related to that group, then we need group-centric theories of crime due to the unique experiences of thsg group, and this is what the TAAO does.
Now that I’ve answered common criticisms of the TAAO, I have a few more successful novel predictions of the theory. In my original article I cited 3 novel predictions, how they followed from the theory, and then the references that confirmed the predictions:
(Prediction 1) Black Americans with a stronger sense of racial identity are less likely to engage in criminal behavior than black Americans with a weak sense of racial identity. How does this prediction follow from the theory? TAAO suggests that a strong racial identity can act as a protective factor against criminal involvement. Those with a stronger sense of racial identity may be less likely to engage in criminal behavior as a way to cope with racial discrimination and societal marginalization. (Burt, Simons, and Gibbons, 2013; Burt, Lei, and Simons, 2017; Gaston and Doherty, 2018; Scott and Seal, 2019)
(Prediction 2) Experiencing racial discrimination increases the likelihood of black Americans engaging in criminal actions. How does this follow from the theory? TAAO posits that racial discrimination can lead to feelings of frustration and marginalization, and to cope with these stressors, some individuals may resort to committing criminal acts as a way to exert power or control in response to their experiences of racial discrimination. (Unnever, 2014; Unnever, Cullen, and Barnes, 2016; Herda, 2016, 2018; Scott and Seal, 2019)
(Prediction 3) Black Americans who feel socially marginalized and disadvantaged are more prone to committing crime as a coping mechanism and have weakened school bonds. How does this follow from the theory? TAAO suggests that those who experience social exclusion and disadvantage may turn to crime as a way to address their negative life circumstances. and feelings of agency. (Unnever, 2014; Unnever, Cullen, and Barnes, 2016)
(Prediction 4) Black people who experience microaggreesions and perceive injustices in the criminal justice system are more likely to engage in serious and violent offending. How does this follow from the theory? Experiences of racial discrimination and marginalization can lead to negative emotions like anger and depression among black people. These negative emotions, which are then exacerbated by microaggreesions and perceptions of injustice in the criminal justice system, may increase the likelihood of engaging in serious and violent offending as a coping mechanism or means of asserting power. But, again, those with a stronger racial identity may be more resilient to the effect of discrimination (Isom, 2015).
(Prediction 5) Black Americans who perceive a lack of opportunity for socioeconomic advancement due to systemic barriers are more inclined to engage in criminal activity as a means of economic survival and social mobility. How does this follow from the theory? Perceptions of limited opportunities and systemic injustices can drive individuals to engage in criminal behaviors as a response to inequality (Vargas, 2023).
The fact that the TAAO generates these novel and successful predictions is evidence that we should accept the theory.
We also know that perceptions of criminal injustice predict offending (Bouffard and Piquero, 2013), we know that blacks are more likely than whites to perceive criminal injustice (Brunson and Weitzer, 2009) and we know that there are small differences among blacks and their perception of criminal injustice (Unnever, Gabbidon, and Higgins, 2011). So knowing this, more blacks should offend, right? Wrong. The vast majority of blacks don’t offend even though they share the same belief about the injustices of the criminal justice system. So how can we explain that? “Positive ethnic-racial socialization buffers the effect of weak school bonds on adolescent substance use and adult offending” (Gaston and Doherty, 2018). So the discrimination that black Americans have erodes their trust in social institutions like the school system, and then these weakened school bonds then increase the risk of offending.
Supporting a major tenet of TAAO and prior research on the protective ability of ethnic-racial socialization, the analyses showed that Black males who received positive ethnic-racial socialization messages in childhood develop resilience to the criminogenic effect of weak school bonds and face a lower risk for offending over the life course. (Gaston and Doherty, 2018)
One factor that is salient in the TAAO is racial subordination. We know that black people don’t commit crime because they are black, but we know that their offending is related to socio-environmental context like poverty, bad schools (while racism and stereotypes weaken school bonds blacks have, which makes them more likely to offend), broken families, and lead exposure (Butler, 2010) of which the TAAO addresses. We also know that there is no such thing as a “safe” level of lead exposure and that the relationship between lead and crime is robust and replicated across different countries and cultures. We also know that blacks were used as an experiment of sorts, where they were knowingly exposed to lead paint in subsidized homes.
This environmental racism (Washington, 2019), then, is another aspect of the racial subordination of blacks. And from 1976 to 2005, blacks were 7 times more likely than whites to commit murder. The fact of the matter is, the black-white murder gap has been large for over 100 years. And in discussing environmental racism, Unnever and Gabbidon (2011: 188) are explicit about the so-called genetic hypothesis of crime: “We want to be perfectly clear that our argument in no way is related to the thesis that there is a genetic cause to African American offending.” Therefore, this question doesn’t strike the heart of the TAAO and is just an attempt at evading the successful novel predictions the theory generates.
Conclusion
I’ve shown that the common “criticisms” of the TAAO are anything but and are easily answered. I then gave more successful predictions of the TAAO. It’s quite clear that one should accept the TAAO over hereditarian explanations. We also know that black isolation is a predictor of crime as well—even in 1996 blacks accounted for over 50 percent of murders and two-thirds of robberies (Shihadeh and Flynn, 1996). In 2020, blacks were six times more likely to be arrested for murder than whites. We also know that the belief by blacks in the violent stereotype predicts their offending and their adherence to the stereotype predicts crime and self control (Unnever, 2014). Therefore, a kind of stereotype threat arises here and has effects during police encounters like wkth height (Hester and Gray, 2018)(Najdowski, Bottoms, and Goff, 2015; Strine, 2018; Najdowski, 2012, 2023) , with one argument that race stereotypes track ecology, not race, (Williams, 2023) (just like for IQ; Steele and Aronson, 1995; Thames et al, 2014). We know that stereotype threats weaken school bonds and that weakened school bonds are related to offending, therefore we can infer that stereotype threats lead to an increase in crime (Unnever and Gabbidon, 2011).
Unnever and Gabbidon were quite clear and explicit in their argument and the hypotheses and predictions they made based on their theory. So when tested, if they were found not to hold then the theory would be falsified. But the theories held under empirical examination. Unnever and Gabbidon (2011: 98) were explicit in their theory and what it meant:
Put simply, we hypothesize that the probability of African American offending increases as blacks become more aware of toxic stereotypes, encounter stereotype threats, and are discriminated against because of their race. Our theory additionally posits that these forms of racism impact offending because they undermine the ability of African Americans to develop strong ties with conventional institutions. The extant literature indicates that stereotype threats and personal experiences of racial discrimination negatively impact the strength of the bonds (attachment, involvement, commitment) that black students have with their schools (Smalls, White, Chavous, and Sellers, 2007; Thomas, Caldwell, Faison, and Jackson, 2009). And, the research is clear; weak social bonds increase the probability of black offending (Carswell, 2007).
The worldview shared by black Americans is a consequence of the experience they and their ancestors had in America. This then explains their offending patterns, and why they commit more crime than whites. The socio-historical context that the TAAO looks to explain black crime is robust. Since the TAAO is successful in what it sets out to do, then, I wouldn’t doubt that there should be other race-centric theories of crime that try to explain and predict offending in those populations. The empirical successes of the TAAO’s predictions attest to the fact that other theories of crime for other races would be fruitful in predicting and explaining crime in those groups.
Hereditarians dream of having a theory that enjoys the empirical support that the TAAO has. The fact that the TAAO makes successful novel predictions and hereditarianism doesn’t is reason enough to reject hereditarian explanations and accept the TAAO. Accepting a theory that makes novel predictions is rational since it speaks to the theory’s predictive power. So by generating predictions that were previously unknown or untested and them confirming them through empirical evidence, the theory therefore shows its ability to predict and anticipate real-world phenomena. This then strengthens confidence in the theory’s underlying principles which provides a framework for understanding complex phenomena. Further, the ability of a theory to make such predictions suggests that the theory is robust and adaptable, meaning that it’s capable of accommodating new data while refining our understanding over time.
Hereditarians would love nothing more than to reduce black criminality to their genes or hormones, but reality tells a different story, and it’s one where the TAAO exists and makes successful novel predictions.
NotPoliticallyCorrect 