Rene Descartes proposed that the peneal gland was the point of contact—the interface—between the immaterial mind and physical body. He thought that the peneal gland in humans was different and special to that of nonhuman animals, where in humans the peneal gland was the seat of the soul (Finger, 1995). This view was eventually shown to be false. However, claims that the mental can causally interact with the physical (interactionist dualism) have been met with similar criticism. If the mental is irreducible to the physical and if the mental does in fact causally interact with the physical, then the mental must be identical with the physical; that is, the mental is reducible to the physical due to physical laws like conservation of energy. This seems to be an issue for the truth of an interactionist dualist theory. But there are solutions. Deny that causal closure of the physical (CCP) is true (the world isn’t causally closed), or argue that CCP is compatible with interactionist dualism, or argue that CCP is question-begging (assuming in a premise what it seeks to establish and conclude) and assumes without proper justification that all physical events must be due to physical causes, which thereby illogically excludes the possibility of mental causation.
In this article I will provide some reasons to believe that CCP is question-begging, and I will argue that mental causation is invisible (see Lowe, 2008). I will also argue that action potentials are the interface by which the mental and the physical interact and which would then lead a conscious decision to make a movement be possible. I will provide arguments that show that interactionist dualism is consistent with physics, while showing that action potentials are the interface that Descartes was looking for. Ultimately, I will show how the mental interacts with the physical for mental causation to be carried out and how this isn’t an issue for the CCP. The view I will argue for here I will call “cognitive interface dualism” since it centers on the influence of mental states on action potentials and on the physical realm, and it conveys the idea that mental processes interface with physical processes through the conduit of action potentials, without implying a reduction of the mental to the physical, making it a substance dualist position since it still adheres to the mental and the physical as two different substances.
Causal closure of the physical
It is claimed that the world is causally closed—this means that every event or occurrence is due to physical causes, all physical events must be due to physical causes. Basically, no non-physical (mental) factors can cause or influence physical events. Here’s the argument:
(1) Every event in the world has a cause. (2) Causes and effects within the physical world are governed by the laws of physics. (3) Non-physical factors or entities, by definition, don’t belong to the physical realm. (4) If a nonphysical factor were to influence a physical event, it would violate the laws of physics. (5) Thus, the world is causally closed, meaning that all causes and effects in it are governed by physical interactions and laws.
But the issue here for the physicalist who wants to use causal closure is the fact that mental events and states are qualitatively different from physical events and states. This is evidenced in Lowe’s distinction between intentional (mental) and event (physical) causation. Mental states like thoughts and consciousness possess qualitatively different properties than physical states. The causal closure argument assumes that physical events are the only causes of other physical events. But mental states appear to exert causal influence over physical events, for instance voluntary action based on conscious decision, like my action right now to write this article. So if M states do influence P events, then there must be interaction between the mental and physical realms. This interaction contradicts the idea of strict causal closure of the physical realm. Since mental causation is necessary to explain aspects of human action and consciousness, it then follows that the physical world may not be causally closed.
The problem of interaction for interactionist dualism is premised on the CCP. It supposedly violated the conservation of energy (CoE). If P energy is needed to do P work, then a convergence of mental into physical energy then results in an increase in energy that is inexplicable. I think there are many ways to attack this supposed knock-down argument against interactionist dualism, and I will make the case in an argument below, arguing that action potentials are where the brain and the mind interact to carry out intentions. However, there are no strong, non-question begging arguments for causal closure that don’t beg the question (eg see Bishop, 2005; Dimitrijevic, 2010; Gabbani, 2013; Gibb, 2015), and the inductive arguments commit a sampling error or non-sequiturs (Buhler, 2020). So the CCP is either question-begging or unsound (Menzies, 2015). I will discuss this issue before concluding this article, and I will argue that my argument that APs serve as the interface between the mental and the physical, along with the question-beggingness of causal closure actually strengthens my argument.
The argument for action potentials as the interface between the mind and the brain
The view that I will argue for here, I think, is unique and has never been argued for in the philosophical literature on mental causation. In the argument that follows, I will show how arguing that action potentials (APs) are the point of contact—the interface—between the mind and brain doesn’t violate the CCP nor does it violate CoE.
But the skeletal muscle will not contract unless the skeletal muscles are stimulated. The nervous system and the muscular system communicate, which is called neural activiation—defined as the contraction of muscle generated by neural stimulation. We have what are called “motor neurons”—neurons located in the CNS (central nervous system) which can send impulses to muscles to move them. This is done through a special synapse called the neuromuscular junction. A motor neuron that connects with muscle fibers is called a motor unit and the point where the muscle fiber and motor unit meet is callled the neuromuscular junction. It is a small gap between the nerve and muscle fiber called a synapse. Action potentials (electrical impulses) are sent down the axon of the motor neuron from the CNS and when the action potential reaches the end of the axon, hormones called neurotransmitters are then released. Neurotransmitters transport the electrical signal from the nerve to the muscle.
So action potentials (APs) are carried out at the junction between synapses. So, regarding acetylcholine, when it is released, it binds to the synapses (a small space which separates the muscle from the nerve) and it then binds onto the receptors of the muscle fibers. Now we know that, in order for a muscle to contract, the brain sends the chemical message (acetylcholine) across synapses which then initiates movement. So, as can be seen from the diagram above, the MMC refers to the chemo-electric connection between the motor cortex, the cortico-spinal column, peripheral nerves and the neuromuscular junction. A neuromuscular junction is a synapse formed by the contact between a motor neuron and a muscle fiber.
This explanation will set the basis for my argument on how action potentials are the interface—the point of contact—by which the mind and brain meet.
As I have already shown, APs are electrochemical events that transmit signals within the nervous system and are generated as the result of neural activity which can be influenced by mental states like thoughts and intentions. The brain operates in accordance with physical laws and obeys the CoE, the initiation of APs could be (and are, though not always) influenced by mental intentions and processes. Mental processes could modulate the threshold or likelihood of AP firing through complex biomechanical mechanisms that do not violate the CoE. Of course, the energy that is required for generating APs ultimately derives from metabolic processes within the body, which could be influenced by mental states like attention, intention and emotional states. This interaction between mental states does not violate the CoE, nor does it require a violation of the laws of physics, since it operates within the bounds of biochemical and electrochemical processes that respect the CoE. Therefore, APs serve as the point of controlled interaction between the mental and physical realms, allowing for mental causation without disrupting the overall energy balance in the physical world.
Lowe argued that mental causation is invisible, and so since it is invisible, it is not amenable to scientific investigation. This view can be integrated into my argument that APs serve as the interface between the two substances, mental and physical. APs are observable electrochemical events in a neuron which could be influenced by mental states. So as I argued above, mental processes could influence or modulate the veneration of APs. When it comes to the invisibility of mental causation, this refers to the idea that mental events like thoughts, intentions, and consciousness are not directly perceptible like physical objects or events are. Mental states are not observable in the same way that physical events or objects are. In my view, APs hold a dual role. They function as the interface between the mental and the physical, providing the means by which the mental can influence physical events while shaping APs, and they also act as the causal mechanism in connecting mental states to physical events.
Thus, given the distinction between physical events (like APs) and the subjective nature of mental states, the view I have argued for above is consistent with the invisibility of mental causation. Mental causation involves the idea that mental states can influence physical events, and that they have causal efficacy on the physical world. So our mental experiences can lead to physical changes in the world based on the actions we carry out. But since mental states aren’t observable like physical states are, it’s challenging to show how they could lead to effects on the physical world. We infer the influence of mental states on physical events through the effects on observable physical processes. We can’t directly observe intention, we infer it on the basis of one’s action. Mental states could influence physical events through complex chains of electrochemical and biochemical processes which would then make the causative relationship less apparent. So while APs serve as the interface, this doesn’t mean that mental states and APs are identical. This is because while the mental can’t be reduced to physiology (the physical), it encompasses a range of subjective experiences, emotions, thoughts, and intentions that transcend the mechanistic explanations of neural activity.
It is quite obviously an empirical fact that the mental can influence the physical. Think of the fight-or-flight response. When one sees something that they are fearful of (like, say, an animal), there is then a concurrent change in certain hormones. This simple example shows how the mental can have an effect on the physical—where the physical event of seeing something fearful (which would be also be a subjective experience) would then lead to a physical change. So the initial mental event of seeing something fearful is a subjective experience which occurs in the realm of consciousness and mental states. The subjective experience of fear then triggers the fight-or-flight response, which leads to the release of stress hormones like cortisol and adrenaline. These physiological changes are part of the body’s response to a perceived threat based on the subject’s personal subjective experience. So the release of stress hormones is a physical event, and these hormones then have a measurable effect on the body like an increase in heart rate, heightened alertness and energy mobilization which then prepares the subject for action. These physiological changes then prepare the subject to either fight or flee from the situation that caused them fear. This is a solid example on how the mental can influence the physical.
The only way, I think, that my view can be challenged is by arguing that the CCP is true. But if it is question-begging, then my proposition that mental states can influence APs is then less contentious. Furthermore, my argument on APs could be open to multiple interpretations of causal closure. So instead of strictly adhering to causal closure, my view could accommodate various interpretations that allow mental causation to have an effect in the physical realm. Thus, since I view causal closure as question begging, it provides a basis for my view that mental states can influence APs and by extension the physical world. And if the CCP is false, my view on action potentials is actually strengthened.
The view I have argued for here is a simplified perspective on the relationship between the mental and the physical. But my intention isn’t to offer a comprehensive account of all aspects of mental and physical interaction, rather, it is to highlight the role of APs as a point of connection between the mental and physical realms.
Cognitive interface dualism as a form of substance dualism
The view I have argued for here is a substance dualist position. Although it posits an intermediary in APs that facilitates interaction between the mental and physical realms, it still maintains the fundamental duality between mental and physical substances. Mental states are irreducible to physical states, and they interact though APs without collapsing into a single substance. Mental states involve subjective experiences, intentionality, and qualia which are fundamentally different from the objective and quantifiable nature of the physical realm, which I have argued before. APs serve as the bridge—the interface—between the mental and the physical realms, so my dualistic perspective allows for interaction while still preserving the unique properties of the mental and the physical.
Although APs serve as the bridge between the mental and the physical, the interaction between mental states and APs suggests that mental causation operates independently of physical processes. This, then, implies that the self which originates in mental states, isn’t confined to the physical realm, and that it isn’t reducible to the physical. The self’s subjective experiences, consciousness and self-awareness cannot be explained by physical or material processes, which indicates an immaterial substance beyond the physical. The unity of consciousness, which is the integrated sense of self and personal identity over time, are better accounted for by an immaterial self that transcends a change in physical states. Lastly mental states possess qualitative properties like qualia that defy reduction to physical properties. These qualities then, point to a distinct and immaterial self.
My view posits a form of non-reductive mental causation, where mental states influence APs, acknowledging the nonphysical influence on the mental to the physical. Interaction doesn’t imply reduction; mental states remain irreducible even though they impact physical processes. My view also accommodates consciousness, subjectivity, and intentionality which can’t be accounted for by material or physical processes. My view also addresses the explanatory gap between objective physical processes and subjective mental processes, which can’t be accounted for by reduction to physical brain (neural) processes.
Conclusion
The exploration of APs within the context of cognitive interface dualism offers a perspective on the interplay between the mental and physical substances. My view acknowledges APs as the bridge of interaction between the mental and the physical, and it fosters a deeper understanding of the role of mental causation in helping us understand reality.
Central to my view is recognizing that while APs do serve as the interface or conduit by which the mental and the physical interact, and how mental states can influence physical events, this does not entail that the mental is reducible to the physical. My cognitive interface dualism therefore presents a nuanced approach that navigates the interface between the seen and the unseen, the physical and the mental.
Traditional views of causal closure may raise questions about the feasibility of mental causation, the concept’s rigidity is challenged by the intermediary role of APs. While I do hold that the CCP is question-begging, the view I have argued for here explores an alternative avenue which seemingly transcends that limitation. So even if the strict view of the CCP were to fall, my view would remain strong.
This view is also inherently anti-reductionist, asserting that personal identity, consciousness, subjectivity and intentionality cannot be reduced to the physical. Thus, it doesn’t succumb to the traditional limitations of physicalism. Cognitive interface dualism also challenges the notion that we are reducible to our physical brains or our mental activity. The self—the bearer of mental states—isn’t confined to neural circuitry, although the physical is necessary for our mental lives, it isn’t a sufficient condition (Gabriel, 2018).
Lastly, of course this view means that since the mental is irreducible to the physical, then psychometrics isn’t a measurement enterprise. Any argument that espouses the view that the mental is irreducible to the physical would entail that psychometrics isn’t measurement. So by acknowledging that mental states, consciousness, and subjective experiences transcend the confines of physical quantification, cognitive interface dualism dismantles the assumption that the human mind can be measured and encapsulated using numerical metrics. This view holds that the mental resists quantification, since only the physical is quantifiable since only the physical have specified measured objects, objects of measurement and measurement units.
All in all, my view I title cognitive interface dualism explains how mental causation occurs through action potentials. It still holds that the mental is irreducible to the physical, but that the mental and physical interact without M being reduced to P. This view I have espoused, I think, is unique, and it shows how mental causation does occur, it shows how we perform actions.
“We can’t directly observe intention, we infer it on the basis of one’s action.”
Same thing with intelligence tests.
Bravo on posting something interesting instead of just repeating the same tired HBD refutations. Not that it isn’t deserved, but Pumpkin and them are not really worth the effort.
That said, as the dirty physicalist I am, I definitely disagree with it.
Correct me if this isn’t an accurate representation, but I think M -> P -> M -> P is the wrong way to conceptualize interactions. I’d say it’s more like M(P) -> M(P) -> M(P). This isn’t to be confused with identity theory, but I’d say the mental is just a layer of abstraction upon what are, ultimately, physical processes.
The concept of mental states is similar to Application Centric Infrastructure (ACI), which allows you to configure and manage networks without having to worry about the underlying hardware. Similarly, the concept of mental states and physical states can help philosophers understand the nature of mind and consciousness.
Furthermore, I think a big problem with your example using the fight-or-flight response is that you fail to realize that the mental states that are causing these APs to fire are accompanied (occurring simultaneously, so this isn’t classical causality) by physical states. The act of seeing an animal is a physical AND mental state.
I think I could say more on this, but I’ll give you a chance to respond before I get too deep into it.
Can you elaborate more on that? Correct me if I’m wrong, but the first sequence is something like: Mental state to physical state, to mental state to physical state? And the second is where M is dependent on P, and both influence each other? So M processes are dependent on P processes which then create a feedback loop with M and P interacting and feeding off each other?
What you said here is interesting, but I don’t think it’s at odds with my argument. CID also emphasizes a bidirectional influence on M and P. For example, in my fight-or-flight example, the sight of a threatening stimulus (mental state) triggers the release of different hormones (physical states) which then prepare the body for action. The physiological changes which are triggered by the release of hormones (physical states) also then impact mental states. So I don’t see how the second formulation is at odds with my view. But I do think your second formulation highlights the fight-or-flight response analogy better. I also think that depending on the context both formulations could be a valid representation. I also don’t think that the second formulation inherently is pro- or anti-physicalist, I don’t think it is inherently consistent with either position. It captures the complexity between M and P, but doesn’t imply a certain metaphysical stance.
So it’s: Seeing something fearful (initial mental event), fear (M) triggers the fight or flight response involving the release of stress hormones (P), physiological changes (P) influence heightened alertness (M), (this forms the “M(P)” interaction; heightened alertness (M) feedback into the physiological state (P) (forming the second “M(P)” interaction) and then the continuous interaction then prepares the subject for action, with M and P states in a dynamic dance with dual influence.
And yea, the act of “seeing” is dependent on physical processes, and of course the act of seeing an animal is physical (you have to see the animal in space, and seeing is dependent on physical processes like having a set of working eyes that are connected correctly), but the subjective experience is itself mental. But of course one could think that there is something in an area that is to be feared (without something actually being there) which would then cause the chain to commence as well.
at least arthur russell had the excuse that turning bi was rewarded in his environment and he had horrible acne scars…sad…without those he was pretty good looking.
rr: unless you engage with my billion word essay you are not serious.
mugabe: exactly! you are not serious rr…but you’re too fucking arrogant and narcissistic to see it…
from the kana upanishad:
Not that which the eye can see, but that whereby the eye can see: know that to be Brahman the eternal, and not what people here adore;
Not that which the ear can hear, but that whereby the ear can hear: know that to be Brahman the eternal, and not what people here adore;
Not that which speech can illuminate, but that by which speech can be illuminated: know that to be Brahman the eternal, and not what people here adore;
Not that which the mind can think, but that whereby the mind can think: know that to be Brahman the eternal, and not what people here adore.</i>
“Can you elaborate more on that? Correct me if I’m wrong, but the first sequence is something like: Mental state to physical state, to mental state to physical state? ”
Yes! That’s how I interpret your argument, with APs acting as the interface between these events. It’s sort of like an API or something.
“And the second is where M is dependent on P, and both influence each other? So M processes are dependent on P processes which then create a feedback loop with M and P interacting and feeding off each other?”
Not quite. I think this idea and what you wrote afterward is incredibly interesting and perhaps another way to perceive this phenomenon, but what I’m arguing for is a little bit different.
Seeing is not just dependent on physical processes; it IS a physical process, but it’s ALSO a mental one. So, when “the sight of a threatening stimulus (mental state)” occurs, an underlying physical state is also happening. It’s more accurate to say that P -> P -> P and M -> M -> M are happening at the same time. That’s what I mean by M (P). This is what I mean by a “layer of abstraction.” When I’m afraid, and I want to convey this feeling, I’m not going to say, ” neuron X interacted with neuron B, and the stress hormone A increased by Y” I’m going to say, “Yo, did you see that fucking bear? It was huge! I almost shit myself! Let’s not come to this part of the woods anymore.”
ACI is a tool I use at my current job. Technically, I could go into each switch/router/whatever and configure them all individually, but ACI allows me to do all of that from a centralized web GUI. That’s how I view mental states in regard to how we conceptualize the mind and brain.
I think this conflicts with substance dualism because Physical and mental states ar ultimately of the same substance. I don’t know what you would call this view. Maybe epiphenomenalism, for lack of a better term. Maybe you would know.
“Seeing is not just dependent on physical processes; it IS a physical process, but it’s ALSO a mental one”
I agree that a physical state is also occuring. For there to be mental facts there need to be physical facts (like seeing an object in space which then leads to the mental state of fear). I agree that you’re not talking about neurons firing and stress hormones increasing. That’s merely a description of what is occuring and how it occurs and how M influences and interacts with P. Ultimately, it’s an example of the mental influencing the physical, it’s an example of mental causation. But the causal chain I described in my argument on how I think M can influence P and so be an example of mental causation (along wkth Krodel’s argument), I think shows that MC exists. I don’t think there is any way to deny that it exists, because we clearly have mental states so I think eliminativism is out of the picture. I also think epiphenomenalism is as well since our mental states clearly have an effect on the physical world.
Regarding what the view would be called, I think it’s a type of physicalist monism. For it to be epiphenomenalism, you would have to hold that mental states are a byproduct of physical states but they have no causal power in the world, they’re basically causally inert.
Sure! So, an API (Application Programming Interface) is like a waiter in a restaurant. When you want to order food, you don’t need to know how to cook it. You just tell the waiter what you want, and they go to the kitchen and get it for you.
In the same way, an API allows you to use a software application without knowing how it works. You just need to know what you want to do, and the API will do it for you.
For example, let’s say you want to get the weather forecast for tomorrow. You could use an API from a weather service to do this. You would simply request the API, which would return the weather forecast for you.
In this instance, an AP is like an API because it’s the middleman between mental states and physical states. It allows translation between two different types of systems.
“I also think epiphenomenalism is as well since our mental states clearly have an effect on the physical world.”
Well, that’s kind of my point. I’m not sure that they do. To me, any causation M appears to be doing is just P. To me, I think M is just something we experience.
I’ll be honest, I think you’re saying what I said in my AP-mental-physical interaction argument. From what you said, APIs serve as an intermediary between a user and a complex while the AP can be seen as the interface or conduit which facilitates the communication between the mental (mind) and the physical. CID acknowledges that mental states are experienced and play a role in shaping physical states.
The continuous bidirectional influence of M and P means that mental phenomena aren’t mere epiphenomena, but they actively shape physical outcomes. So this means that mental states aren’t only something that we experience, they play an active part in shaping physical outcomes. My explanation on the mind-body problem argues that the interaction is integral in explaining consciousness and mind and how we can carry out intentions and actions.
M states influence P states, and vice versa, and this aligns with what you said about making a request through an API in that it can trigger actions in the underlying system leading to changes that are then communicated back to you.
So while I disagree that “M is just something we experience”, I respect the argument you’re mounting.
“I think you’re saying what I said in my AP-mental-physical interaction argument. ”
Well, yeah. I was using APIs as a metaphor for how I assume you’re conceptualizing the causal flow of M and P. I disagree with it, but I think it accurately portrays the idea you are conveying.
“they actively shape physical outcomes. So this means that mental states aren’t only something that we experience”
How do you know it’s M that’s affecting changes in P and not the P that underlies every mental state? What I mean is, if every instance of M is coextensive with an instance of P how are you differentiating which event is causal?
You seem to be implying that my CID is either a form of dual-aspect monism or property dualism. P “underlies every mental state”, as a necessary, not sufficient condition. In line with substance dualism, my position posits the existence of two distinct substances—mental and physical and according to CID, mental states aren’t reducible to physical states and physical states aren’t reducible to mental states. So this dualism maintains the irreducible nature of mental phenomena, in that M can’t be reduced to P. Thus, this foundational premise of CID underscores that mental states exist independently of physical states and that they possess unique properties that physical states don’t have.
So in the context of causation, CID acknowledges that M states can cause P states and P states can cause M states. So the differentiation between which event is causal depends on the context and perspective of the event. For example, in my fight-or-flight example, the mental state (M) of fear causes physiological responses and the release of stress hormones (P). As I argued, this is an example of mental causation (MC), where the mental can indeed influence the physical (along with Lowe’s and Krodel’s argument).
All in all, my view acknowledges that M and P exist as distinct but interconnected domains (think about the proposition “The brain is a necessary pre-condition for human mindedness”), while each has its own unique properties and characteristics. And while it does recognize the interaction between both realms, it fundamentally maintains the irreducible nature of mentality.
Not at all. Sorry for the miscommunication, but I’m saying that P is a necessary condition of M (which is true for both property and substance dualism). That means there is an instance of P in every instance of M. This poses a problem for MC. I’ll illustrate how with another fight-or-flight example.
Let’s say I see a grizzly bear in the woods; I become frightened; I decide to load bullets into my rifle, and then I shoot the bear, killing it instantly.
Now, I imagine you would conceptualize this scenario as follows: Neuronal state (P) -> Seeing the bear (M) -> Hormonal Changes(P) -> Fear (M) -> Resolving to kill the bear to protect yourself (M)-> Loading bullets into your gun (P) -> Shooting the bear (P).
This is obviously an oversimplification. Undoubtedly, you could fill an enumerable number of steps in between any other. However, I think you would agree that, on a general level, it encapsulates your view succinctly.
The problem is that the act of seeing a bear, the fear induced by it, and the resolve to kill the bear are not just M; they are also P. The physical states that are necessary for M to exist are happening simultaneously as the M they create, so how do you know that it is the mental state of seeing a bear in front of your eyes and not the physical state that coincides with it that induces the other physical responses that occur afterward? I contend that you simply don’t. As such, I don’t think the conclusion of MC is warranted.
“there is an instance of P in every instance of M”
Good example, and I won’t get into the details of the causal chain. But I do think, as I argued in the article, that ultimately, it’s an example of MC. Of course the act of seeing a bear, the fear it induces, and the decision to protect oneself are mental and physical events. CID doesn’t deny this, but contends that they are interconnected while emphasizing the distinction between M and P while maintaining their distinctiveness.
Further, CID doesn’t claim that M is always an exclusive causal agent, just that it CAN exert causal influence on P and vice versa. Moreover, CID doesn’t insist that M is the causal factor in every scenario, but it posts that mental states play a distinct role in causation along with physical states. So the claim isn’t “Necessarily, M causes everything”, but it’s “M contributes meaningfully to the causal chain.”
Lastly, CID is a metaphysical theory which details with fundamental aspects of the mind-body problem. It doesn’t aim to provide detailed causal explanations for every scenario; rather, it offers a framework for how M and P interact through APs, which I think is a novel argument.
So if CID is valid, then mental states have genuine causal influence on physical states. CID posits that mental states have genuine causal influence on physical states. Your challenge to the validity of CID questions whether mental states are the primary causal agents in complex scenarios like the one you sketched out. But if mental states aren’t the primary agents in complex scenarios, then CID isn’t undermined. CID allows for complex interactions between mental and physical states without requiring mental states to be the sole cause. So your challenge to CID’s validity doesn’t necessarily undermine CID. Thus, CID remains a valid philosophical framework for understanding the mind-body relationship.
I realize I didn’t formulate my original fight or flight argument, so here it is (drawing the structure from Krodel’s argument for mental causation, which also establishes MC):
(1) If a person experiences a threatening stimulus (T), then they will have a mental state of fear (F).
(T –> F)
(2) If a person has a mental state of fear (F), it will lead to physiological changes (P) associated with the fight-or-flight response.
(F –> P)
(3) Physiological changes (P) in the body prepare the person for action, either fighting or fleeing from the threat.
(P –> A)
———————
(4) Therefore, if a person experiences a threatening stimulus (T), it will lead to physiological changes (P) that prepare them for action (A).
“So if CID is valid, then mental states have genuine causal influence on physical states. CID posits that mental states have genuine causal influence on physical states. Your challenge to the validity of CID questions whether mental states are the primary causal agents in complex scenarios like the one you sketched out”
Again, there is miscommunication. I am saying that there is no evidence that M have genuine causal influence on P.
“(1) If a person experiences a threatening stimulus (T), then they will have a mental state of fear (F).
(T –> F)
(2) If a person has a mental state of fear (F), it will lead to physiological changes (P) associated with the fight-or-flight response.
(F –> P)
(3) Physiological changes (P) in the body prepare the person for action, either fighting or fleeing from the threat.
(P –> A)
———————
(4) Therefore, if a person experiences a threatening stimulus (T), it will lead to physiological changes (P) that prepare them for action (A).”
To be specific, the issue lies there at (2.) F is coextensive with a P. And it is unwarranted to say F leads to P2. It is possible that the P that underlies F is what is leading to P2. F is just the “shadow.” P1 is causing F AND P2. F has no causal influence.
So before I respond further to that—you’re positing an epiphenomenalist view, right? The claim that mental states are causally inert and are byproducts of physical states? My AP argument shows how MC can be possible with M and P interacting.
The thing is, mental states (F) correspond to conscious experiences, qualia and subjective phenomena. Physical states (P) are represented by APs which are observable, measurable and have distinct properties. F is distinct from P because F encompasses subjective experiences, emotions, thoughts and intentions which are unique to each person and are inherently qualitative. P, as represented by APs, comprises the electrochemical processes in the brain which are objective, quantifiable, and are devoid of qualitative properties. So while F and P are correlated, coextensive, and interact in the context of CID, the distinction lies in the inherent natures of F and P—F being in the realm of subjective consciousness and P being in the realm of objective, physical processes. So CID maintains the qualitative differences between mental states (F) and their corresponding physical states (P), since they are fundamentally distinct entities with fundamentally different natures. Thus, despite the coextension and interaction, CID emphasizes the essential distinction between M and P.
So mental states (F) are not mere “shadows”, they are the very essence of our conscious experiences which define our unique personal identities, emotions, and thoughts. So while F and P may be correlated and interact (something I never denied), F holds it’s distinct and irreducible properties—properties that go beyond being a mere “shadow.”
“you’re positing an epiphenomenalist view, right? The claim that mental states are causally inert and are byproducts of physical states? ”
That’s the closest thing I could think of. But I hesitate to call it epiphenomenalism because the arguments for and against that philosophy are quite antiquated and have negative connotations.
“So mental states (F) are not mere “shadows,” they are the very essence of our conscious experiences which define our unique personal identities, emotions, and thoughts.”
I think they can be “shadows” and still be qualitatively different.
Well yea, epiphenomenalism leads to an absurdity, since our thoughts clearly can cause things to happen in the world, like this comment I’m making to you now.
Can you explain how M states “can be “shadows” and still be qualitatively different”?
What do you mean by how “would I prove MC”? Logically or empirically? I honestly think MC is a given in everyday lives, since we will something to happen and it happens (talking about thoughts, beliefs, and desires). And I think my fight-or-flight argument shows that MC is a thing, along with Kroedel’s argument for MC.
“since our thoughts clearly can cause things to happen in the world, like this comment I’m making to you now.”
It’s not really clear. Your neural states could be causing your fingers to hit the keyboard. Mental causation is redundant because physical states can sufficiently account for other physical states.
“Can you explain how M states “can be “shadows” and still be qualitatively different”?”
How couldn’t they be? What about being the after effect P means that M cannot have certain qualities that make it unique?
“What do you mean by how “would I prove MC”? Logically or empirically?”
Either. Whatever you try to explain M with could probably be equally explained by P.
“along with Kroedel’s argument for MC.”
I don’t think appealing to counterfactuals can save you from the exclusion problem. That said, I didn’t read all of Kroedel’s article. Can you just simplify his argument for me?
but at least we can agree arthur russell has all the best breaks yet to be culturally appropriated/exploited by rappers. genius who died from anal pleasure in 1992.
4150 words Introduction Back in September I published an article arguing that since the theory of African American offending (TAAO) makes successful novel predictions and…
2200 words Introduction People who have received organ transplants have reported stark changes in their personalities. Some (truly outrageous) stories claim that people who receive…
2600 words Introduction Over the last 10 years or so, claims from the human biodiversity (HBD) movement have been gaining more and more traction. Proponents…
2100 words Introduction Health can be defined as “a relative state in which one is able to function well physically, mentally, socially, and spiritually to…
NotPoliticallyCorrect 
“We can’t directly observe intention, we infer it on the basis of one’s action.”
Same thing with intelligence tests.
Bravo on posting something interesting instead of just repeating the same tired HBD refutations. Not that it isn’t deserved, but Pumpkin and them are not really worth the effort.
That said, as the dirty physicalist I am, I definitely disagree with it.
Correct me if this isn’t an accurate representation, but I think M -> P -> M -> P is the wrong way to conceptualize interactions. I’d say it’s more like M(P) -> M(P) -> M(P). This isn’t to be confused with identity theory, but I’d say the mental is just a layer of abstraction upon what are, ultimately, physical processes.
The concept of mental states is similar to Application Centric Infrastructure (ACI), which allows you to configure and manage networks without having to worry about the underlying hardware. Similarly, the concept of mental states and physical states can help philosophers understand the nature of mind and consciousness.
Furthermore, I think a big problem with your example using the fight-or-flight response is that you fail to realize that the mental states that are causing these APs to fire are accompanied (occurring simultaneously, so this isn’t classical causality) by physical states. The act of seeing an animal is a physical AND mental state.
I think I could say more on this, but I’ll give you a chance to respond before I get too deep into it.
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“Bravo on posting something interesting”
Thanks. This argument dawned on me last week.
“Correct me if this isn’t accurate”
Can you elaborate more on that? Correct me if I’m wrong, but the first sequence is something like: Mental state to physical state, to mental state to physical state? And the second is where M is dependent on P, and both influence each other? So M processes are dependent on P processes which then create a feedback loop with M and P interacting and feeding off each other?
What you said here is interesting, but I don’t think it’s at odds with my argument. CID also emphasizes a bidirectional influence on M and P. For example, in my fight-or-flight example, the sight of a threatening stimulus (mental state) triggers the release of different hormones (physical states) which then prepare the body for action. The physiological changes which are triggered by the release of hormones (physical states) also then impact mental states. So I don’t see how the second formulation is at odds with my view. But I do think your second formulation highlights the fight-or-flight response analogy better. I also think that depending on the context both formulations could be a valid representation. I also don’t think that the second formulation inherently is pro- or anti-physicalist, I don’t think it is inherently consistent with either position. It captures the complexity between M and P, but doesn’t imply a certain metaphysical stance.
So it’s: Seeing something fearful (initial mental event), fear (M) triggers the fight or flight response involving the release of stress hormones (P), physiological changes (P) influence heightened alertness (M), (this forms the “M(P)” interaction; heightened alertness (M) feedback into the physiological state (P) (forming the second “M(P)” interaction) and then the continuous interaction then prepares the subject for action, with M and P states in a dynamic dance with dual influence.
And yea, the act of “seeing” is dependent on physical processes, and of course the act of seeing an animal is physical (you have to see the animal in space, and seeing is dependent on physical processes like having a set of working eyes that are connected correctly), but the subjective experience is itself mental. But of course one could think that there is something in an area that is to be feared (without something actually being there) which would then cause the chain to commence as well.
Very interesting comment.
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beyond gay!
at least arthur russell had the excuse that turning bi was rewarded in his environment and he had horrible acne scars…sad…without those he was pretty good looking.
rr: unless you engage with my billion word essay you are not serious.
mugabe: exactly! you are not serious rr…but you’re too fucking arrogant and narcissistic to see it…
from the kana upanishad:
Not that which the eye can see, but that whereby the eye can see: know that to be Brahman the eternal, and not what people here adore;
try harder mein herr…the whole world awaits…
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“Can you elaborate more on that? Correct me if I’m wrong, but the first sequence is something like: Mental state to physical state, to mental state to physical state? ”
Yes! That’s how I interpret your argument, with APs acting as the interface between these events. It’s sort of like an API or something.
“And the second is where M is dependent on P, and both influence each other? So M processes are dependent on P processes which then create a feedback loop with M and P interacting and feeding off each other?”
Not quite. I think this idea and what you wrote afterward is incredibly interesting and perhaps another way to perceive this phenomenon, but what I’m arguing for is a little bit different.
Seeing is not just dependent on physical processes; it IS a physical process, but it’s ALSO a mental one. So, when “the sight of a threatening stimulus (mental state)” occurs, an underlying physical state is also happening. It’s more accurate to say that P -> P -> P and M -> M -> M are happening at the same time. That’s what I mean by M (P). This is what I mean by a “layer of abstraction.” When I’m afraid, and I want to convey this feeling, I’m not going to say, ” neuron X interacted with neuron B, and the stress hormone A increased by Y” I’m going to say, “Yo, did you see that fucking bear? It was huge! I almost shit myself! Let’s not come to this part of the woods anymore.”
ACI is a tool I use at my current job. Technically, I could go into each switch/router/whatever and configure them all individually, but ACI allows me to do all of that from a centralized web GUI. That’s how I view mental states in regard to how we conceptualize the mind and brain.
I think this conflicts with substance dualism because Physical and mental states ar ultimately of the same substance. I don’t know what you would call this view. Maybe epiphenomenalism, for lack of a better term. Maybe you would know.
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“It’s sort of like an API or something.”
I don’t know what that is. Can you explain?
“Seeing is not just dependent on physical processes; it IS a physical process, but it’s ALSO a mental one”
I agree that a physical state is also occuring. For there to be mental facts there need to be physical facts (like seeing an object in space which then leads to the mental state of fear). I agree that you’re not talking about neurons firing and stress hormones increasing. That’s merely a description of what is occuring and how it occurs and how M influences and interacts with P. Ultimately, it’s an example of the mental influencing the physical, it’s an example of mental causation. But the causal chain I described in my argument on how I think M can influence P and so be an example of mental causation (along wkth Krodel’s argument), I think shows that MC exists. I don’t think there is any way to deny that it exists, because we clearly have mental states so I think eliminativism is out of the picture. I also think epiphenomenalism is as well since our mental states clearly have an effect on the physical world.
Regarding what the view would be called, I think it’s a type of physicalist monism. For it to be epiphenomenalism, you would have to hold that mental states are a byproduct of physical states but they have no causal power in the world, they’re basically causally inert.
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“Can you explain?”
Sure! So, an API (Application Programming Interface) is like a waiter in a restaurant. When you want to order food, you don’t need to know how to cook it. You just tell the waiter what you want, and they go to the kitchen and get it for you.
In the same way, an API allows you to use a software application without knowing how it works. You just need to know what you want to do, and the API will do it for you.
For example, let’s say you want to get the weather forecast for tomorrow. You could use an API from a weather service to do this. You would simply request the API, which would return the weather forecast for you.
In this instance, an AP is like an API because it’s the middleman between mental states and physical states. It allows translation between two different types of systems.
“I also think epiphenomenalism is as well since our mental states clearly have an effect on the physical world.”
Well, that’s kind of my point. I’m not sure that they do. To me, any causation M appears to be doing is just P. To me, I think M is just something we experience.
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I’ll be honest, I think you’re saying what I said in my AP-mental-physical interaction argument. From what you said, APIs serve as an intermediary between a user and a complex while the AP can be seen as the interface or conduit which facilitates the communication between the mental (mind) and the physical. CID acknowledges that mental states are experienced and play a role in shaping physical states.
The continuous bidirectional influence of M and P means that mental phenomena aren’t mere epiphenomena, but they actively shape physical outcomes. So this means that mental states aren’t only something that we experience, they play an active part in shaping physical outcomes. My explanation on the mind-body problem argues that the interaction is integral in explaining consciousness and mind and how we can carry out intentions and actions.
M states influence P states, and vice versa, and this aligns with what you said about making a request through an API in that it can trigger actions in the underlying system leading to changes that are then communicated back to you.
So while I disagree that “M is just something we experience”, I respect the argument you’re mounting.
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“I think you’re saying what I said in my AP-mental-physical interaction argument. ”
Well, yeah. I was using APIs as a metaphor for how I assume you’re conceptualizing the causal flow of M and P. I disagree with it, but I think it accurately portrays the idea you are conveying.
“they actively shape physical outcomes. So this means that mental states aren’t only something that we experience”
How do you know it’s M that’s affecting changes in P and not the P that underlies every mental state? What I mean is, if every instance of M is coextensive with an instance of P how are you differentiating which event is causal?
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You seem to be implying that my CID is either a form of dual-aspect monism or property dualism. P “underlies every mental state”, as a necessary, not sufficient condition. In line with substance dualism, my position posits the existence of two distinct substances—mental and physical and according to CID, mental states aren’t reducible to physical states and physical states aren’t reducible to mental states. So this dualism maintains the irreducible nature of mental phenomena, in that M can’t be reduced to P. Thus, this foundational premise of CID underscores that mental states exist independently of physical states and that they possess unique properties that physical states don’t have.
So in the context of causation, CID acknowledges that M states can cause P states and P states can cause M states. So the differentiation between which event is causal depends on the context and perspective of the event. For example, in my fight-or-flight example, the mental state (M) of fear causes physiological responses and the release of stress hormones (P). As I argued, this is an example of mental causation (MC), where the mental can indeed influence the physical (along with Lowe’s and Krodel’s argument).
All in all, my view acknowledges that M and P exist as distinct but interconnected domains (think about the proposition “The brain is a necessary pre-condition for human mindedness”), while each has its own unique properties and characteristics. And while it does recognize the interaction between both realms, it fundamentally maintains the irreducible nature of mentality.
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Not at all. Sorry for the miscommunication, but I’m saying that P is a necessary condition of M (which is true for both property and substance dualism). That means there is an instance of P in every instance of M. This poses a problem for MC. I’ll illustrate how with another fight-or-flight example.
Let’s say I see a grizzly bear in the woods; I become frightened; I decide to load bullets into my rifle, and then I shoot the bear, killing it instantly.
Now, I imagine you would conceptualize this scenario as follows: Neuronal state (P) -> Seeing the bear (M) -> Hormonal Changes(P) -> Fear (M) -> Resolving to kill the bear to protect yourself (M)-> Loading bullets into your gun (P) -> Shooting the bear (P).
This is obviously an oversimplification. Undoubtedly, you could fill an enumerable number of steps in between any other. However, I think you would agree that, on a general level, it encapsulates your view succinctly.
The problem is that the act of seeing a bear, the fear induced by it, and the resolve to kill the bear are not just M; they are also P. The physical states that are necessary for M to exist are happening simultaneously as the M they create, so how do you know that it is the mental state of seeing a bear in front of your eyes and not the physical state that coincides with it that induces the other physical responses that occur afterward? I contend that you simply don’t. As such, I don’t think the conclusion of MC is warranted.
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“P is a necessary condition of M”
Right, which is what I’ve been saying for years.
“there is an instance of P in every instance of M”
Good example, and I won’t get into the details of the causal chain. But I do think, as I argued in the article, that ultimately, it’s an example of MC. Of course the act of seeing a bear, the fear it induces, and the decision to protect oneself are mental and physical events. CID doesn’t deny this, but contends that they are interconnected while emphasizing the distinction between M and P while maintaining their distinctiveness.
Further, CID doesn’t claim that M is always an exclusive causal agent, just that it CAN exert causal influence on P and vice versa. Moreover, CID doesn’t insist that M is the causal factor in every scenario, but it posts that mental states play a distinct role in causation along with physical states. So the claim isn’t “Necessarily, M causes everything”, but it’s “M contributes meaningfully to the causal chain.”
Lastly, CID is a metaphysical theory which details with fundamental aspects of the mind-body problem. It doesn’t aim to provide detailed causal explanations for every scenario; rather, it offers a framework for how M and P interact through APs, which I think is a novel argument.
So if CID is valid, then mental states have genuine causal influence on physical states. CID posits that mental states have genuine causal influence on physical states. Your challenge to the validity of CID questions whether mental states are the primary causal agents in complex scenarios like the one you sketched out. But if mental states aren’t the primary agents in complex scenarios, then CID isn’t undermined. CID allows for complex interactions between mental and physical states without requiring mental states to be the sole cause. So your challenge to CID’s validity doesn’t necessarily undermine CID. Thus, CID remains a valid philosophical framework for understanding the mind-body relationship.
I realize I didn’t formulate my original fight or flight argument, so here it is (drawing the structure from Krodel’s argument for mental causation, which also establishes MC):
(1) If a person experiences a threatening stimulus (T), then they will have a mental state of fear (F).
(T –> F)
(2) If a person has a mental state of fear (F), it will lead to physiological changes (P) associated with the fight-or-flight response.
(F –> P)
(3) Physiological changes (P) in the body prepare the person for action, either fighting or fleeing from the threat.
(P –> A)
———————
(4) Therefore, if a person experiences a threatening stimulus (T), it will lead to physiological changes (P) that prepare them for action (A).
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“So if CID is valid, then mental states have genuine causal influence on physical states. CID posits that mental states have genuine causal influence on physical states. Your challenge to the validity of CID questions whether mental states are the primary causal agents in complex scenarios like the one you sketched out”
Again, there is miscommunication. I am saying that there is no evidence that M have genuine causal influence on P.
“(1) If a person experiences a threatening stimulus (T), then they will have a mental state of fear (F).
(T –> F)
(2) If a person has a mental state of fear (F), it will lead to physiological changes (P) associated with the fight-or-flight response.
(F –> P)
(3) Physiological changes (P) in the body prepare the person for action, either fighting or fleeing from the threat.
(P –> A)
———————
(4) Therefore, if a person experiences a threatening stimulus (T), it will lead to physiological changes (P) that prepare them for action (A).”
To be specific, the issue lies there at (2.) F is coextensive with a P. And it is unwarranted to say F leads to P2. It is possible that the P that underlies F is what is leading to P2. F is just the “shadow.” P1 is causing F AND P2. F has no causal influence.
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So before I respond further to that—you’re positing an epiphenomenalist view, right? The claim that mental states are causally inert and are byproducts of physical states? My AP argument shows how MC can be possible with M and P interacting.
The thing is, mental states (F) correspond to conscious experiences, qualia and subjective phenomena. Physical states (P) are represented by APs which are observable, measurable and have distinct properties. F is distinct from P because F encompasses subjective experiences, emotions, thoughts and intentions which are unique to each person and are inherently qualitative. P, as represented by APs, comprises the electrochemical processes in the brain which are objective, quantifiable, and are devoid of qualitative properties. So while F and P are correlated, coextensive, and interact in the context of CID, the distinction lies in the inherent natures of F and P—F being in the realm of subjective consciousness and P being in the realm of objective, physical processes. So CID maintains the qualitative differences between mental states (F) and their corresponding physical states (P), since they are fundamentally distinct entities with fundamentally different natures. Thus, despite the coextension and interaction, CID emphasizes the essential distinction between M and P.
So mental states (F) are not mere “shadows”, they are the very essence of our conscious experiences which define our unique personal identities, emotions, and thoughts. So while F and P may be correlated and interact (something I never denied), F holds it’s distinct and irreducible properties—properties that go beyond being a mere “shadow.”
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“you’re positing an epiphenomenalist view, right? The claim that mental states are causally inert and are byproducts of physical states? ”
That’s the closest thing I could think of. But I hesitate to call it epiphenomenalism because the arguments for and against that philosophy are quite antiquated and have negative connotations.
“So mental states (F) are not mere “shadows,” they are the very essence of our conscious experiences which define our unique personal identities, emotions, and thoughts.”
I think they can be “shadows” and still be qualitatively different.
How would you prove MC?
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Well yea, epiphenomenalism leads to an absurdity, since our thoughts clearly can cause things to happen in the world, like this comment I’m making to you now.
Can you explain how M states “can be “shadows” and still be qualitatively different”?
What do you mean by how “would I prove MC”? Logically or empirically? I honestly think MC is a given in everyday lives, since we will something to happen and it happens (talking about thoughts, beliefs, and desires). And I think my fight-or-flight argument shows that MC is a thing, along with Kroedel’s argument for MC.
Click to access Kroedel-Nous2013.pdf
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“since our thoughts clearly can cause things to happen in the world, like this comment I’m making to you now.”
It’s not really clear. Your neural states could be causing your fingers to hit the keyboard. Mental causation is redundant because physical states can sufficiently account for other physical states.
“Can you explain how M states “can be “shadows” and still be qualitatively different”?”
How couldn’t they be? What about being the after effect P means that M cannot have certain qualities that make it unique?
“What do you mean by how “would I prove MC”? Logically or empirically?”
Either. Whatever you try to explain M with could probably be equally explained by P.
“along with Kroedel’s argument for MC.”
I don’t think appealing to counterfactuals can save you from the exclusion problem. That said, I didn’t read all of Kroedel’s article. Can you just simplify his argument for me?
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talking about the mind by anatomizing the brain is either mentally retarded or autistic or both.
how many times do i have to say it?
ANAL PHILOSOPHY IS NOT PHILOSOPHY!
IT’S 12 YEAR OLD GIRLS TALKING ABOUT CUTE BOYS.
SAD.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I8sNiAgEKGo&ab_channel=TheMemoryOfAllThat
but at least we can agree arthur russell has all the best breaks yet to be culturally appropriated/exploited by rappers. genius who died from anal pleasure in 1992.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=izOuMciY6ks&ab_channel=nvrmindtherain
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rr: why is anatomizing the brain mentally retarded or autistic or both? what’s your argument?
mugabe: [mezcal kicking in] rr…there is nothing i can say that by itself can lead you out of the wilderness…to see the promised land…to get to it…
there’s a limit to science and arguments. do you know that? do you know what that limit is?
rr: just tell me how i can play checkers better.
mugabe: rr. i’m playing chess. read heidegger. read the upanishads. stop being so INCREDIBLY ARROGANT!
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UKgPmnjbAy8&ab_channel=airwavesinmymouth
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rr shits all over other people’s blogs but won’t allow anyone to comment on his blog who doesn’t agree with him.
because…
rr is a low IQ homosexual with ridiculous hair who worships satan.
sad.
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whatever happened to your old acc, dealwithit?
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