Rene Descartes proposed that the peneal gland was the point of contact—the interface—between the immaterial mind and physical body. He thought that the peneal gland in humans was different and special to that of nonhuman animals, where in humans the peneal gland was the seat of the soul (Finger, 1995). This view was eventually shown to be false. However, claims that the mental can causally interact with the physical (interactionist dualism) have been met with similar criticism. If the mental is irreducible to the physical and if the mental does in fact causally interact with the physical, then the mental must be identical with the physical; that is, the mental is reducible to the physical due to physical laws like conservation of energy. This seems to be an issue for the truth of an interactionist dualist theory. But there are solutions. Deny that causal closure of the physical (CCP) is true (the world isn’t causally closed), or argue that CCP is compatible with interactionist dualism, or argue that CCP is question-begging (assuming in a premise what it seeks to establish and conclude) and assumes without proper justification that all physical events must be due to physical causes, which thereby illogically excludes the possibility of mental causation.
In this article I will provide some reasons to believe that CCP is question-begging, and I will argue that mental causation is invisible (see Lowe, 2008). I will also argue that action potentials are the interface by which the mental and the physical interact and which would then lead a conscious decision to make a movement be possible. I will provide arguments that show that interactionist dualism is consistent with physics, while showing that action potentials are the interface that Descartes was looking for. Ultimately, I will show how the mental interacts with the physical for mental causation to be carried out and how this isn’t an issue for the CCP. The view I will argue for here I will call “cognitive interface dualism” since it centers on the influence of mental states on action potentials and on the physical realm, and it conveys the idea that mental processes interface with physical processes through the conduit of action potentials, without implying a reduction of the mental to the physical, making it a substance dualist position since it still adheres to the mental and the physical as two different substances.
Causal closure of the physical
It is claimed that the world is causally closed—this means that every event or occurrence is due to physical causes, all physical events must be due to physical causes. Basically, no non-physical (mental) factors can cause or influence physical events. Here’s the argument:
(1) Every event in the world has a cause. (2) Causes and effects within the physical world are governed by the laws of physics. (3) Non-physical factors or entities, by definition, don’t belong to the physical realm. (4) If a nonphysical factor were to influence a physical event, it would violate the laws of physics. (5) Thus, the world is causally closed, meaning that all causes and effects in it are governed by physical interactions and laws.
But the issue here for the physicalist who wants to use causal closure is the fact that mental events and states are qualitatively different from physical events and states. This is evidenced in Lowe’s distinction between intentional (mental) and event (physical) causation. Mental states like thoughts and consciousness possess qualitatively different properties than physical states. The causal closure argument assumes that physical events are the only causes of other physical events. But mental states appear to exert causal influence over physical events, for instance voluntary action based on conscious decision, like my action right now to write this article. So if M states do influence P events, then there must be interaction between the mental and physical realms. This interaction contradicts the idea of strict causal closure of the physical realm. Since mental causation is necessary to explain aspects of human action and consciousness, it then follows that the physical world may not be causally closed.
The problem of interaction for interactionist dualism is premised on the CCP. It supposedly violated the conservation of energy (CoE). If P energy is needed to do P work, then a convergence of mental into physical energy then results in an increase in energy that is inexplicable. I think there are many ways to attack this supposed knock-down argument against interactionist dualism, and I will make the case in an argument below, arguing that action potentials are where the brain and the mind interact to carry out intentions. However, there are no strong, non-question begging arguments for causal closure that don’t beg the question (eg see Bishop, 2005; Dimitrijevic, 2010; Gabbani, 2013; Gibb, 2015), and the inductive arguments commit a sampling error or non-sequiturs (Buhler, 2020). So the CCP is either question-begging or unsound (Menzies, 2015). I will discuss this issue before concluding this article, and I will argue that my argument that APs serve as the interface between the mental and the physical, along with the question-beggingness of causal closure actually strengthens my argument.
The argument for action potentials as the interface between the mind and the brain
The view that I will argue for here, I think, is unique and has never been argued for in the philosophical literature on mental causation. In the argument that follows, I will show how arguing that action potentials (APs) are the point of contact—the interface—between the mind and brain doesn’t violate the CCP nor does it violate CoE.
But the skeletal muscle will not contract unless the skeletal muscles are stimulated. The nervous system and the muscular system communicate, which is called neural activiation—defined as the contraction of muscle generated by neural stimulation. We have what are called “motor neurons”—neurons located in the CNS (central nervous system) which can send impulses to muscles to move them. This is done through a special synapse called the neuromuscular junction. A motor neuron that connects with muscle fibers is called a motor unit and the point where the muscle fiber and motor unit meet is callled the neuromuscular junction. It is a small gap between the nerve and muscle fiber called a synapse. Action potentials (electrical impulses) are sent down the axon of the motor neuron from the CNS and when the action potential reaches the end of the axon, hormones called neurotransmitters are then released. Neurotransmitters transport the electrical signal from the nerve to the muscle.
So action potentials (APs) are carried out at the junction between synapses. So, regarding acetylcholine, when it is released, it binds to the synapses (a small space which separates the muscle from the nerve) and it then binds onto the receptors of the muscle fibers. Now we know that, in order for a muscle to contract, the brain sends the chemical message (acetylcholine) across synapses which then initiates movement. So, as can be seen from the diagram above, the MMC refers to the chemo-electric connection between the motor cortex, the cortico-spinal column, peripheral nerves and the neuromuscular junction. A neuromuscular junction is a synapse formed by the contact between a motor neuron and a muscle fiber.
This explanation will set the basis for my argument on how action potentials are the interface—the point of contact—by which the mind and brain meet.
As I have already shown, APs are electrochemical events that transmit signals within the nervous system and are generated as the result of neural activity which can be influenced by mental states like thoughts and intentions. The brain operates in accordance with physical laws and obeys the CoE, the initiation of APs could be (and are, though not always) influenced by mental intentions and processes. Mental processes could modulate the threshold or likelihood of AP firing through complex biomechanical mechanisms that do not violate the CoE. Of course, the energy that is required for generating APs ultimately derives from metabolic processes within the body, which could be influenced by mental states like attention, intention and emotional states. This interaction between mental states does not violate the CoE, nor does it require a violation of the laws of physics, since it operates within the bounds of biochemical and electrochemical processes that respect the CoE. Therefore, APs serve as the point of controlled interaction between the mental and physical realms, allowing for mental causation without disrupting the overall energy balance in the physical world.
Lowe argued that mental causation is invisible, and so since it is invisible, it is not amenable to scientific investigation. This view can be integrated into my argument that APs serve as the interface between the two substances, mental and physical. APs are observable electrochemical events in a neuron which could be influenced by mental states. So as I argued above, mental processes could influence or modulate the veneration of APs. When it comes to the invisibility of mental causation, this refers to the idea that mental events like thoughts, intentions, and consciousness are not directly perceptible like physical objects or events are. Mental states are not observable in the same way that physical events or objects are. In my view, APs hold a dual role. They function as the interface between the mental and the physical, providing the means by which the mental can influence physical events while shaping APs, and they also act as the causal mechanism in connecting mental states to physical events.
Thus, given the distinction between physical events (like APs) and the subjective nature of mental states, the view I have argued for above is consistent with the invisibility of mental causation. Mental causation involves the idea that mental states can influence physical events, and that they have causal efficacy on the physical world. So our mental experiences can lead to physical changes in the world based on the actions we carry out. But since mental states aren’t observable like physical states are, it’s challenging to show how they could lead to effects on the physical world. We infer the influence of mental states on physical events through the effects on observable physical processes. We can’t directly observe intention, we infer it on the basis of one’s action. Mental states could influence physical events through complex chains of electrochemical and biochemical processes which would then make the causative relationship less apparent. So while APs serve as the interface, this doesn’t mean that mental states and APs are identical. This is because while the mental can’t be reduced to physiology (the physical), it encompasses a range of subjective experiences, emotions, thoughts, and intentions that transcend the mechanistic explanations of neural activity.
It is quite obviously an empirical fact that the mental can influence the physical. Think of the fight-or-flight response. When one sees something that they are fearful of (like, say, an animal), there is then a concurrent change in certain hormones. This simple example shows how the mental can have an effect on the physical—where the physical event of seeing something fearful (which would be also be a subjective experience) would then lead to a physical change. So the initial mental event of seeing something fearful is a subjective experience which occurs in the realm of consciousness and mental states. The subjective experience of fear then triggers the fight-or-flight response, which leads to the release of stress hormones like cortisol and adrenaline. These physiological changes are part of the body’s response to a perceived threat based on the subject’s personal subjective experience. So the release of stress hormones is a physical event, and these hormones then have a measurable effect on the body like an increase in heart rate, heightened alertness and energy mobilization which then prepares the subject for action. These physiological changes then prepare the subject to either fight or flee from the situation that caused them fear. This is a solid example on how the mental can influence the physical.
The only way, I think, that my view can be challenged is by arguing that the CCP is true. But if it is question-begging, then my proposition that mental states can influence APs is then less contentious. Furthermore, my argument on APs could be open to multiple interpretations of causal closure. So instead of strictly adhering to causal closure, my view could accommodate various interpretations that allow mental causation to have an effect in the physical realm. Thus, since I view causal closure as question begging, it provides a basis for my view that mental states can influence APs and by extension the physical world. And if the CCP is false, my view on action potentials is actually strengthened.
The view I have argued for here is a simplified perspective on the relationship between the mental and the physical. But my intention isn’t to offer a comprehensive account of all aspects of mental and physical interaction, rather, it is to highlight the role of APs as a point of connection between the mental and physical realms.
Cognitive interface dualism as a form of substance dualism
The view I have argued for here is a substance dualist position. Although it posits an intermediary in APs that facilitates interaction between the mental and physical realms, it still maintains the fundamental duality between mental and physical substances. Mental states are irreducible to physical states, and they interact though APs without collapsing into a single substance. Mental states involve subjective experiences, intentionality, and qualia which are fundamentally different from the objective and quantifiable nature of the physical realm, which I have argued before. APs serve as the bridge—the interface—between the mental and the physical realms, so my dualistic perspective allows for interaction while still preserving the unique properties of the mental and the physical.
Although APs serve as the bridge between the mental and the physical, the interaction between mental states and APs suggests that mental causation operates independently of physical processes. This, then, implies that the self which originates in mental states, isn’t confined to the physical realm, and that it isn’t reducible to the physical. The self’s subjective experiences, consciousness and self-awareness cannot be explained by physical or material processes, which indicates an immaterial substance beyond the physical. The unity of consciousness, which is the integrated sense of self and personal identity over time, are better accounted for by an immaterial self that transcends a change in physical states. Lastly mental states possess qualitative properties like qualia that defy reduction to physical properties. These qualities then, point to a distinct and immaterial self.
My view posits a form of non-reductive mental causation, where mental states influence APs, acknowledging the nonphysical influence on the mental to the physical. Interaction doesn’t imply reduction; mental states remain irreducible even though they impact physical processes. My view also accommodates consciousness, subjectivity, and intentionality which can’t be accounted for by material or physical processes. My view also addresses the explanatory gap between objective physical processes and subjective mental processes, which can’t be accounted for by reduction to physical brain (neural) processes.
Conclusion
The exploration of APs within the context of cognitive interface dualism offers a perspective on the interplay between the mental and physical substances. My view acknowledges APs as the bridge of interaction between the mental and the physical, and it fosters a deeper understanding of the role of mental causation in helping us understand reality.
Central to my view is recognizing that while APs do serve as the interface or conduit by which the mental and the physical interact, and how mental states can influence physical events, this does not entail that the mental is reducible to the physical. My cognitive interface dualism therefore presents a nuanced approach that navigates the interface between the seen and the unseen, the physical and the mental.
Traditional views of causal closure may raise questions about the feasibility of mental causation, the concept’s rigidity is challenged by the intermediary role of APs. While I do hold that the CCP is question-begging, the view I have argued for here explores an alternative avenue which seemingly transcends that limitation. So even if the strict view of the CCP were to fall, my view would remain strong.
This view is also inherently anti-reductionist, asserting that personal identity, consciousness, subjectivity and intentionality cannot be reduced to the physical. Thus, it doesn’t succumb to the traditional limitations of physicalism. Cognitive interface dualism also challenges the notion that we are reducible to our physical brains or our mental activity. The self—the bearer of mental states—isn’t confined to neural circuitry, although the physical is necessary for our mental lives, it isn’t a sufficient condition (Gabriel, 2018).
Lastly, of course this view means that since the mental is irreducible to the physical, then psychometrics isn’t a measurement enterprise. Any argument that espouses the view that the mental is irreducible to the physical would entail that psychometrics isn’t measurement. So by acknowledging that mental states, consciousness, and subjective experiences transcend the confines of physical quantification, cognitive interface dualism dismantles the assumption that the human mind can be measured and encapsulated using numerical metrics. This view holds that the mental resists quantification, since only the physical is quantifiable since only the physical have specified measured objects, objects of measurement and measurement units.
All in all, my view I title cognitive interface dualism explains how mental causation occurs through action potentials. It still holds that the mental is irreducible to the physical, but that the mental and physical interact without M being reduced to P. This view I have espoused, I think, is unique, and it shows how mental causation does occur, it shows how we perform actions.
In the realm of educational assessment and psychometrics, a distinction between IQ and achievement tests needs to be upheld. It is claimed that IQ is a measure of one’s potential learning ability, while achievement tests show what one has actually learned. However, this distinction is not strongly supported in my reading of this literature. IQ and achievement tests are merely different versions of the same evaluative tool. This is what I will argue in this article: That IQ and achievement tests are different versions of the same test, and so any attempt to “validate” IQ tests based not only on other IQ tests, achievement tests and job performance is circular, I will argue that, of course, the goal of psychometrics in measuring the mind is impossible. The hereditarian argument, when it comes to defending their concept and the claim that they are measuring some unitary and hypothetical variable, then, fails. At best, these tests show one’s distance from the middle class, since that’s the where most of the items on the test derive from. Thus, IQ and achievement tests are different versions of the same test and so, they merely show one’s “distance” from a certain kind of class-specific knowledge (Richardson, 2012), due to the cultural and psychologicaltools one must possess to score well on these tests (Richardson, 2002).
Circular IQ-ist arguments
IQ-ists have been using IQ tests since they were brought to America by Henry Goddard in 1913. But one major issue (one they still haven’t solved—and quite honestly never will) was that they didn’t have any way to ensure that the test was construct valid. So this is why, in 1923, Boring stated that “intelligence is what intelligence tests test“, while Jensen (1972: 76) said “intelligence, by definition, is what intelligence tests measure.” However, such statements are circular and they are circular because they don’t provide real evidence or explanation.
Boring’s claim that “intelligence is what intelligence tests test” is circular since it defines intelligence based on the outcome of “intelligence tests.” So if you ask “What is intelligence“, and I say “It’s what intelligence tests measure“, I haven’t actually provided a meaningful definition of intelligence. The claim merely rests on the assumption that “intelligence tests” measure intelligence, not telling us what it actually is.
Jensen’s (1976) claim that “intelligence, by definition, is what intelligence tests measure” is circular for similar reasons to Boring’s since it also defines intelligence by referring to “intelligence tests” and at the same time assumes that intelligence tests are accurately measuring intelligence. Neither claim actually provides an independent understanding of what intelligence is, it merely ties the concept of “intelligence” back to its “measurement” (by IQ tests). Jensen’s Spearman’s hypothesis on the nature of black-white differences has also been criticized as circular (Wilson, 1985). Not only was Jensen (and by extension Spearman) guilty of circular reasoning, so too was Sternberg (Schlinger, 2003). Such a circular claim was also made by Van der Mass, Kan, and Borsboom (2014).
But Jensen seemed to have changed his view, since in his 1998 book The g Factor, he argues that we should dispense with the term “intelligence”, but curiously that we should still study the g factor and assume identity between IQ and g… (Jensen made many more logical errors in his defense of “general intelligence”, like saying not to reify intelligence on one page and then a few pages later reifying it.) Circular arguments have been identified in not only Jensen’s writings Spearman’s hypothesis, but also in using construct validity to validate a measure (Gordon, Schonemann; Guttman, 1992: 192).
The same circularity can be seen when discussions of the correlation between IQ and achievement tests is brought up. “These two tests correlate so they’re measuring the same thing”, is an example one may come across. But the error here is assuming that mental measurement is possible and that IQ and achievement tests are independent of each other. However, IQ and achievement tests are different versions of the same test. This is an example of circular validation, which occurs when a test’s “validity” is established by the test itself, leading to a self-reinforcing loop.
IQ tests are often validated with other older editions of the test. For example, the newer version of the S-B would be “validated” against the older version of the test that the newer version was created to replace (Howe, 1997: 18; Richardson, 2002: 301), which not only leads to circular “validation”, but would also lead to the same assumptions from the older test constructors (like Terman) which would still then be alive in the test itself (since Terman assumed men and women should be equal in IQ and so this assumption is still there today). IQ tests are also often “validated” by comparing IQ test results to outcomes like job performance and academic performance. Richardson and Norgate (2015) have a critical review of the correlation between IQ and job performance, arguing that it’s inflated by “corrections”, while Sackett et al, 2023 show “a mean observed validity of .16, and a mean corrected for unreliability in the criterion and for range restriction of .23. Using this value drops cognitive ability’s rank among the set of predictors examined from 5th to 12th” for the correlation between “general cognitive ability” and job performance.
But this could lead to circular validation, in that if a high IQ is used as a predictor of success in school or work, then success in school or work would be used as evidence in validating the IQ test, which would then lead to a circular argument. The test’s validity is being supported by the outcome that it’s supposed to predict.
Achievement tests are destined to see what one had learned or achieved regarding a certain kind of subject matter. Achievement tests are often validated by correlating test scores with grades or other kinds of academic achievement (which would also be circular). But if high achievement test scores are used to validate the test and those scores are also used as evidence of academic achievement, then that would be circular. Achievement tests are “validated” on their relationship between IQ tests and grades. Heckman and Kautz (2013) note that “achievement tests are often validated using other standardized achievement tests or other measures of cognitive ability—surely a circular practice” and “Validating one measure of cognitive ability using other measures of cognitive ability is circular.” But it should also be noted that the correlation between college grades and job performance 6 or more years after college is only .05 (Armstrong, 2011).
Now what about the claim that IQ tests and achievement tests correlate so they measure the same thing? Richardson (2017) addressed this issue:
For example, IQ tests are so constructed as to predict school performance by testing for specific knowledge or text‐like rules—like those learned in school. But then, a circularity of logic makes the case that a correlation between IQ and school performance proves test validity. From the very way in which the tests are assembled, however, this is inevitable. Such circularity is also reflected in correlations between IQ and adult occupational levels, income, wealth, and so on. As education largely determines the entry level to the job market, correlations between IQ and occupation are, again, at least partly, self‐fulfilling
The circularity inherent in likening IQ and achievement tests has also been noted by Nash (1990). There is no distinction between IQ and achievement tests since there is no theory or definition of intelligence and how, then, this theory and definition would be likened to answering questions correctly on an IQ test.
But how, to put first things first, is the term ‘cognitive ability’ defined? If it is a hypothetical ability required to do well at school then an ability so theorised could be measured by an ordinary scholastic attainment test. IQ measures are the best measures of IQ we have because IQ is defined as ‘general cognitive ability’. Actually, as we have seen, IQ theory is compelled to maintain that IQ tests measure ‘cognitive ability’ by fiat, and it therefore follows that it is tautologous to claim that IQ tests are the best measures of IQ that we have. Unless IQ theory can protect the distinction it makes between IQ/ability tests and attainment/ achievement tests its argument is revealed as circular. IQ measures are the best measures of IQ we have because IQ is defined as ‘general cognitive ability’: IQ tests are the only measures of IQ.
The fact of the matter is, IQ “predicts” (is correlated with) school achievement since they are different versions of the same test (Schwartz, 1975; Beaujean et al, 2018). Since the main purpose of IQ tests in the modern day is to “predict” achievement (Kaufman et al, 2012), then if we correctly identify IQ and achievement tests as different versions of the same test, then we can rightly state that the “prediction” is itself a form of circular reasoning. What is the distinction between “intelligence” tests and achievement tests? They both have similar items on them, which is why they correlate so highly with each other. This, therefore, makes the comparison of the two in an attempt to “validate” one or the other circular.
I can now argue that the distinction between IQ and achievement tests is nonexistent. If IQ and achievement tests are different versions of the same test, then they share the same domain of assessing knowledge and skills. IQ and achievement tests contain similar informational content on them, and so they can both be considered knowledge tests—class-specific knowledge. IQ and achievement tests share the same domain of assessing knowledge and skills. Therefore, IQ and achievement tests are different versions of the same test. Put simply, if IQ and achievement tests are different versions of the same test, then they will have similar item content, and they do so we can correctly argue that they are different versions of the same test.
Moreover, even constructing tests has been criticized as circular:
Given the consistent use of teachers’ opinions as a primary criterion for validity of the Binet and Wechsler tests, it seems odd to claim then that such tests provide “objective alternatives to the subjective judgments of teachers and employers.” If the tests’ primary claim to predictive validity is that their results have strong correlations with academic success, one wonders how an objective test can predict performance in an acknowledged subjective environment? No one seems willing to acknowledge the circular and tortuous reasoning behind the development of tests that rely on the subjective judgments of secondary teachers in order to develop an assessment device that claims independence of those judgments so as to then be able to claim that it can objectively assess a student’s ability to gain the approval of subjective judgments of college professors. (And remember, these tests were used to validate the next generation of tests and those tests validated the following generation and so forth on down to the tests that are being given today.) Anastasi (1985) comes close to admitting that bias is inherent in the tests when he confesses the tests only measure what many anthropologists would called a culturally bound definition of intelligence. (Thorndike and Lohman, 1990)
Conclusion
It seems clear to me that almost the whole field of psychometrics is plagued with the problem of inferring causes from correlation and using circular arguments in an attempt to justify and validate the claim that IQ tests measure intelligence by using flawed arguments that relate IQ to job and academic performance. However this idea is very confused. Moreover, circular arguments aren’t only restricted to IQ and achievement tests, but also in twin studies (Joseph, 2014; Joseph et al, 2015). IQ and achievement tests merely show what one knows, not their learning potential, since they are general knowledge tests—tests of class-specific knowledge. So even Gottfredson’s “definition” of intelligence fails, since Gottfredson presumes IQ to be a measure of learning ability (nevermind the fact that the “definition” is so narrow and I struggle to think of a valid way to operationalize it to culture-bound tests).
The fact that newer versions of tests already in circulation are “validated” against other older versions of the same test means that the tests are circularly validated. The original test (say the S-B) was never itself validated, and so, they’re just “validating” the newer test on the assumption that the older one was valid. The newer test, in being compared to its predecessor, means that the “validation” is occuring on the other older test which has similar principles, assumptions, and content to the newer test. The issue of content overlap, too, is a problem, since some questions or tasks on the newer test could be identical to questions or tasks on the older test. The point is, both IQ and achievement tests are merely knowledge tests, not tests of a mythical general cognitive ability.
The IQ-ists are at it again. This time, PP is claiming that his little tests he created are on an absolute scale—meaning that they have a true 0 point. This has been the Achilles heel of psychometry for many decades. But abstract concepts don’t have true 0 points, and this is why “cognitive measurement” isn’t possible. I will conceptually analyze PP’s arguments for his “spatial intelligence test” and his “verbal intelligence test” and show that they aren’t on absolute scales. I will then use the IQ-ists favorite measurement—temperature (one they try to claim is like IQ)—and show the folly in his reasoning on claiming that these tests are on an absolute scale. I will then discuss the real reasons for score disparities and relate them to social class and one’s life experiences and the argue that the score results reflect merely environmental variables.
Fixed reference points and absolute scales
There are no fixed reference points for “IQ” like there are for temperature. IQ-ists have claimed for decades that temperature is like IQ while thermometers are like IQ tests (Nash, 1990). But I have shown the confused thinking of hereditarians on this issue. An absolute scale requires a fixed reference point or a true 0 point which can be objectively established. Physical quantities like distance, weight, and temperature have natural objective 0 points which can serve as fixed reference points. But nonphysical or abstract concepts lack inherent or universally agreed-upon 0 points which can serve as consistent reference points. So only physical quantities can truly be measured in an absolute scale, since they possess natural 0 points which provide a foundation for measurement.
If “spatial intelligence” is a unitary and objectively measureable cognitive trait, then all individuals’ spatial abilities should consistently align across various tasks. But individuals often exhibit significant variablity in their performance across spatial tasks, excelling in one aspect and not others. This variablity suggests that “spatial intelligence” isn’t a unitary concept. So the concept of a single, unitary, measurable “spatial intelligence” is questionable.
If the test is on an absolute scale for measuring “spatial intelligence”, then the scores obtained directly reflect the inherent “spatial intelligence” of individuals, without being influenced by factors like puzzle complexity, practice, or other variables. The scores are influenced by factors like puzzle complexity and practice effects (like doing similar things in the past). Since the scores are influenced by various factors, then it’s not on an absolute scale.
If a measurement is on an absolute scale, then it should produce consistent results across different contexts and scenarios, reflecting a stable and underlying trait. But cognitive abilities can be influenced by various external factors like stress, fatigue, motivation, and test-taking conditions. These external factors can lead to fluctuations in performance which aren’t indicative of the “trait” that’s attempting to be measured. It’s merely reflective of the circumstances of the moment one took the test in. So the concept of an absolute scale for measuring cognitive abilities fails to account for the impact of external variables which can introduce variability and inaccuracies in the “measurement.” This argument undermines the claim that this—or any test—is on an absolute scale, since motivation, stress and other socio-cognitive factors, like Richardson (2002: 287-288) notes:
the basic source of variation in IQ test scores is not entirely (or even mainly) cognitive, and what is cognitive is not general or unitary. It arises from a nexus of sociocognitive-affective factors determining individuals’ relative preparedness for the demands of the IQ test. These factors include (a) the extent to which people of different social classes and cultures have acquired a specific form of intelligence (or forms of knowledge and reasoning); (b) related variation in ‘academic orientation’ and ‘self-efficacy beliefs’; and (c) related variation in test anxiety, self-confidence, and so on, which affect performance in testing situations irrespective of actual ability.
Such factors, which influence test scores, merely show what one was exposed to in their lives, under my DEC framework. Socio-cognitive factors related to social class could introduce bias, since people from different backgrounds are exposed to different information, have unequal access to information and test prep, along with familiarity with item content. Thus, we can then look at these scores as mere social class surrogates.
If test scores are influenced by stress, anxiety, fatigue, motivation, familiarity, non-cognitive factors, and socio-cognitive factors due to social class, then the concept of an absolute scale for measuring cognitive abilities may not hold true. I have established that test scores can indeed be influenced by myriad external factors. So given that these factors affect test scores and undermine the assumption of an absolute scale, the concept of measuring cognitive ability on such a scale is challenged (don’t forget the irreducibility arguments). Further, the argument that “spatial intelligence” is not measurable on an absolute scale due to its nonphysical nature aligns with this perspective, which further supports the idea that the concept of an absolute scale isn’t applicable in these contexts. Thus, the implications for testing are profound, and so score differences are due to social class and one’s life experiences, nor any kind of “genotypic IQ” (which is an oxymoron).
Regarding vocabulary, this is influenced by the home environment—the types of words one is exposed to as they grow up (and can therefore also be integrated into the DEC). Kids from lower SES families here fewer words at home and in their neighborhoods (low SES children hear 30 million fewer words than higher SES children) (Brito, 2017). We know that word usage is the strongest determinant of child vocabulary growth, and that less educated parents use fewer words with less complex syntax (Perkins, Finegood, and Swain, 2013). The language quality that is addressed to children also matters (Golinkoff et al, 2023). We can then liken this to the Vygotskian More Knowledgeable Other (MKO). An MKO would have the knowledge that their dependent doesn’t. But if the MKO in this instance isn’t educated or low income, then they will use fewer words and they then will have this feature in their home. Such tests merely show what one was exposed to in their lives, not any underlying unitary “thing” like the IQ-ists claim.
Increasing both the amount and diversity of language within the home can positively influence language development, regardless of SES. Repeated exposure to words and phrases increases the child’s opportunity to learn and remember (McGregor, Sheng, & Ball, 2007). The complexity of grammar, the responsiveness of language to the child, and the use of questions all aid language development (Bornstein, Tamis-LeMonda, Hahn, & Haynes, 2008; Huttenlocher, Waterfall, Vasilyeva, Vevea, & Hedges, 2010). Besides frequency of language input, how caregivers communicate with children also affects children’s language skills. Children from higher SES families experience more gestures by their care-givers during parent–child interactions; these SES differences predict vocabulary differences at 54 months of age (Rowe & Goldin-Meadow, 2009). Parent–child interactions provide a context for language exposure and mold the child’s language development. Specific characteristics of the caregiver, including affect, responsiveness, and sensitivity predict children’s early and later language skills (Murray & Hornbaker, 1997; Tamis-LeMonda, Bornstein, Baumwell, & Melstein Damast, 1996). Maternal sensitivity partially explains links between SES and both children’s receptive and expressive language skills at age 3 years (Raviv, Kessenich, & Morrison, 2004). These differences also appear across culture (Mistry, Biesanz, Chien, Howes, & Benner, 2008). Maternal supportiveness partially explained the link between SES and language outcomes at 3 years of age, for both immigrant and native families in the United States. (Brito, 2017: 3-4)
The issue of temperature
This can be illustrated using the IQ-ists favorite (real) measurement—temperature. The Kelvin scale avoids the issues in the first argument. In the Kelvin scale, temperature is measured in relation to absolutel 0 (the point where molecular motion theoretically stops). It doesn’t involve factors like variability in measurement techniques, practice effects, or individual differences. The Kelvin scale has a consistent reference point—absolute 0—which provides a consistent and fixed baseline for temperature measurement. The values in the Kelvin scale are directly tied to a true 0 point.
There are no external influences on the measurement of temperature (beyond that which influences the mercury in the thermometer to move up or down), like the type of thermometer used or one’s familiarity with temperature measurement. External factors like these aren’t relevant to the Kelvin scale, unlike puzzle complexity and practice effects on the spatial abilities test.
Finally, temperature values on the Kelvin scale are universally applicable, which means that a specific temperature corresponds to the same level of molecular motion regardless of who performs the measurement, or what measurement instrument is used. So the Kelvin temperature scale doesn’t have the same issues as PP’s little “spatial intelligence” test. It has a clear and consistent measurement framework, where values directly represent the underlying physical phenomenon of molecular motion without being influenced by external factors or individual differences. When you think about actual, established measurements like temperature and then try to relate them to IQ, then the folly of “mental measurement” reveals itself.
Now, having said all of this, I can draw a parralel between the argument against an absolute scale for cognitive abilities and the concept of temperature.
Temperature measurements, while influenced by external factors (since this is what makes the mercury travel up or down in the thermometer) like atmospheric pressure and humidity, still have an absolute 0 point in the Kelvin scale which represents a complete absence of thermal energy. Unlike “spatial intelligence”, temperature has a fixed reference point which served as an objective 0 point, which allows it to be measured on an absolute scale. The external factors influencing temperature measurement are fundamentally different from the factors which influence one’s performance on a test, since they don’t introduce subjective variations in the same manner. So while temperature is influenced by external factors, it’s measurement is fundamentally different from nonphysical concepts due to the presence of an objective 0 point and the presence and distinct nature of influencing factors. This is put wonderfully by Nash (1990: 131):
First, the idea that the temperature scale is an interval scale is a myth and, second, a scale zero can be established for an intelligence scale by the same method of extrapolation used in defining absolute zero temperature. In this manner Eysenck (p. 16) concludes, ‘if the measurement of temperature is scientific (and who would doubt that it is?) then so is that of intelligence.’ It should hardly be necessary to point out that all of this is special pleading of the most unabashed sort. In order to measure temperature three requirements are necessary: (i) a scale, (ii) some thermometric property of an object and, (iii) fixed points of reference. Zero temperature is defined theoretically and successive interval points are fixed by the physical properties of material objects. As Byerly (p. 379) notes, that ‘the length of a column of mercury is a thermometric property presupposes a lawful relationship between the order of length and the temperature order under certain conditions.’ It is precisely this lawful relationship which does not exist between the normative IQ scale and any property of intelligence. The most obvious problem with the theory of IQ measurement is that although a scale of items held to test ‘intelligence’ can be constructed there are no fixed points of reference. If the ice point of water at one atmosphere fixes 276.16 K, what fixes 140 points of IQ? Fellows of the Royal Society? Ordinal scales are perfectly adequate for certain measurements, Moh’s scale of scratch hardness consists of ten fixed points, from talc to diamond, and is good enough for certain practical purposes. IQ scales (like attainment test scales) are ordinal scales, but this is not really to the point, for whatever the nature of the scale it could not provide evidence for the property IQ or, therefore, that IQ has been measured.
Conclusion
It’s quite obvious that IQ-ists have no leg to stand on, which is why they need to claim that their tests are on absolute scales even when it leads to an absurd conclusion. The fact that test performance is influenced by myriad non-cognitive traits due to one’s social class (Richardson, 2002) shows that these—and all tests—take place in certain cultural contexts, meaning that all tests are culture-bound, as argued by Cole (2004) with his West African Binet argument.
The fact of the matter is, “mental measurement” is impossible, and all these tests do is show the proximity to a certain kind of class-specific knowledge, not any kind of general cognitive “strength”. Taking a Vygotskian perspective on this issue will allow us to see how and why people score differently from each other, and it comes down to their home environment and what they learn in their lives.
Nevertheless, the claims from IQ-ists that they have a specified measured object, object of measurement and measurement unit for IQ or that their tests have a true 0 point are absurd, since these things are properties of physical objects, not non-physical, mental ones. The Vygotskian perspective will allow use to understand score variances between individuals and groups, as I have argued before. We don’t need to claim that there is an absolute scale for cognitive assessment nor do we need to claim that mental measurement is possible for this to be a truism. So, yet again, PP’s argument fails.
Recently, I have been seeing people say that Ashkenazi Jews (AJs) are not white. Some may say that Jews “pretend to be white”, so they can accomplish their “group goals” (like pitting whites and blacks against each other in an attempt to sow racial strife, due to their ethnic nepotism due to their genetic similarity). I have also seen people deriding Jews for saying “I’m white” and then finding an instance of them saying “I’m Jewish” (see here for an example), as if that’s a contradiction, but it’s not. It’s the same thing as saying “I’m Italian… I’m white” or “I’m German… I’m white.” But since pluralism about race is true, there could be some contexts and places that Jews aren’t white, due to the social construction of racial identities. However, in the American context it is quite clear: In both historical and contemporary thought in America, AJs are white.
But a claim like this, then, raises an important question: If AJs are not white, then what race are they? This is a question I will answer in this article, and I will of course show that AJs are indeed white in an American conception of race. Using Quayshawn Spencer’s racial identity argument, I will assume that Ashkenazi Jews aren’t white, and then I will argue that this leads to a contradiction, so Jews must be white. And while there was discussion about the racial status of Jews after they began emigrating to America through Ellis Island, I will show that Jews arrived to America as whites.
White or not?
The question of whether or not AJs are white is a vexing one. Of course, AJs are a religious group. However, this doesn’t mean that they themselves have their own specific racial category. It’s like if one says they are German, or Italian, or British. Those are mere ethnicities which make up the white racial group. One study found that AJs have “White privilege vis-á-vis persons of color. This privilege, however, is limited to Jews who can “pass” as White gentiles” (Blumenfeld, 2009). Jews that can “pass as white” are obviously white, and there is no other race for them to be.
This is due to the social nature of race. Since race is a social construct, then the way people’s racial background is perceived in America is based on how they look (their phenotype). An Ashkenazi Jew saying “I’m Jewish. I’m white” isn’t a contradiction, since AJs aren’t a race. It’s just like saying “I’m Italian. I’m white” or “I’m German. I’m white.” It’s quite obviously an ethnic group which is a part of the white race. Jews are white and whites are a socialrace.
This discussion is similar to the one where it is claimed that “Hispanic/Latino/Spanish” aren’t white. But that, too, is a ridiculous claim. In cluster studies, HLSs don’t have their own cluster, but they cluster near the group where their majority ancestry derives (Risch et al, 2002). Saying that AJs aren’t white is similar to this.
But during WWII, Jews were persecuted in Nazi German and eventually some 6 million Jews were killed. Jews, in this instance, were seen as a socialrace in Germany, and so they were themselves racialized. It has been shown that Germans who grew up under their Nazi regime are much more anti-Semitic than Germans who were born before or after the Nazi regime, and it was Nazi schooling which contributed to this the most (Voigtlander and Voth, 2015). This shows how one’s beliefs—and that of a whole society’s—are malleable along with how effective propaganda is. The Nuremberg laws of 1935 established anti-Jewish sentiment in the Nazi racial state, and so they had to have a way to identify Jews. They settled on the religious affiliation of one’s 4 grandparents as a way to identify Jews. But when one’s origins were in doubt, the Reich Kinship Office was deployed in order to ascertain one’s genealogy. But in the event this could not be done, one’s physical attributes would be assessed and compared to 120 physical measures between the individual and their parents (Rupnow, 2020: 373-374).
This can now be centered on Whoopi Goldberg’s divisive comment from February, 2022, where she states that the attempted genocide of Jews in Nazi Germany “wasn’t about race“, but it was about “man’s inhumanity to man; [it involved] two groups of white people.” Of course Goldberg is operating under an American conception of race, so I could see why she would say that. However, at the time in Nazi Germany, Jews were Racialized Others, and so they were a socialrace in Germany.
92% of U.S. Jews describe themselves as White and non-Hispanic, while 8% say they belong to another racial or ethnic group. This includes 1% who identify as Black and non-Hispanic; 4% who identify as Hispanic; and 3% who identify with another race or ethnicity – such as Asian, American Indian or Hawaiian/Pacific Islander – or with more than one race.
A super majority (94%) of American Jews are (and identify as) white and non-“Hispanic” in Pew’s 2013 research, which is down slightly from the 2020 research (Lugo et al, 2013):
AJs were viewed as white even as early as 1790 when the Naturalization Act was put into law, which stated that only free white persons were allowed to emigrate to America (Tanner, 2021). Even in 1965, Srole (1965) stated that “Jews are white.” But the perception that all Jews are white came after WWII (Levine-Rasky, 2020) and this claim is of course false. All Jews certainly aren’t white, but some Jews are white. Thus, even historically in the history of America, AJs were seen as white. Yang and Koshy (2016) write:
We found no evidence from U.S. censuses, naturalization legislation, and court cases that the racial categorization of some non-Anglo-Saxon European immigrant groups such as the Irish, Italians, and Jews changed to white. They were legally white and always white, and there was no need for them to switch to white.
…
White ethnics could be considered ethnically inferior and discriminated against because of their ethnic distinctions, but in terms of race or color, they were all white and had access to resources not available to nonwhites.
It was precisely because of the changing meanings of race that “the Irish race,” “the German race,” “the Dutch race,” “the Jewish race,” “the Italian race,” and so on changed their races and became white. In today’s terminology, it should be read that these European groups changed their ethnicities to become part of whites, or more precisely they were racialized to become white.
…
Our findings help resolve the controversy over whether certain U.S. non-Anglo-Saxon European immigrant groups became white in historical America. Our analysis suggests that “becoming white” carries different meanings: change in racial classification, and change in majority/minority status. In terms of the former, “becoming white” for non-Anglo-Saxon European immigrant groups is bogus. Hence, the argument of Eric Arnesen (2001), Aldoph Reed (2001), Barbara Fields (2001), and Thomas Guglielmo (2003) that the Irish, Italians, and Jews were white on arrival in America is vindicated.
But one article in The Forward argued that “Ashkenazi Jews are not functionally white.” The author (Danzig) attempts to make an analogy between the founder of the NAACP Walter White who was “white-passing” (both of his parents were born into slavery) and Jews who are “white-passing”, “due to years of colonialism, expulsion and exile in European lands.” The author then claims that as along as Jews maintain their unique Jewish identity, they therefore are a racial group. This article is a response to another which claims that Ashkenazi Jews are” functionally white” (Burton). Danzig discusses Button’s claim that a “white-passing ‘Latinx'” person could be deported if their immigration status is discovered. This of course implies that “Hispanics” are themselves a racial group (they aren’t). Danzig discusses the discrimination that his family went through in the 1920s, stating that they could do certain things because they were Jewish. The argument in Danzig’s article, I think, is confused. It’s confused because just because Jews were discriminated against in the past doesn’t mean they weren’t white. In fact, Jews, Italians, and the Irish were white on arrival to the United States (Steward, 1964; Yang and Koshy, 2016). But this doesn’t mean that they didn’t face discrimination. That is, Jews, Italians and the Irish didn’t change to white they were always legally white in America. (But see Gardaphe, 2002, Bisesi, 2017, Baddorf, 2020, and Rubin, 2021. Italians didn’t become white as those authors claim, they were white upon arrival). So Danzig’s claim fails—Jews are functionally white because they are white and they arrived in America as white. Claims to the contrary that AJs (and Italians and the Irish) became white are clearly false.
So despite claims that Jews became white after WWII, Jews are in fact white in America (Pearson and Geronimus, 2011). Of course in the early 1900s as immigrants were arriving to Ellis Island, the question of whether or not Jews (“Hebrews” in this instance) were white or even if they were their own racial group had a decent amount of discussion at the time (Goldstein, 2005; Pearlman, 2018). The fact that there was ethnic strife between new-wave immigrants to Ellis Island doesn’t entail that they were racial groups or that those European immigrants weren’t white. It’s quite clear that Jews—like italians and the Irish—were considered white upon arrival.
Now that I have established the fact that Jews AJs are indeed white (and arrived to America as white) despite the confused protestations of some authors, now I will formalize the argument that AJs are white, since if they aren’t white, then they would need to fit into one of the other 4 racial categories.
Many may know that I push Quayshawn Spencer’s OMB race theory, and that I am a pluralist about race. In the volume What is Race?: Four Philosophical Views, philosopher or race Quayshawn Spencer (2019: 98) writes:
After all, in OMB race talk, White is not a narrow group limited to Europeans, European Americans, and the like. Rather, White is a broad group that includes Arabs, Persians, Jews, and other ethnic groups originating from the Middle East and North Africa.
Although there is some research on the racial identity of MENA (Middle Eastern/North African people) and how they may not perceive themselves as white or be perceived as white (Maghbouleh, Schachter, and Flores, 2022), the OMB is quite clear that the social group designated “white” doesn’t refer only to Europeans (Spencer, 2019).
So, if AJs aren’t white, then they must be part of another of the 4 OMB races (black, Native American, East Asian or Pacific Islander). Part of this racial scheme is K=5—where when K is set to 5 in STRUCTURE, 5 clusters are spit out and these map onto the OMB races. But of those 5 clusters, there is no Jewish cluster. Note that I am not denying that there is some kind of genetic structure to AJs, I’m just denying that this would entail that they are a racial group. If they were, then they would appear in these runs. AJs are merely an ethno-religious in the white socialrace. So let’s assume this is true: Ashkenazi Jews are not white.
When we consider the complexities of racial classification, it becomes apparent that societies tend to organize individuals on numerous traits into distinct categories based on physical traits, cultural background, and ancestry. If AJs aren’t white in an American context, then they would have to fall into one of the four other racial groups in a Spencerian OMB race theory.
But there is one important aspect to consider here—that of the phenotype of Ashkenazi Jews. Many Ashkenazi Jews exhibit physical traits which are more likely associated with “white” populations. This simple observation shows that AJs don’t fit into the established categories of East Asian, Pacific Islander, black or Native American. AJs’ typical phenotype aligns more closely with that of white populations.
So examining the racial landscape in America, we can see that how social perceptions and classifications can significantly impact how individuals are positioned in a broader framework. AJs have historically been classified and perceived as white in the American racial context, as can be seen above. So within American racetalk, AJs are predominantly classified in the white racial grouping.
So taking all of this together, I can rightly state that Jews are white. Since we assumed at the outset that if they weren’t white they would belong to some other racial group, but they don’t look like any other racial group but look and are treated as white (both in contemporary thought and historically), then AJs are most definitely seen as white in American racetalk. Here’s the formalized argument:
P1: If AJs aren’t white, then they must belong to one of the other 4 racial categories (black, Native American, East Asian or Pacific Islander). P2: AJs do not belong to any of the four racial categories mentioned (based on their phenotype typical of white people). P3: In the American racial context, AJs are predominantly classified and perceived as white. Conclusion: from P1, if AJs aren’t white then they must belong to one of the other 4 racial groups. But from P2, AJs do not belong to any of those categories, because from P3, AJs are perceived and classified as white. These premises, then, lead to a contradiction, since they all cannot be simultaneously true.
So we must reject the assumption that AJs aren’t white, and the logical conclusion is that AJs are considered white in the American context, based on their phenotype (and the fact that they arrived to America as white). Jews didn’t “become white” like some claim (eg, Brodkin, 2004). American Jews even benefit from white privilege (Schraub, 2019). MacDonald-Dennis’ (2005, 2006) qualitative research (although small not generalizable) shows that some Ashkenazi Jews think of themselves as white. AJs are legally and politically white.
All Jews aren’t white, but some (most) Jews are white (in America).
Conclusion
Thus, AJs are white. Although many authors have claimed that Jews became white after arrival to America (or even after WWII), this claim is false. It is false even as far back as 1790. If we accept the assumption that AJs aren’t white, then it leads to a contradiction, since they would have to be one of the other 4 racial groups, but since they look white, they cannot be a part of those racial groups.
There are white Jews and there are non-white Jews. But when it comes to AJs, the question “When did they become white?” is nonsense since they were always perceived and treated as white in America from it’s founding. Some AJs are white, some aren’t; some Mizrahi Jews are white, some aren’t. However in the context of this discussion, it is quite clear that AJs are white, and there is no other race for them to be, based on the OMB race theory. In fact, in the minds of most Americans, Jews aren’t a racialized group, but they are perceived as outsiders (Levin, Filindra, and Kopstein, 2022). But there were some instances in history where sometimes Jews were racialized, and sometimes they weren’t (Hochman, 2017). But what I have decisively shown here, in the American context ever since its inception, AJs are most definitely white. Saying that AJs are white is like saying that Italians or Germans are white. There is no contradiction. Jews get treated as white in the American social context, they look white, and have been considered white since they have arrived to America in the early 1900s (like the Irish and Italians).
The evidence and reasoning presented in this article points to one conclusion: That AJs are indeed white. This of course doesn’t mean that all AJs are white, it merely means that some (and I would say most) are white. AJs have been historically, legally, and politically white. Mere claims that they aren’t white are irrelevant.
NotPoliticallyCorrect 