2050 words

Introduction

“Variance explained” (VE) is a statistical concept which is used to quantify the proportion of variance in a trait that can be accounted for or attributed to one or more independent variables in a statistical model. VE is represented by “R squared”, which ranges from 0 to 100 percent. An r2 of 0 percent means that none of the variance in the dependent variable is explained by the independent variable whereas an r2 of 100 percent means that all of the variance is explained. But VE doesn’t imply causation, it merely quantifies the degree of association or predictability between two variables.

So in the world of genetics, heritability and GWAS, the VE concept has been employed as a fundamental measure to quantify the extent to which a specific trait’s variability can be attributed to genetic factors. One may think that it’s intuitive to think that G and E factors can be separated and their relative influences can be seen and disentangled for human traits. But beneath its apparent simplicity lies a philosophically contentious issue, most importantly, due to the claim/assumption that G and E factors can be separated into percentages.

But I think the concept of VE in psychology/psychometrics and GWAS is mistaken, because (1) it implies a causal relationship that may not exist; (2) implies reductionism; (3) upholds the nature-nurture dichotomy; (4) doesn’t account for interaction and epigenetics; and (5) doesn’t account for context-dependency. In this article, I will argue that the concept of VE is confused, since it assumes too much while explaining too little. Overall, I will explain the issues using a conceptual analysis and then give a few arguments on why I think the phrase is confused.

Arguments against the phrase “variance explained”

While VE doesn’t necessarily imply causation, in psychology/psychometrics and GWAS literature, it seems to be used as somewhat of a causal phrase. The phrase also reduces the trait in question to a single percentage, which is of course not accurate—so basically it attempts at reducing T to a number, a percentage.

But more importantly, the notion of VE is subject to philosophical critique in virtue of the implications of what the phrase inherently means, particularly when it comes to the separation of genetic and environmental factors. The idea of VE most often perpetuates the nature-nurture dichotomy, assuming that G and E can be neatly separated into percentages of causes of a trait. Thus this simplistic division between G and E oversimplifies the intricate interplay between genes, environment and all levels of the developmental system and the irreducible interaction between all developmental resources that lead to the reliable ontogeny of traits (Noble, 2012).

Moreover, VE can be reductionist in nature, since it implies that a certain percentage of a trait’s variance can be attributable to genetics, disregarding the dynamic and complex interactions between genes and other resources in the developmental system. Therefore, this reductionism fails to capture the holistic and emergent nature of human development and behavior. So just like the concept of heritability, the reductionism inherent in the concept of VE focuses on isolating the contributions of G and E, rather than treating them as interacting factors that are not reducible.

Furthermore, we know that epigenetics demonstrates that environmental factors can influence gene expression which then blurs the line between G and E. Therefore, G and E are not separable entities but are intertwined and influence each other in unique ways.

It also may inadvertently carry implicit value judgements about which traits or outcomes are deemed desirable or significant. In a lot circles, a high heritability is seen as evidence for the belief that a trait is strongly influenced by genes—however wrong that may be (Moore and Shenk, 2016). Further, it could also stigmatize environmental influences if a trait is perceived as primarily genetic. This, then, could contribute to a bias that then downplays the importance of environmental factors which would then overlook their importance and potential impact in individual development and behavior.

This concept, moreover, doesn’t provide clarity on questions like identity and causality. Even if a high percentage of variance is attributed to genetics, it doesn’t necessarily reveal the causal mechanisms or genetic factors responsible, which then leads to philosophical indeterminancy regarding the nature of causation. Human traits are highly complex and the attempt to quantify them and break then apart into heat percentages or variances explained by G and E vastly oversimplifies the complexity of these traits. This oversimplification then further contributes to philosophical indeterminancy about the nature and true origins (which would be the irreducible interactions between all developmental resources) of these traits.

The act of quantifying variance also inherently involves power dynamics, where certain variables are deemed more significant or influential than others. This, then, introduces a potential bias that may reflect existing societal norms or power structures. “Variance explained” may inadvertently perpetuate and reinforce these power dynamics by quantifying and emphasizing certain factors over others. (Like eg the results of Hill et al, 2019 and Barth, Papageorge, and Thom, 2020 and see Joseph’s critique of these claims). Basically, these differences between people in income and other socially-important traits are due to genetic differences between them. (Even though there is no molecular genetic evidence for the claim made in The Bell Curve that we are becoming more genetically stratified; Conley and Domingue, 2016.)

The concept of VE also implies a kind of predictive precision that may not align with the uncertainty of human behavior. The illusion of certainty created by high r2 values can lead to misplaced confidence in predictions. In reality, the complexity of human traits often defies prediction and overreliance on VE may create a false sense of certainty.

We also have what I call the “veil of objectivity” argument. This argument challenges the notion that VE provides an entirely objective view. Behind the numerical representation lies a series of subjective decisions, like the selection of variables to the interpretation of results. From the initial selection of variables to be studied to the interpretation of their results, researchers exercise subjective judgments which then could introduce biases and assumptions. So if “variance explained” is presumed to offer an entirely objective view of human traits, then the numerical representation represents an objective measure of variance attribution. If, behind this numerical representation, subjective decisions are involved in variable selection and results interpretation, then the presumed objectivity implied by VE becomes a veil masking underlying subjectivity. So if subjective decisions are integral to the process of VE, then the presumed objectivity of the numerical representation serves as a veil concealing the subjective aspects of the research process. So if the veil of objectivity conceals subjective decisions, then there exists a potential for biases and assumptions which then would influence the quantitative analysis. Thus, if biases and assumptions are inherent in the quantitative analysis due to the veil of objectivity, then the objectivity attributed to VE is compromised, and a more critical examination of subjective elements becomes imperative. This argument of course is for “IQ” studies, heritability studies of socially-important human traits and the like, along with GWASs. In interpreting associations, GWASs and h2 studies also fall prey to the veil of objectivity argument, since as seen above, many people would like the hereditarian claim to be true. So when it comes to GWAS and heritability studies, VE refers to the propagation of phenotypic variance attributed to genetic variance.

So the VE concept assumes a clear separation between genetic and environmental factors which is often reductionist and unwarranted. It doesn’t account for the dynamic nature and influence of these influences, nor—of course—the influence of unmeasured factors. The concepts oversimplification can lead to misunderstandings and has ethical implications, especially when dealing with complex human traits and behaviors. Thus, the VE concept is conceptually flawed and should be used cautiously, if at all, in the fields in which it is applied. It does not adequately represent the complex reality of genetic and environmental influences on human traits. So the VE concept is conceptually limited.

If the concept of VE accurately separates genetic and environmental influences, then it should provide a comprehensive and nuanced representation of factors that contribute to a trait. But the concept does not adequately consider the dynamic interactions, correlations, contextual dependencies, and unmeasured variables. So if the concept does not and cannot address these complexities, then it cannot accurately separate genetic and environmental influences. So if a concept can’t accurately separate genetic and environmental influences, then it lacks coherence in the context of genetic and behavioral studies. Thus the concept of VE lacks coherence in the context of genetic and behavioral studies, as it does not and cannot adequately separate genetic and environmental influences.

Conclusion

In exploring the concept of VE and it’s application in genetic studies, heritability research and GWAS, a series of nuanced critiques have been uncovered that challenge its conceptual coherence. The phrase quantifies the proportion of variance in a trait that is attributed to certain variables, typically genetic and environmental ones. The reductionist nature of VE is apparent since it attempts to distill interplay between G and E into percentages (like h2 studies). But this oversimplification neglects the complexity and dynamic nature of these influences which then perpetuates the nature-nurture dichotomy which fails to capture the intricate interactions between all developmental resources in the system. The concepts inclination to overlook G-E interactions, epigenetic influences, and context-dependents variablity further speaks to its limitations. Lastly, normative assumptions intertwined with the concept thenninteouvde ethical considerations as implicit judgments may stigmatize certain traits or downplay the role and importance of environmental factors. Philosophical indeterminancy, therefore, arises from the inability of the concept of VE to offer clarity on identity, causality, and the complex nature of human traits.

So by considering the reductionist nature, the perpetuation of the false dichotomy between nature and nurture, the oversight of G-E interactions, and the introduction of normative assumptions, I have demonstrated through multiple cases that the phrase “variance explained” falls short in providing a nuanced and coherent understanding of the complexities involved in the study of human traits.

In all reality, the issue of this concept is refuted by the fact that the interaction between all developmental resources shows that the separation of the influences/factors is an impossible project, along with the fact that we know that there is no privileged level of causation. Claims of “variance explained”, heritability, and GWAS all push forth the false notion that the relative contributions of genes and environment can be be quantified into the causes of a trait in question. However, we know now that this is false since this is conceptually confused, since the organism and environment are interdependent. So the inseparability of nature and nurture, genes and environment, means that the The ability for GWAS and heritability studies to meet their intended goals will necessarily fall short, especially due to the missing heritability problem. The phrase “variance explained by” implies a direct causal link between independent and dependent variables. A priori reasoning suggests that the intracacies of human traits are probabilistic and context-dependent and it implicated a vast web of bidirectional influences with feedback loops and dynamic interactions. So if the a priori argument advocates for a contextual, nuanced and probabilistic view of human traits, then it challenges the conceptual foundations of VE.

At the molecular level, the nurture/nature debate currently revolves around reactive genomes and the environments, internal and external to the body, to which they ceaselessly respond. Body boundaries are permeable, and our genome and microbiome are constantly made and remade over our lifetimes. Certain of these changes can be transmitted from one generation to the next and may, at times, persist into succeeding generations. But these findings will not terminate the nurture/nature debate – ongoing research keeps arguments fueled and forces shifts in orientations to shift. Without doubt, molecular pathways will come to light that better account for the circumstances under which specific genes are expressed or inhibited, and data based on correlations will be replaced gradually by causal findings. Slowly, “links” between nurture and nature will collapse, leaving an indivisible entity. But such research, almost exclusively, will miniaturize the environment for the sake of accuracy – an unavoidable process if findings are to be scientifically replicable and reliable. Even so, increasing recognition of the frequency of stochastic, unpredictable events ensures that we can never achieve certainty. (Locke and Pallson, 2016)

3250 words

Introduction

Language is the road map of a culture. It tells you where its people come from and where they are going. – Rita May Brown

Communication bridges gaps. The words we use and the languages we speak along with the knowledge that we share serve as a bridge to weave together human culture and intelligence. So imagine a multilingual encyclopedia that encompasses the whole of human knowledge, a book of human understanding from the sciences, the arts, history and philosophy. This encyclopedia is a testament to the universal nature of human knowledge, but it also shows the interplay between culture, language, knowledge and human intelligence.

In my most recent article, I argued that human intelligence is shaped by cultural and social context and that this is shaped by interactions in a cultural and social context. So here I will argue that: there are necessary aspects of knowledge; knowledge is context-dependent; language, culture and knowledge interact with the specific contexts to form intelligence, mind and rationality; and my multilingual encyclopedia analogy shows that while there are what is termed “universal core knowledge”, these would then become context-dependent based on the needs for different cultures and I will also use this example to again argue against IQ. Finally I will conclude that the arguments in this article and the previous one show how the mind is socially formed based on the necessary physical substrates but that the socio-cultural contexts are what is necessary for human intelligence, mindedness, and rationality.

Necessary aspects of knowledge

There are two necessary and fundamental aspects of knowledge and thought—that of cognition and the brain. The brain is a necessary pre-condition for human mindedness, and cognition is influenced by culture, although my framework posits that cognitive processes play a necessary role in human cognition, just as the brain plays a necessary physical substrate for these processes. While cognition and knowledge are intertwined, they’re not synonymous. To cognize is to actively think about something that you want to, meaning it is an action. There is a minimal structure and it’s accounted for by cognition, like pattern recognition, categorization, sequential processing, sensory integration, associative memory and selective attention. And these processes are necessary, they are inherent in “cognition” and they set the stage for more complex mental abilities, which is what Vygotsky was getting at with the social formation of mind with his theory.

Individuals do interpret their experiences through a cultural lense, since culture provides the framework for understanding, categorizing, and making sense of experiences. I recognize the role of individual experiences and personal interpretations. So while cultural lenses may shape initial perceptions, people can also think critically and reflect on their interpretations over time due to the differing experiences they have.

Fundamental necessary aspects of knowledge like sensory perception are also pivotal. By “fundamental”, I mean “necessary”—that is, we couldn’t think or cognize without the brain and it therefore follows we couldn’t think without cognition. These things are necessary for thinking, language, culture and eventually intelligence, but what is sufficient for mind, thinking, language and rationality are the specific socio-cultural interactions and knowledge formulations that we get by being engrossed in linguistically-mediated cultural environments.

The context-dependence of knowledge

“Context-dependent knowledge” refers to information or understanding that can take on different meaning or interpretations based on the specific context in which it is applied or used. But I also mean something else by this: I mean that an individual’s performance on IQ tests is influenced by their exposure to specific cultural, linguistic, and contextual factors. Thus, this means that IQ tests aren’t culture-neutral or universally applicable, but they are biased towards people who share similar class-cultural backgrounds and experiences.

There is something about humans that allow us to be receptive to cultural and social contexts to form mind, language, rationality and intelligence (and I would say that something is the immaterial self). But I wouldn’t call it “innate.” Thus, so-called “innate” traits need certain environmental contexts to be able to manifest themselves. So called “innate” traits are experience-dependent (Blumberg 2018).

So while humans actively adapt, shape, and create cultural knowledge through cultural processes, knowledge acquisition isn’t solely mediated by culture. Individual experiences matter, as do interactions with the environment along with the accumulation of knowledge from various cultural contexts. So human cognitive capacity isn’t entirely a product of culture, and human cognition allows for critical thinking, creative problem solving, along with the ability to adapt cultural knowledge.

Finally, knowledge acquisition is cumulative—and by this, I mean it is qualitatively cumulative. Because as individuals acquire knowledge from their cultural contexts, individual experiences etc, this knowledge then becomes internalized in their cognitive framework. They can then build on thus existing knowledge to further adapt and shape culture.

The statement “knowledge is context-dependent” is a description of the nature of knowledge itself. It means that knowledge can take on different meaning or interpretations in different contexts. So when I say “knowledge is context-dependent”, I am acknowledging that it applies in all contexts, I’m discussing the contextual nature of knowledge itself.

Examples of the context-dependence of universal knowledge for example, are how English-speakers use the “+” sign for addition, while the Chinese have “加” or “Jiā”. So while this fundamental principle is the same, these two cultures have different symbols and notations to signify the operation. Furthermore, there are differences in thinking between Eastern and Western cultures, where thinking is more analytic in Western cultures and more holistic in Eastern cultures (Yates and de Oliveira, 2016; also refer to their paper for more differences between cultures in decision-making processes). There are also differences between cultures in visual attention (Jurkat et al, 2016). While this isn’t “knowledge” per se, it does attest to how cultures are different in their perceptions and cognitive processes, which underscores the broader idea that cognition, including visual attention, is influenced by cultural contexts and social situations. Even the brain’s neural activity (the brain’s physiology) is context-dependent—thus culture is context-dependent (Northoff, 2013).

But when it comes to culture, how does language affect the meaning of culture and along with it intelligence and how it develops?

Language, culture, knowledge, and intelligence

Language plays a pivotal role in shaping the meaning of culture, and by extension, intelligence and its development. Language is not only a way to communicate, but it is also a psychological tool that molds how we think, perceive and relate to the world around us. Therefore, it serves as the bridge between individual cognition and shares cultural knowledge, while acting as the interface through which cultural values and norms are conveyed and internalized.

So language allows us to encode and decode cultural information, which is how, then, culture is generationally transmitted. Language provides the framework for expressing complex thoughts, concepts, and emotions, which enables us to discuss and negotiate the cultural norms that define our societies. Different languages offer unique structures for expressing ideas, which can then influence how people perceive and make sense of their cultural surroundings. And important for this understanding is the fact that a human can’t have a thought unless they have language (Davidson, 1982).

Language is also intimately linked with cognitive development. Under Vygotsky’s socio-historical theory of learning and development, language is a necessary cognitive tool for thought and the development of higher mental functions. So language not only reflects our cognitive abilities, it also plays an active role in their formation. Thus, through social interactions and linguistic exchanges, individuals engage in a dynamic process of cultural development, building on the foundation of their native language and culture.

Feral children and deaf linguistic isolates show this dictum: that there is a critical window in which language could be acquired and thusly the importance of human culture in human development (Vyshedakiy, Mahapatra, and Dunn, 2017). Cases of feral children, then, show us how children would develop without human culture and shows the importance of early language hearing and use for normal brain development. In fact, this shows how social isolation has negative effects on children, and since human culture is inherently social, it shows the importance of human culture and society in forming and nurturing the formation of mind, intelligence, rationality and knowledge.

So the relationship between language, culture and intelligence is intricate and reciprocal. Language allows us to express ourselves and our cultural knowledge while shaping our cognitive processes and influencing how we acquire and express our intelligence. On the other hand, intelligence—as shaped by cultural contexts—contributes to the diversification of language and culture. The interplay underscores how language impacts our understanding of intelligence within it’s cultural framework.

Furthermore, in my framework, intelligence isn’t a static, universally-measureable trait, but it is a dynamic and constantly-developing trait shaped by social and cultural interactions along with individualsm experiences, and so intentionality is inherent in it. Moreover, in the context of acquiring cultural knowledge, Vygotsky’s ZPD concept shows that individuals can learn and internalize things outside of their current toolkit as guided by more knowledgeable others (MKOs). It also shows that learning and development occur mostly in this zone between what someone can do alone and what someone can do with help which then allows them to expand their cognitive abilities and cultural understanding.

Cultural and social exposure

Cultural and social exposure are critical to my conception of intelligence. Because, as we can see in cases of feral children, there is a clear developmental window of opportunity to gain language and to think and act like a human due to the interaction of the individual in human culture. The base cognitive capacities that we are born with and develop throughout infancy to toddlerhood to childhood and then adulthood aren’t just inert, passive things that merely receive information through vision and then we gain minds, intelligence and then become human. Critically, they need to be nurtured through culture and socialization. The infant needs the requisite experiences doing certain things to be able to learn how to roll over, crawl, and finally walk. They need to be exposed to different things in order to be exposed to the culture they were borne into correctly. So while we are born into both cultural, and linguistically-mediated environments, it’s these three types of environment—along with what the individual does themselves when they finally learn to walk, talk, and gain their mind, intelligence and rationality—that shape individual humans, the knowledge they gain and ultimately their intelligence.

If humans possess foundational cognitive capacities that aren’t entirely culturally determined or influenced, and culture serves as a mediator in shaping how these capacities are expressed and applied, then it follows that culture influences cognitive development while cognitive abilities provide the foundation for being able to learn at all, as well as being able to speak and to internalize the culture and language they are exposed to. So if culture interacts dynamically with cognitive capacities, and crucial periods exist during which cultural learning is particularly influential (cases of feral children), then it follows that early cultural exposure and socialization are critical. So it follows that my framework acknowledges both cognitive capacities and cultural influences in shaping human cognition and intelligence.

In his book Vygotsky and the Social Formation of Mind, Wertsch (1985) noted that Vygotsky didn’t discount the role of biology (like in development in the womb), but that after a certain point, biology no longer can be viewed as the sole or even primary factor in force of change for the individual, and that the explanation necessarily shifts to a sociocultural explanation:

However, [Vygotsky] argued that beyond a certain point in development, biological forces can no longer be viewed as the sole, or even the primary, force of change. At this point there is a fundamental reorganization of the forces of development and a need for a corresponding reorganization in the system of explanatory principles. Specifically, in Vygotsky’s view the burden of explanation shifts from biological to social factors. The latter operate within a given biological framework and must be compatible with it, but they cannot be reduced to it. That is, biological factors are still given a role in this new system, but they lose their role as the primary force of change. Vygotsky contrasted embryological and psychological development on this basis:

The embryological development of the child … in no way can be considered on the same level as the postnatal development of the child as a social being. Embryological development is a completely unique type of development subordinated to other laws than is the development of the child’s personality, which begins at birth. Embryological development is studied by an independent science—embryology, which cannot be considered one of the chapters of psychology … Psychology does not study heredity or prenatal development as such, but only the role and influence of heredity and prenatal development of the child in the process of social development. ([Vygotsky] 1972, p. 123)

The multilingual encyclopedia

Imagine a multilingual encyclopedia that encompasses knowledge of multiple disciplines from the sciences to the humanities to religion. This encyclopedia has what I term universal core knowledge. This encyclopedia is maintained by experts from around the world and is available in many languages. So although the information in the encyclopedia is written in different languages and upheld by people from different cultures, fundamental scientific discoveries, historical events and mathematical theorems remain constant across all versions of the encyclopedia. So this knowledge is context-independent because it holds true no matter the language it’s written in or the cultural context it is presented in. But the encyclopedia’s entries are designed to be used in specific contexts. The same scientific principles can be applied in labs across the world, but the specific experiments, equipment and cultural practices could vary. Moreover, historical events could be studied differently in different parts of the world, but the events themselves are context-independent.

So this thought experiment challenges the claim that context-independent knowledge requires an assertion of absolute knowledge. Context-independent knowledge exists in the encyclopedia, but it isn’t absolute. It’s merely a collection of universally-accepted facts, principles and theories that are applied in different contexts taking into account linguistic and cultural differences. Thus the knowledge in the encyclopedia is context-independent in that it remains the same across the world, across languages and cultures, but it is used in specific contexts.

Now, likening this to IQ tests is simple. When I say that “all IQ tests culture-bound, and this means that they’re class-specific”, this is a specific claim. What this means, in my view, is that people grow up in different class-cultural environments, and so they are exposed to different knowledge bases and kinds of knowledge. Since they are exposed to different knowledge bases and kinds of knowledge, when it comes time for test time, if they aren’t exposed to the knowledge bases and kinds of knowledge on the test, they necessarily won’t score as high as someone who was immersed in the knowledge bases and kinds of knowledge. Cole’s (2002) argument that all tests are culture-bound is true. Thus IQ tests aren’t culture-neutral, they are all culture-bound, and culture-neutral tests are an impossibility. This further buttresses my argument that intelligence is shaped by the social and cultural environment, underscoring the idea that the specific knowledge bases and cognitive resources that individuals are exposed to within their unique socio-cultural contexts play a pivotal role in the expression and development of their cognitive abilities.

IQ tests are mere cultural artifacts. So IQ tests, like the entries in the multilingual encyclopedia, are not immune to cultural biases. So although the multilingual encyclopedia has universal core knowledge, the way that the information is presented in the encyclopedia, like explanations and illustrations, would be culturally influenced by the authors/editors of the encyclopedia. Remember—this encyclopedia is an encyclopedia of the whole of human knowledge written in different languages, seen through different cultural lenses. So different cultures could have ways of explaining the universal core knowledge or illustrating the concepts that are derived from them.

So IQ tests, just like the entries in the encyclopedia, are only usable for certain contexts. While the entries in the encyclopedia could be usable for more than one context of idea one has, there is a difference for IQ testing. The tests are created by people from a narrow social class and so the items on them are therefore class-specific. This then results in cultural biases, because people from different classes and cultures are exposed to varying different knowledge bases, so people will be differentially prepared for test-taking on this basis alone. So the knowledge that people are exposed to based on their class membership or even different cultures within America or even from an immigrant culture would influence test scores. So while there is universal core knowledge, and some of this knowledge may be on IQ tests, the fact is that different classes and cultures are exposed to different knowledge bases, and so that’s why they score differently—the specific language and numerical skills on IQ tests are class-specific (Brito, 2017). I have noted how culturally-dependent IQ tests are for years, and this interpretation is reinforced when we consider knowledge and its varying interpretations found in the multilingual encyclopedia, which then highlights the intricate relationship between culture, language, and IQ. This then serves to show that IQ tests are mere knowledge tests—class-specific knowledge tests (Richardson, 2002).

So my thought experiment shows that while there are fundamental scientific discoveries, historical events and mathematical theorems that remain constant throughout the world and across different languages and cultures, the encyclopedia’s entries are designed to be used in specific contexts. So the multilingual encyclopedia thought experiment supports my claim that even when knowledge is context-independent (like that of scientific discoveries, historical facts), it can become context-dependent when it is used and applied within specific cultural and linguistic contexts. This, then, aligns with the part of my argument that knowledge is not entirely divorced from social, cultural and contextual influences.

Conclusion

The limitations of IQ tests become evident when we consider how individuals produce and acquire knowledge and the cultural and linguistic diversity and contexts that define our social worlds. The analogy of the multilingual encyclopedia shows that while certain core principles remain constant, the way that we perceive and apply knowledge is deeply entwined within the cultural and social contexts in which we exist. This dynamic relationship between culture, language, knowledge and intelligence, then, underscores the need to recognize the social formation of mind and intelligence.

Ultimately, human socio-cultural interactions, language, and the knowledge we accumulate together mold our understanding of intelligence and how we acquire it. The understanding that intelligence arises through these multifaceted exchanges and interactions within a social and cultural framework points to a more comprehensive perspective. So by acknowledging the vital role of culture and language in the formation of human intelligence, we not only deconstruct the limitations of IQ tests, but we also lay the foundation for a more encompassing way of thinking about what it truly means to be intelligent, and how it is shaped and nurtured by our social lives in our unique cultural contexts and the experiences that we have.

Thus, to truly grasp the essence of human intelligence, we don’t need IQ tests, and we certainly don’t need claims like genes causing IQ or psychological traits and this then is what makes certain people or groups more intelligent than others; we have to embrace the fact that human intelligence thrives within the web of social and cultural influences and interactions which then collectively form what we understand as the social formation of mind.