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What If Charles Darwin Never Existed and the Theory of Natural Selection Was Never Formulated?
2200 words
Introduction
Let’s say that we either use a machine to teleport to another reality where Darwin didn’t exist or one where he died early, before formulating the theory of natural selection (ToNS). Would our evolutionary knowledge suffer? Under what pretenses could we say that our evolutionary knowledge wouldn’t suffer? Well, since Darwin humbly stated that what he said wasn’t original and that he just assembled numerous pieces of evidence to cohere to make his ToNS, then obviously we know that species changed over time. That’s what evolution is—change over time—and Darwin, in formulating his ToNS, attempted to prove that it was a mechanism of evolutionary change. But if Darwin never existed or if the ToNS was never formulated by him, I don’t think that our evolutionary knowledge would suffer. This is because people before Darwin observed that species change over time, like Lamarck and Darwin’s grandfather, Erasmus Darwin.
So in this article I will argue that had Darwin not existed or died young and had not formulated the ToNS, we would still have adequate theories of speciation, trait fixation and evolutionary change and processes, since naturalists at the time knew that species changed over time. I will discuss putative mechanisms of evolutionary change and show that without Darwin or the ToNS that we would still be able to have coherent theories of speciation events and trait fixation. Mechanisms like genetic drift, mutation and neutral evolution, environmental constraints, Lamarckian mechanisms, epigenetic factors, and ecological interactions would have been some plausible mechanisms sans Darwin and his ToNS even in the modern day as our scientific knowledge advanced without Darwin.
What if Darwin never existed?
For years I have been critical of Darwin’s theory of natural selection as being a mechanism for evolutionary change since it can’t distinguish between causes and correlates of causes. I was convinced by Fodor’s (2008) argument and Fodor and Piattelli-Palmarini’s (2010) argument in What Darwin Got Wrong that Darwin was wrong about natural selection being a mechanism of evolutionary change. I even recently published an article on alternatives to natural selection (which will be the basis of the argument in this article).
So, if Darwin never existed, how would the fact that species can change over time (due to, for instance, selective breeding) be explained? Well, before Charles Darwin, we had his grandfather Erasmus Darwin and Jean Baptiste Lamarck, of Lamarckian inheritance fame. So if Charles Darwin didn’t exist, there would still be enough for a theory of evolution had Darwin not been alive to formulate the ToNS.
We now know that Charles did read Erasmus’ The Temple of Nature (TToN) (1803) due to the annotations in his copy, and that the TOnF bore resemblance not to Darwin’s On the Origin of Species, but to The Descent of Man (Hernandez-Avilez and Ruiz-Guttierez, 2023). So although it is tentative, we know that Charles had knowledge of Erasmus’ writings on evolution. But before TToN, Erasmus wrote Zoonomia (1794), where he proposed a theory of common descent and also speculated on the transmutation of species over time. Being very prescient for the time he was writing in, he also discussed how the environment can influence the development of organisms, and how variations in species can arise due to the environment (think directed mutations). Erasmus also discussed the concept of use and disuse—where traits that an organism would use more would develop while traits they would use less would diminish over time—which was then a pre-cursor to Lamarck’s thoughts.
An antecedent to the “struggle for existence” is seen in Erasmus’ 1794 work Zoonomia (p. 503) (which Darwin underlined in his annotations, see Hernandez-Avilez and Ruiz-Guttierez, 2023):
The birds, which do not carry food to their young, and do not therefore marry, are armed with spurs for the purpose of fighting for the exclusive possession of the females, as cocks and quails. It is certain that these weapons are not provided for their defence against other adversaries, because the females of these species are without this armour. The final cause of this contest amongst the males seems to be, that the strongest and most active animal should propagate the species, which should thence become improved.
Jean Baptiste Lamarck wrote Philosophie Zoologique (Philosophical Zoology) in 1809. His ideas on evolution were from the same time period as Erasmus’, and they discussed similar subject matter. Lamarck believed that nature could explain species differentiation, and that behavioral changes which were environmentally induced could explain changes in species eventually leading to speciation. Lamarck’s first law was that use or disue would cause appendages to enlarge or shrink while his second law was that the changes in question were heritable. We also know that in many cases that development precedes evolution (West-Eberhard, 2005; Richardson, 2017) so these ideas in the modern day along with the observations to show they’re true also lend credence to Lamarck’s ideas.
First Law: In every animal that has not reached the end of its development, the more frequent and sustained use of any organ will strengthen this organ little by little, develop it, enlarge it, and give to it a power proportionate to the duration of its use; while the constant disuse of such an organ will insensibly weaken it, deteriorate it, progressively diminish its faculties, and finally cause it to disappear.
Second Law: All that nature has caused individuals to gain or lose by the influence of the circumstances to which their race has been exposed for a long time, and, consequently, by the influence of a predominant use or constant disuse of an organ or part, is conserved through generation in the new individuals descending from them, provided that these acquired changes are common to the two sexes or to those which have produced these new individuals (Lamarck 1809, p. 235). [Quoted in Burkhardt Jr., 2013]
Basically, Lamarck’s idea was that acquired traits during an organism’s lifetime could be passed onto descendants. If an organism developed a particular trait in response to its environment, then that trait could be inherited by its descendants. He was also one of the first—along with Erasmus—to go against the accepted wisdom of the time and propose that species could change over time and that they weren’t fixed. Basically, I think that Lamarck’s main idea was that the environment could have considerable effects on the evolution of species, and that these environmentally-induced changes could be heritable.
Well today, we have evidence that Lamarck was right, for example with the discovery and experiments showing that directed mutation is a thing. There was a lot that Lamarck got right and which has been integrated into the current evolutionary theory. We also know that there is evidence that “parental environment-induced epigenetic alterations are transmitted through both the maternal and paternal germlines and exert sex-specific effects” (Wang, Liu, and Sun, 2017). So we can then state Lamarck’s dictum: environmental change leads to behavioral change which leads to morphological change (Ward, 2018) (and with what we know about how the epigenetic regulation of the transposable elements regulates punctuated equilibrium, see Zeh, Zeh, and Ishida, 2009, we have a mechanism that can lead to this). And since we know that environmental epigenetics and transgenerational epigenetic provides mechanisms for Lamarck’s proposed process (Skinner, 2015), it seems that Lamarck has been vindicated. Indeed, Lamarckian inheritance is now seen as a mechanism of evolutionary change today (Koonin, 2014).
So knowing all of this, what if Charles Darwin never existed? How would the course of evolutionary theory be changed? We know that Darwin merely put the pieces of the puzzle together (from animal breeding, to the thought that transmutation could occur, etc.), but I won’t take anything away from Darwin, since even though I think he was wrong on a mechanism of evolution being natural selection, he did a lot of good work to put the pieces of the puzzle together into a theory of evolution that—at the time—could explain the fixation of traits and speciation (though I think that there are other ways to show that without relying on natural selection). The components of the theory that Darwin proposed were all there, but he was the one that coalesced them into a theory (no matter if it was wrong or not). Non-Darwinian evolution obviously was “the in thing” in the 19th century, and I don’t see how or why it would change. But Bowler (2013) argues that Alfred Russell Wallace would have articulated a theory of nature selection based on competition between varieties, not individuals as Darwin did. He argues that an equivalent of Darwin’s ToNS wouldn’t have been articulated until one recognized the similarities between what would become natural selection and artificial selection (where humans attempt to consciously select for traits) (Bowler, 2008). Though I do think that the ToNS is wrong, false, and incoherent, I do recognize how one would think that it’s a valid theory in explaining the evolution of species and the fixation of traits in biological populations. (Though I do of course think that my proposed explanation in linking saltation, internal physiological mechanisms and decimationism would have played a part in a world without Charles Darwin in explaining what we see around us.)
Now I will sketch out how I think our understanding of evolutionary theory would go had Charles Darwin not existed.
Although Lamarckism was pretty much discredited when Darwin articulated the ToNS (although Darwin did take to some of Lamarck’s ideas), the Lamarckian emphasis of the role of the environment shaping the traits of organisms would have persisted and remained influential. Darwin was influenced by many different observations that were known before he articulated his theory, and so even if Darwin didn’t exist to articulate the ToNS, the concept that species changed over time (that is, the concept that species evolved) was persistent before Darwin’s observations which led to his theory, along with the numerous lines of evidence that led Darwin to formulating the ToNS after his voyage on The Beagle. So while Darwin’s work did accelerate the exceptance of evolution, it is therefore very plausible that other mechanisms that don’t rely on selection would have been articulated. Both Erasmus and Lamarck had a kind of teleology in their thinking, which is alive today in modern conceptions of the EES like in that of arguments forwarded by Denis Noble (Noble and Noble, 2020, 2022) Indeed, Lamarck was one of the first to propose a theory of change over time.
Punctuated equilibrium (PE) can also be integrated with these ideas. PE is where rapid speciation events occur and then there is a period of stasis, and this can then be interpreted as purposeful evolutionary change based on the environment (similar to directed mutations). So each punctuated episode could align with Lamarck’s idea that organisms actively adapt to specific conditions, and it could also play a role in explaining the inheritance of acquired characters. So organisms could rapidly acquire traits due to environmental cues thsg the embryo’s physiology detects (since physiology is homeodynamic), there would be a response to the environmental change, and this would then contribute to the bursts of evolutionary change. Further, in periods of stasis, it could be inferred that there would be really no changing in the environment—not enough anyway, to lead to the change in the traits of a species—and so organisms would have been in equilibrium with their environment minting the traits until a new change in the environmental challenges triggered a burst of evolutionary change which would kick the species out of stasis and lead to punctuated events of evolutionary change. Therefore, this model (which is a holistic approach) would allow for a theory of evolution in which it is responsive, directed, and linked with the striving of organisms in their environmental context.
Conclusion
So in a world without Charles Darwin, the evolutionary narrative would have been significantly shaped by Erasmus and Lamarck. This alternative world would focus on Lamarckian concepts, the idea of transmutation over time, purposeful adaptation over time along with directed mutations and the integration of PE with these other ideas to give us a fuller and better understanding of how organisms change over time—that is, how organisms evolve. The punctuated episodic bursts of evolutionary change can be interpreted as purposeful evolutionary change based on Lamarckian concepts. Environmental determinism and stability shape the periods between bursts of change. And since we know that organisms in fact can adapt to complex, changing environments due to their physiology (Richardson, 2020), eventually as our scientific knowledge advanced we would then come to this understanding.
Therefore, the combination of Erasmus’ and Lamarck’s ideas would have provided a holistic, non-reductive narrative to explain the evolution of species. While I do believe that someone would have eventually articulated something similar to Darwin’s ToNS, I think that it would have been subsumed under the framework of built off of Erasmus and Lamarck. So there was quite obviously enough evolutionary thought and ideas before Darwin for there to be a relevant and explanatory theory of evolution had Darwin not been alive to formulate the ToNS, and this shows how such mechanisms to explain the origin of life, speciation, and trait fixation would have occurred, even in the absence of Darwin.
Mechanisms that Transcend Natural Selection in the Evolutionary Process: Alternatives to Natural Selection
2250 words
Fodor’s argument was a general complaint against adaptationism. Selection can’t be the mechanism of evolution since it can’t distinguish between causes and correlates of causes—so it thusly can’t account for the creation (arrival) of new species. Here, I will provide quotes showing that the claim that natural selection is a mechanism is ubiquitous in the literature—claims that either Darwin discovered the mechanism or claims that it is a mechanism—and that’s what Fodor was responding to. I will then provide an argument combining saltation, internal physiological mechanisms and decimationism and the EES into a coherent explanatory framework to show that there are alternatives to Darwinian evolution, and that these thusly explain speciation and the proliferation of traits while natural selection can’t since it isn’t a mechanism.
Grant and Grant, 2007: “the driving mechanism of evolutionary change was natural selection”
American Museum of Natural History: “Natural selection is a simple mechanism that causes populations of living things to change over time.”
Andrews et al, 2010: “Natural selection is certainly an important mechanism of allele-frequency change, and it is the only mechanism that generates adaptation of organisms to their environments.”
Pianka: “Natural selection is the only directed evolutionary mechanism resulting in conformity between an organism and its environment”
Cottner and Wassenberg, 2020: “This mechanism is natural selection: individuals who inherit adaptations simply out-compete (by out-surviving and out-reproducing) individuals that do not possess the adaptations.”
So natural selection is seen as the mechanism by which traits become fixed in organisms and how speciation happens. Indeed, Darwin (1859: 54) wrote in On the Origin of Species:
“From these several considerations I think it inevitably follows, that as new species in the course of time are formed through natural selection, others will become rarer and rarer, and finally extinct.”
[And some more of the same from authors in the modern day]
“The role of natural selection in speciation, first described by Darwin, has finally been widely accepted” (Via, 2009)
“Selection must necessarily be involved in speciation” (Barton, 2010)
“Darwin’s theory shows how some natural phenomena may be explained (including at least adaptations and speciation)” (SEP, Natural Selection)
“Natural selection has always been considered a key component of adaptive divergence and speciation (2, 15–17)” (Schneider, 2000)
“Natural selection plays a prominent role in most theories of speciation” (Schulter and Nagel, 1995)
So quite obviously, natural selection is seen as a mechanism, and this mechanism supposedly explains speciation of organisms. But since Fodor (2008) and Fodor and Piattelli-Palmarini (2010) showed that natural selection isn’t a mechanism and can’t explain speciation, then there are obviously other ways that evolution happened. There are alternatives to natural selection, and that’s where I will now turn. I will discuss saltation, internal physiological mechanisms and decimationism and then cohere them into a framework that shows how species can arise sans selection.
Explaining speciation
Saltation is the concept of abrupt and substantial changes which lead to the creation of new species, and it challenges phyletic gradualism through natural selection. Instances of sudden genetic alterations along with other goings-on in the environment that lead to things such as directed mutation can eventually result in the emergence of distinct species. Saltation, therefore, challenges Darwinism showing that certain traits can arise quickly, which lead to the emergence of new species within a short time frame. We also have internal physiological mechanisms which play a role in speciation while influencing the development and divergence of traits within biological populations. They don’t rely on external selective pressures—although goings-on in the environment of course can affect physiology—this emphasizes internal factors like developmental constraints, epigenetic modifications and genetic regulatory networks. These can then lead to the expression of novel traits and then on to speciation without the need for external selective forces. And finally decimationism—which emphasizes periodic mass extinction as drivers of evolutionary change—offers another alternative.
Catastrophic events create holes in ecological niches which then allow for the rapid adaptation and diversification of surviving species. So the decimation and recurrent re-colonizing of ecological niches can then lead to the establishment of distinct lineages (species), which then highlight the role of external and non-selective factors in the process of evolution.
So the interaction between saltation, internal physiological mechanisms, and decimationism thusly provides a novel and comprehensive framework for understanding speciation. Sudden genetic changes and other changes to the system can the initiate the development of unique physiological traits (due to the interaction of the developmental resources, and so any change to one resource would cause a cascading change to the system), while internal mechanisms then ensure the stabilization and heritability of the traits within the population. And when this is coupled with environmental upheaval caused by decimation leading to mass extinctions, these processes then contribute to the formation of new species which then offers a framework and novel perspective of the ARRIVAL of the fittest (Darwin’s theory said nothing about arrival, only the struggle for existence), which extends beyond the concept of natural selection.
So if abrupt genetic and other internal changes (saltation) can passively respond to external stimuli and/or environmental pressures, leading to the emergence of distinct traits within a population, and if internal physiological mechanisms influence the expression and development of these traits, then it follows that saltation, coupled with internal physiological mechanisms, can explain and contribute to the rise of new species. If periodic mass extinctions (decimationism) create ecological vacuums and opportunities for adaptive radiation, and if internal physiological mechanisms play a role in the heritability and stability of traits, then it follows that decimationism in conjunction with internal physiological mechanisms can contribute to the speciation of surviving lineages. Also note that all of this is consistent with Gould’s punctuated equilibrium (PE) model.
Punctuated equilibrium was proposed by Gould and Eldgridge as an alternative to phyletic gradualism (Eldgridge and Gould, 1971). It proposes that species evolve rapidly and not gradually. A developmental gene hypothesis also exists for PE (Casanova and Conkel, 2020).
One prediction of PE is rapid speciation events. During periods of punctuated equilibrium, there will be relatively short intervals of rapid speciation which then result in the emergence of new species. This follows from the theory in that it posits that speciation occurs rapidly, concentrated in short bursts, which lead to the prediction that distinct species should emerge more quickly during these punctuated periods. So if species undergo long periods of stasis with occasional rapid change, then it logically follows that new species should arise quickly during these punctuated periods. Seeing that the PE model was developed to explain the lack of transitional fossils, it proposes that species undergo a long period of morphological stasis, with evolutionary changes occurring in short bursts during speciation events, which therefore provides a framework that accounts for the intermittent presence of transitional fossils in the fossil record.
Another prediction is that during periods of stasis (equilibrium), species will exhibit stability in terms of morphology and adaptation. This follows from the theory in that PE posits that stability characterizes a majority of a species existence and that change should occur in quick bursts. Thus, between these bursts, there should be morphological stability. So the prediction is that observable changes are concentrated in specific intervals.
The epigenome along with transposable elements have been argued to be at the heart of PE, and that “physiological stress, associated with major climatic change or invasion of new habitats, disrupts epigenetic silencing, resulting in TE reactivation, increased TE expression and/or germ-line infection by exogenous retroviruses” (Zeh, Zeh, and Ishida, 2009: 715). Further, this hypothesis—that the epigenetic regulation of transposable elements regulates PE—makes testable predictions (Zeh, Zeh and Ishida, 2009: 721). This is also a mechanism to further explain how stress-induced directed mutations occur. Thus, there is an epigenetic basis for the rapid transformation of species which involves the silencing of transposable elements. So calls for an epigenetic synthesis have been made (Crews and Gore, 2012). We, furthermore, know that Lamarckian inheritance is a major mechanism of evolution (Koonin, 2014). We also know that epigenetic processes like DNA methylation contribute to the evolutionary course (Ash, Colot, and Oldroyd, 2021). Such epigenetic mechanisms have been given solid treatment in West-Eberhard’s (2003) Developmental Plasticity and Evolution. (See also West-Eberhard, 2005 on how developmental plasticity leads to the origin of species differences and Wund, 2015 on the impact of phenotypic plasticity on the evolutionary process.)
Integrating the mechanisms into the EES
So in integrating saltation, internal physiological mechanisms, decimationism, epigenetic processes, phenotypic evaluation and directed mutations into the EES (extended evolutionary synthesis), we can then get a more comprehensive framework. Phenotypic plasticity allows organisms to exhibit various phenotypes in response to various environmental cues, so this introduces a broader aspect of adaptability that go beyond genetic change while emphasizing the capacity of populations to change based on what is going on in the immediate environment during development.
Generic drift and neutral evolution also at a role. So beyond the selective pressures emphasized by the modern synthesis, the EES recognizes that genetic changes can occur through stochastic mechanisms which then influence the genetic constitution of a population. Evo-devo then contributes to the synthesis by highlighting the role of developmental processes in evolutionary outcomes. Thus, by understanding how changes in gene regulation during development contribute to morphological diversity, evo-devo therefore provides insight into evolutionary mechanisms which transcend so-called natural selection.
Moreover, the integration of epigenetic inheritance and cultural evolution also extends the scope of the EES. Epigenetic mechanisms can influence gene expression without a change to the DNA sequence, and can contribute to heritability and adaptability. Cultural evolution, then, while acknowledging the power of transmitted knowledge and practices on adaptive success, also broadens our understanding of evolution beyond biological factors. Thus, by incorporating all of the discussed mechanisms, the EES fosters a unique approach in integrating numerous different mechanisms while recognizing that the evolutionary process is influenced by a mixture of biological, environmental, cultural and developmental factors. There is also the fact that the EES has better predictive and explanatory power than the modern synthesis—it also makes novel predictions (Laland et al, 2015).
Conclusion
This discussion has delved into diverse facets of evolutionary theory, showed that natural selection is seen as a mechanism in the modern day, that Darwin and modern day authors see natural selection as the mechanism of speciation, and has considered a few mechanisms of evolution beyond natural selection. Fodor’s argument was introduced to question the applicability of “selection-for” traits, and challenged the notion of natural selection as a mechanism of evolutionary change. Fodor’s argument therefore paved the way for the mechanisms I discussed and opened the door for the reevaluation of saltation, internal physiological mechanisms, decimationism and the EES more broadly in explaining the fact of evolution. So this discussion has shown that we have to think about evolution not as selection-centric, but in a more holistic manner.
There are clearly epigenetic mechanisms which influence speciation on a PE model, and these epigenetic mechanisms then also contribute to the broader understanding of evolution beyond PE. In the PE model, where speciation events are characterized by rapid and distinct changes, epigenetic mechanisms play a crucial role in influencing the trajectory of evolutionary transitions. These epigenetic mechanisms, then, continue to the heritability of traits and the adaptability of populations. These epigenetic mechanisms also extend beyond their impact of speciation within the PE model. So by influencing gene expression in response to environmental cues, epigenetic changes then provide a dynamic layer to the evolutionary process which allow populations to adapt more rapidly to changing conditions. Therefore, epigenetic mechanisms become integral components in explaining evolutionary dynamics which then align with the principles of the EES.
The integration of these concepts into the EES then further broadens our understanding of evolution. So by incorporating genetic drift, phenotypic plasticity, evo-devo, epigenetic inheritance, directed mutation, and cultural evolution, the EES provides a comprehensive framework which recognizes the complexity of evolutionary process beyond mere reductive genetic change. Phenotypic plasticity allows organisms to be adaptively plastic to respond to cues during development and change the course of their development to respond to what is occurring in the environment without relying solely on genetic changes. Genetic drift then introduces stochastic processes and neutral evolution. Evo-devo then contributes to the synthesis by highlighting the role of developmental processes in evolutionary outcomes. Epigenetic inheritance also brings a non-genetic layer to heritability, acknowledging the impact of environmentally responsive gene regulation. Cultural evolution then recognizes the transmission of knowledge and practices within populations as a factor which influences adaptive success. So putting this all together, these integrations then suggests that evolution is a multifaceted interplay of irreducible levels (Noble, 2012) which then challenges natural selection as a a primary or sole mechanism of evolution and as a mechanism at all, since we can explain what natural selection purports to explain without reliance on it.
So if evolutionary processes encompass mechanisms beyond natural selection like saltation, internal physiological mechanisms, decimationism, punctuated equilibrium, and phenotypic plasticity, and if we are to reject natural selection as an explanation for trait fixation and speciation based on Fodor’s argument, and if these mechanisms are an integral part of the EES, then the EES offers a more comprehensive framework in understanding evolution. Evolutionary processes do encompass mechanisms beyond natural selection as evidenced by critiques of selection-centric views and those views that are seen as alternatives to natural selection like saltation, internal physiological mechanisms and decimationism. Thus, by incorporating the aforementioned mechanisms, we will have a better understanding evolution than if merely relying on the non-mechanism of natural selection to explain trait fixation and sp
Cope’s (Deperet’s) Rule, Evolutionary Passiveness, and Alternative Explanations
4450 words
Introduction
Cope’s rule is an evolutionary hypothesis which suggests that, over geological time, species have a tendency to increase in body size. (Although it has been proposed for Cope’s rule to be named Deperet’s rule, since Cope didn’t explicitly state the hypothesis while Deperet did, Bokma et al, 2015.) Named after Edward Drinker Cope, it proposes that on average through the process of “natural selection” species have a tendency to get larger, and so it implies a directionality to evolution (Hone and Benton, 2005; Liow and Taylor, 2019). So there are a few explanations for the so-called rule: Either it’s due to passive or driven evolution (McShea, 1994; Gould, 1996; Raia et al, 2012) or due to methodological artifacts (Sowe and Wang, 2008; Monroe and Bokma, 2010).
However, Cope’s rule has been subject to debate and scrutiny in paleontology and evolutionary biology. The interpretation of Cope’s rule hinges on how “body size” is interpreted (mass or length), along with alternative explanations. I will trace the history of Cope’s rule, discuss studies in which it was proposed that this directionality from the rule was empirically shown, discuss methodological issues. I propose alternative explanations that don’t rely on the claim that evolution is “progressive” or “driven.” I will also show that developmental plasticity throws a wrench in this claim, too. I will then end with a constructive dilemma argument showing that either Cope’s rule is a methodological artifact, or it’s due to passive evolution, since it’s not a driven trend as progressionists claim.
How developmental plasticity refutes the concept of “more evolved”
In my last article on this issue, I showed the logical fallacies inherent in the argument PumpkinPerson uses—it affirms the consequent, assuming it’s true leads to a logical contradiction, and of course reading phylogenies in the way he does just isn’t valid.
If the claim “more speciation events within a given taxon = more evolution” were valid, then we would consistently observe a direct correlation between the number of speciation events and the extent evolutionary change in all cases, but we don’t since evolutionary rates vary and other factors influence evolution, so the claim isn’t universally valid.
Take these specific examples: The horseshoe crab has a lineage going back hundreds of millions of years with few speciation events but it has undergone evolutionary changes. Consequently, microorganisms could undergo many speciation events and have relatively minor genetic change. Genetic and phenotypic diversity of the cichlid fishes (fishes that have undergone rapid evolutionary change and speciation), but the diversity between them doesn’t solely depend on speciation events, since factors like ecological niche partitioning and sexual selection also play a role in why they are different even though they are relatively young species (a specific claim that Herculano-Houzel made in her 2016 book The Human Advantage). Lastly, human evolution has relatively few speciation events but the extent of evolutionary change in our species is vast. Speciation events are of course crucial to evolution. But if one reads too much into the abstractness of the evolutionary tree then they will not read it correctly. The position of the terminal nodes is meaningless.
It’s important to realize that evolution just isn’t morphological change which then leads to the creation of a new species (this is macro-evolution), but there is also micro-evolution. Species that underwent evolutionary change without speciation include peppered moths, antibody resistance in bacteria, lactase persistence in humans, Darwin’s finches, and industrial melanism in moths. These are quite clearly evolutionary changes, and they’re due to microevolutionary changes.
Developmental plasticity directly refutes the contention of more evolved since individuals within a species can exhibit significant trait variation without speciation events. This isn’t captured by phylogenies. They’re typically modeled on genetic data and they don’t capture developmental differences that arise due to environmental factors during development. (See West-Eberhard’outstanding Developmental Plasticity and Evolution for more on how in many cases development precedes genetic change, meaning that the inference can be drawn that genes aren’t leaders in evolution, they’re mere followers.)
If “more evolved” is solely determined by the number of speciation events (branches) in a phylogeny, then species that exhibit greater developmental plasticity should be considered “more evolved.” But it is empirically observed that some species exhibit significant developmental plasticity which allows them to rapidly change their traits during development in response to environmental variation without undergoing speciation. So since the species with more developmental plasticity aren’t considered “more evolved” based on the “more evolved” criteria, then the assumption that “more evolved” is determined by speciation events is invalid. So the concept of “more evolved” as determined by speciation events or branches isn’t valid since it isn’t supported when considering the significant role of developmental plasticity in adaptation.
There is anagenesis and cladogenesis. Anagenesis is the creation of a species without a branching of the ancestral species. Cladogenesis is the formation of a new species by evolutionary divergence from an ancestral form. So due to evolutionary changes within a lineage, the organism that underwent evolutionary changes replaces the older one. So anagenesis shows that a species can slowly change and become a new species without there being a branching event. Horse, human, elephant, and bird evolution are examples of this.
Nonetheless, developmental plasticity can lead to anagenesis. Developmental, or phenotypic, plasticity is the ability of an organism to produce different phenotypes with the same genotype based on environmental cues that occur during development. Developmental plasticity can facilitate anagenesis, and since developmental plasticity is ubiquitous in development of not only an individual in a species but a species as a whole, then it is a rule and not an exception.
Directed mutation and evolution
Back in March, I wrote on the existence of directed mutations. Directed mutation directly speaks against the concept of “more evolved.” Here’s the argument:
(1) If directed mutations play a crucial role in helping organisms adapt to changing environments, then the notion of “more evolved” as a linear hierarchy is invalid.
(2) Directed mutations are known to occur and contribute to a species survivability in an environment undergoing change during development (the concept of evolvability is apt here).
(C) So the concept of “more evolved” as a linear hierarchy is invalid.
A directed mutation is a mutation that occurs due to environmental instability which helps an organism survive in the environment that changed while the individual was developing. Two mechanisms of DM are transcriptional activation (TA) and supercoiling. TAs can cause changes to single-stranded DNA, and can also cause supercoiling (the addition of more strands on DNA). TA can be caused by depression (a mechanism that occurs due to the absence of some molecule) or induction (the activation of an inactive gene which then gets transcribed). So these are examples of how nonrandom (directed) mutation and evolution can occur (Wright, 2000). Such changes are possibly through the plasticity of phenotypes during development and ultimately are due to developmental plasticity. These stress-directed mutations can be seen as quasi-Lamarckian (Koonin and Wolf, 2009). It’s quite clear that directed mutations are a thing and have been proven true.
DMs, along with developmental plasticity and evo-devo as a whole refute the simplistic thinking of “more evolved.”
Now here is the argument that PP is using, and why it’s false:
(1) More branches on a phylogeny indicate more speciation events.
(2) More speciation events imply a higher level of evolutionary advancement.
(C) Thus, more branches on a phylogeny indicate a higher level of evolutionary advancement.
The false premise is (2) since it suggests that more speciation events imply a higher level of evolutionary advancement. It implies a goal-directed aspect to evolution, where the generation of more species is equated with evolutionary progress. It’s just reducing evolution to linear advancement and progress; it’s a teleological bent on evolution (which isn’t inherently bad if argued for correctly, see Noble and Noble, 2022). But using mere branching events on a phylogeny to assume that more branches = more speciation = more evolved is simplistic thinking that doesn’t make sense.
If evolution encompasses changes in an organism’s phenotype, then changes in an organism’s phenotype, even without changing its genes, are considered examples of evolution. Evolution encompasses changes in an organism’s phenotype, so changes in an organism’s phenotype even without changes in genes are considered examples of evolution. There is nongenetic “soft inheritance” (see Bonduriansky and Day, 2018).
Organisms can exhibit similar traits due to convergent evolution. So it’s not valid to assume a direct and strong correlation between and organism’s position on a phylogeny and it’s degree of resemblance to a common ancestor.
Dolphins and ichthyosaurs share similar traits but dolphins are mammals while ichthyosaurs are reptiles that lived millions of years ago. Their convergent morphology demonstrates that common ancestry doesn’t determine resemblance. The Tasmanian and Grey wolf have independently evolved similar body plans and roles in their ecologies and despite different genetics and evolutionary history, they share a physical resemblance due to similar ecological niches. The LCA of bats and birds didn’t have wings but they have wings and they occurred independently showing that the trait emerged independently while the LCA didn’t have wings so it emerged twice independently. These examples show that the degree of resemblance to a common ancestor is not determined by an organism’s position on a phylogeny.
Now, there is a correlation between body size and branches (splits) on a phylogeny (Cope’s rule) and I will explain that later. That there is a correlation doesn’t mean that there is a linear progression and they don’t imply a linear progression. Years ago back in 2017 I used the example of floresiensis and that holds here too. And Terrance Deacon’s (1990) work suggests that pseudoprogressive trends in brain size can be explained by bigger whole organisms being selected—this is important because the whole animal is selected, not any one of its individual parts. The correlation isn’t indicative of a linear progression up some evolutionary ladder, either: It’s merely a byproduct of selecting larger animals (the only things that are selected).
I will argue that it is this remarkable parallelism, and not some progressive selection for increasing intelligence, that is responsible for many pseudoprogressive trends in mammalian brain evolution. Larger whole animals were being selected—not just larger brains—but along with the correlated brain enlargement in each lineage a multitude of parallel secondary internal adaptations followed. (Deacon, 1990)
Nonetheless, the claim here is one from DST—the whole organism is selected, so obviously so is it’s body plan (bauplan). Nevertheless, the last two havens for the progressionist is in the realm of brain size and body size. Deacon refuted the selection-for brain size claim, so we’re now left with body size.
Does the evolution of body size lend credence to claims of driven, progressive evolution?
The tendency for bodies to grow larger and larger over evolutionary time is something of a trusim. Since smaller bacterium have eventually evolved into larger (see Gould’s modal bacter argument), more complex multicellular organisms, then this must mean that evolution is progressive and driven, at least for body size, right? Wrong. I will argue here using a constructive dilemma that either evolution is passive and that’s what explains the evolution of body size increases, or is it due to methodological flaws in how body size is measured (length or mass)?
In Full House, Gould (1996) argued that the evolution of body size isn’t driven, but that it is passive, namely that it is evolution away from smaller size. Nonetheless, it seems that Cope’s (Deperet’s) rule is due to cladogenesis (the emergence of new species), not selection for body size per se (Bokma et al, 2015).
Given these three conditions, we note an increase in size of the largest species only because founding species start at the left wall, and the range of size can therefore expand in only one direction. Size of the most common species (the modal decade) never changes, and descendants show no bias for arising at larger sizes than ancestors. But, during each act, the range of size expands in the only open direction by increase in the total number of species, a few of which (and only a few) become larger (while none can penetrate the left wall and get smaller). We can say only this for Cope’s Rule: in cases with boundary conditions like the three listed above, extreme achievements in body size will move away from initial values near walls. Size increase, in other words, is really random evolution away from small size, not directed evolution toward large size. (Gould, 1996)
Dinosaurs were some of the largest animals to ever live. So we might say that there is a drivenness in their bodies to become larger and larger, right? Wrong. The evolution of body size in dinosaurs is passive, not driven (progressive) (Sookias, Butler, and Benson, 2012). Gould (1996) also showed passive trends in body size in plankton and forams. He also cited Stanley (1973) who argued that groups starting at the left wall of minimum complexity will increase in mean size as a consequence of randomness, not any driven tendency for larger body size.
In other, more legitimate cases, increases in means or extremes occur, as in our story of planktonic forams, because lineages started near the left wall of a potential range in size and then filled available space as the number of species increased—in other words, a drift of means or extremes away from a small size, rather than directed evolution of lineages toward large size (and remember that such a drift can occur within a regime of random change in size for each individual lineage—the “drunkard’s walk” model).
In 1973, my colleague Steven Stanley of Johns Hopkins University published a marvelous, and now celebrated, paper to advance this important argument. He showed (see Figure 27, taken from his work) that groups beginning at small size, and constrained by a left wall near this starting point, will increase in mean or extreme size under a regime of random evolution within each species. He also advocated that we test his idea by looking for right-skewed distributions of size within entire systems, rather than by tracking mean or extreme values that falsely abstract such systems as single numbers. In a 1985 paper I suggested that we speak of “Stanley’s Rule” when such an increase of means or extremes can best be explained by undirected evolution away from a starting point near a left wall. I would venture to guess (in fact I would wager substantial money on the proposition) that a large majority of lineages showing increase of body size for mean or extreme values (Cope’s Rule in the broad sense) will properly be explained by Stanley’s Rule of random evolution away from small size rather than by the conventional account of directed evolution toward selectively advantageous large size. (Gould, 1996)
Gould (1996) also discusses the results of McShea’s study, writing:
Passive trends (see Figure 33) conform to the unfamiliar model, championed for complexity in this book, of overall results arising as incidental consequences, with no favored direction for individual species, (McShea calls such a trend passive because no driver conducts any species along a preferred pathway. The general trend will arise even when the evolution of each individual species confirms to a “drunkard’s walk” of random motion.) For passive trends in complexity, McShea proposes the same set of constraints that I have advocated throughout this book: ancestral beginnings at a left wall of minimal complexity, with only one direction open to novelty in subsequent evolution.
But Baker et al (2015) claim that body size is an example of driven evolution. However, that they did not model cladogenetic factors calls their conclusion into question. But I think Baker et al’s claim doesn’t follow. If a taxon possesses a potential size range and the ancestral size approaches the lower limit of this range, it will result in a passive inclination for descendants to exceed the size of their ancestors. The taxon in question possesses a potential size range, and the ancestral size range is on the lower end of the range. So there will be a passive tendency for descendants of this taxon to be larger than their predecessors.
Here’s an argument that concludes that evolution is passive and not driven. I will then give examples of P2.
(1) Extant animals that are descended from more nodes on an evolutionary tree tend to be bigger than animals descended from fewer nodes (your initial premise).
(2) There exist cases where extant animals descended from fewer nodes are larger or more complex than those descended from more nodes (counterexamples of bats and whales, whales are descended from fewer nodes while having some of the largest body sizes in the world while bats are descended from more nodes while having a way comparatively smaller body size).
(C1) Thus, either P1 doesn’t consistently hold (not all extant animals descended from more nodes are larger), or it is not a reliable rule (given the counters).
(3) If P1 does not consistently hold true (not all extant animals descended from more nodes are larger), then it is not a reliable rule.
(4) P1 does not consistently hold true.
(C2) P1 is not a reliable rule.
(5) If P1 is not a reliable rule (given the existence of counterexamples), then it is not a valid generalization.
(6) P1 is not a reliable rule.
(C3) So P1 is not a valid generalization.
(6) If P1 isn’t a valid generalization in the context of evolutionary biology, then there must be exceptions to this observed trend.
(7) The existence of passive evolution, as suggested by the inconsistenties in P1, implies that the trends aren’t driven by progressive forces.
(C4) Thus, the presence of passive evolution and exceptions to P1’s trend challenge the notion of a universally progressive model of evolution.
(8) If the presence of passive evolution and exceptions to P1’s trend challenges the notion of a universally progressive model of evolution, then the notion of a universally progressive model of evolution isn’t supported by the evidence, as indicated by passive evolution and exceptions to P1’s trend.
(9) The presence of passive evolution and exceptions to P1’s trend challenge the notion. of a universally progressive model of evolution.
(1) Bluefin tuna are known to have a potential range of size, with some being small and others being massive (think of that TV show Deadliest Catch and the massive size ranges of tuna these fisherman catch, both in length and mass). So imagine a population of bluefin tuna where the ancestral size is found to be close to the lower end of their size range. So P2 is satisfied because bluefin tuna have a potential size range. So the ancestral size of the ancestors of the tuna were relatively small in comparison to the maximum size of the tuna.
(2) African elephants in some parts of Africa are small, due to ecological constraints and hunting pressures and these smaller-sized ancestors are close to the lower limit of the potential size range of African elephants. Thus, according to P1, there will be a passive tendency for descendants of these elephants to be larger than their smaller-sizes ancestors over time.
(3) Consider galapagos tortoises whom are also known for their large variation in size among the different species and populations on the galapagos islands. So consider a case of galapagos tortoises who have smaller body sizes due to either resource conditions or the conditions of their ecologies. So in this case, the potential size for the ancestors of these tortoises is close to the theoretical limit of their potential size range. Therefore, we can expect a passive tendency for descendants of these tortoises to evolve large body sizes.
Further, in Stanley’s (1973) study of Cope’s rule from fossil rodents, he observed that body size distributions in these rodents, over time, became bigger while the modal size stayed small. This doesn’t even touch the fact that because there are more small than large mammals, that there would be a passive tendency in large body sizes for mammals. This also doesn’t even touch the methodological issues in determining body size for the rule—mass, length? Nonetheless, Monroe and Bokma’s (2010) study showed that while there is a tendency for species to be larger than their ancestors, it was a mere 0.5 percent difference. So the increase in body size is explained by an increase in variance in body size (passiveness) not drivenness.
Explaining the rule
I think there are two explanations: Either a methodological artifact or passive evolution. I will discuss both, and I will then give a constructive dilemma argument that articulates this position.
Monroe and Bokma (2010) showed that even when Cope’s rule is assumed, the ancestor-descendant increase in body size showed a mere .4 percent increase. They further discussed methodological issues with the so-called rule, citing Solow and Wang (2008) who showed that Cope’s rule “appears” based on what assumptions of body size are used. For example, Monroe and Bokma (2010) write:
If Cope’s rule is interpreted as an increase in the mean size of lineages, it is for example possible that body mass suggests Cope’s rule whereas body length does not. If Cope’s rule is instead interpreted as an increase in the median body size of a lineage, its validity may depend on the number of speciation events separating an ancestor-descendant pair.
…
If size increase were a general property of evolutionary lineages – as Cope’s rule suggests – then even if its effect were only moderate, 120 years of research would probably have yielded more convincing and widespread evidence than we have seen so far.
Gould (1997) suggested that Cope’s rule is a mere psychological artifact. But I think it’s deeper than that. Now I will provide my constructive dilemma argument, now that I have ruled out body size being due to progressive, driven evolution.
The form of constructive dilemma goes: (1) A V B. (2) If A, then C. (3) If B, then D. (C) C V D. P1 represents a disjunction: There are two possible choices, A and B. P2 and P3 are conditional statements, that provide implications for both of the options. And C states that at least one or both of the implications have to be true (C or D).
Now, Gould’s Full House argument can be formulated either using modus tollens or constructive dillema:
(1) If evolution were a deterministic, teleological process, there would be a clear overall progression and a predetermined endpoint. (2) There is no predetermined endpoint or progression to evolution. (C) So evolution isn’t a deterministic or teleological process.
(1) Either evolution is a deterministic, teleological process (A) or it’s not (B). (2) If A, then there would be a clear direction and predetermined endpoint. (3) If B, then there is no overall direction or predetermined endpoint. (4) So either there is a clear overall progression (A), or there isn’t (B). (5) Not A. (6) Therefore, B.
Or (1) Life began at a relatively simple state (the left wall of complexity). (2) Evolution is influenced by a combination of chance events,, environmental factors and genetic variation. (3) Organisms may stumble I’m various directions along the path of evolution. (4) Evolution lacks a clear path or predetermined endpoint.
Now here is the overall argument combining the methodological issues pointed out by Sowe and Wang and the implications of passive evolution, combined with Gould’s Full House argument:
(1) Either Cope’s rule is a methodological artifact (A), or it’s due to passive, not driven evolution (B). (2) If Cope’s rule is a methodological artifact (A), then different ways to measure body size (length or mass) can come to different conclusions. (3) If Cope’s rule is due to passive, not driven evolution (B), then it implies that larger body sizes simply accumulate over time without being actively driven by selective pressures. (4) Either evolution is a deterministic, teleological process (C), or it is not (D). (5) If C, then there would be a clear overall direction and predetermined endpoint in evolution (Gould’s argument). (6) If D, then there is no clear overall direction or predetermined endpoint in evolution (Gould’s argument). (7) Therefore, either there is a clear overall direction (C) or there isn’t (D) (Constructive Dilemma). (8) If there is a clear overall direction (C) in evolution, then it contradicts passive, not driven evolution (B). (9) If there isn’t a clear overall direction (D) in evolution, then it supports passive, not driven evolution (B). (10) Therefore, either Cope’s rule is due to passive evolution or it’s a methodological artifact.
Conclusion
Evolution is quite clearly passive and non-driven (Bonner, 2013). The fact of the matter is, as I’ve shown, evolution isn’t driven (progressive), it is passive due to the drunken, random walk that organisms take from the minimum left wall of complexity. The discussions of developmental plasticity and directed mutation further show that evolution can’t be progressive or driven. Organism body plans had nowhere to go but up from the left wall of minimal complexity, and that means increase the variance in, say, body size is due to passive trends. Given the discussion here, we can draw one main inference: since evolution isn’t directed or progressive, then the so-called Cope’s (Deperet’s) rule is either due to passive trends or they are mere methodological artifacts. The argument I have mounted for that claim is sound and so, it obviously must be accepted that evolution is a random, drunken walk, not one of overall drivenness and progress and so, we must therefore look at the evolution of body size in this way.
Rushton tried to use the concept of evolutionary progress to argue that some races may be “more evolved” than other races, like “Mongoloids” being “more evolved” than “Caucasoids” who are “more evolved” than “Negroids.” But Rushton’s “theory” was merely a racist one, and it obviously fails upon close inspection. Moreover, even the claims Rushton made at the end of his book Race, Evolution, and Behavior don’t even work. (See here.) Evolution isn’t progressive so we can’t logically state that one population group is more “advanced” or “evolved” than another. This is of course merely Rushton being racist with shoddy “explanations” used to justify it. (Like in Rushton’s long-refuted r/K selection theory or Differential-K theory, where more “K-evolved” races are “more advanced” than others.)
Lastly, this argument I constructed based on the principles of Gould’s argument shows that there is no progress to evolution.
P1 The claim that evolutionary “progress” is real and not illusory can only be justified iff organisms deemed more “advanced” outnumber “lesser” organisms.
P2 There are more “lesser” organisms (bacteria/insects) on earth than “advanced” organisms (mammals/species of mammals).
C Therefore evolutionary “progress” is illusory.
Examining Misguided Notions of Evolutionary “Progress”
2650 words
Introduction
For years, PumpkinPerson (PP) has been pushing an argument which states that “if you’re the first branch, and you don’t do anymore branching, then you’re less evolved than higher branches.” This is the concept of “more evolved” or the concept of evolutionary progress. Over the years I have written a few articles on the confused nature of this thinking. PP seems to like the argument since Rushton deployed a version of it for his r/K selection (Differential K) theory, which stated that “Mongoloids” are more “K evolved” than “Caucasians” who are more “K evolved” than “Negroids”, to use Rushton’s (1992) language. Rushton posited that this ordering occurred due to the cold winters that the ancestors of “Mongoloids” and “Caucasoids” underwent, and he theorized that this led to evolutionary progress, which would mean that certain populations are more advanced than others (Rushton, 1992; see here for response). It is in this context that PP’s statement above needs to be carefully considered and analyzed to determine its implications and relevance to Rushton’s argument. It commits the affirming the consequent fallacy, and assuming the statement is true leads to many logical inconsistenties like there being a “most evolved” species,
Why this evolutionary progress argument is fallacious
if you’re the first branch, and you don’t do anymore branching, then you’re less evolved than higher branches.
This is one of the most confused statements I have ever read on the subject of phylogenies. This misconception, though, is so widespread that there have been quite a few papers that talk about this and talk about how to steer students away from this kind of thinking about evolutionary trees (Crisp and Cook, 2004; Baum, Smith, and Donovan, 2005; Gregory, 2008; Omland, Cook, and Crisp, 2008). This argument is invalid since the concept of “evolved” in evolutionary trees doesn’t refer to a hierarchical scale, where higher branches are “more evolved” than lower branches (which are “less evolved”). What evolutionary trees do is show historical relationships between different species, which shows common ancestry and divergence over time. So each branch represents a lineage and all living organisms have been evolving foe the same amount of time since the last common ancestor (LCA). Thus, the position of a branch on the tree doesn’t determine a species’ level of evolution.
The argument is invalid since it incorrectly assumes that the position of the branch on a phylogeny determines the evolution or the “evolutionary advancement” of a species. Here’s how I formulate this argument:
(P1) If you’re the first branch on the evolutionary tree and you don’t do any more branching, then you’re less evolved than higher branches.
(P2) (Assumption) Evolutionary advancement is solely determined by the position on the tree and the number of branches.
(C) So species represented by higher branches on the evolutionary tree are more evolved than species represented by lower branches.
There is a contradiction in P2, since as I explained above, each branch represents a new lineage and every species on the tree is equally evolved. PP’s assumption seems to be that newer branches have different traits than the species that preceded it, implying that there is an advancement occurring. Nevertheless, I can use a reductio to refute the argument.
Let’s consider a hypothetical scenario in which this statement is true: “If you’re the first branch and you don’t do any more branching, then you’re less evolved than higher branches.” This suggests that the position of a species on a phylogeny determines its level of evolution. So according to this concept, if a species occupies a higher branch, it should be “more evolved” than a species on a lower branch. So following this line of reasoning, a species that has undergone extensive branching and diversification should be classified as “more evolved” compared to a species that has fewer branching points.
Now imagine that in this hypothetical scenario, we have species A and species B in a phylogeny. Suppose that species A is the first branch and that it hasn’t undergone any branching. Conversely, species B, which is represented on a higher branch, has experienced extensive branching and diversification, which adheres to the criteria for a species to be considered “more evolved.” But there are logical implications for the concept concerning the positions of species A and species B on the phylogeny.
So according to the concept of linear progression which is implied in the original statement, if species B is “more evolved” than species A due to its higher branch position, it logically follows that species B should continue to further evolve and diversify. This progression should lead to new branching points, as each subsequent stage would be considered “more evolved” than the last. Thus, applying the line of reasoning in the original statement, it suggests that there should always be a species represented on an even higher branch than species B, and this should continue ad infinitim, with no endpoint.
The logical consequence of the statement is that an infinite progression of increasingly evolved species, each species being represented by a higher branch than the one before, without any final of ultimate endpoint for a “most evolved” species. This result leads to an absurdity, since it contradicts our understanding of evolution as an ongoing and continuous process. The idea of a linear and hierarchical progression of a species in an evolutionary tree culminating in a “most evolved” species isn’t supported by our scientific understanding and it leads to an absurd outcome.
Thus, the logical implications of the statement “If you’re the first branch and you don’t do any more branching, then you’re less evolved than higher branches” leads to an absurd and contradictory result and so it must be false. The concept of the position of a species on an evolutionary tree isn’t supported by scientific evidence and understanding. Phylogenies represent historical relationships and divergence events over time.
(1) Assume the original claim is true: If you’re the first branch and you don’t do any more branching, then you’re less evolved than higher branches.
(2) Suppose species A is the first branch and undergoes no further branching.
(3) Now take species B which is in a higher branch which has undergone extensive diversification and branching, making it “more evolved”, according to the statement in (1).
(4) But based on the concept of linear progression implied in (1), species B should continue to evolved and diversity even further, leading to new branches and increased evolution.
(5) Following the logic in (1), there should always be a species represented on an even higher branch than species B, which is even more evolved.
(6) This process should continue ad infinitim with species continually branching and becoming “more evolved” without an endpoint.
(7) This leads to an absurd result, since it suggests that there is no species that could be considered “more evolved” or reach a final stage of evolution, contradicting our understanding of evolution as a continuous, ongoing process, with no ultimate endpoint.
(8) So since the assumption in (1) leads to an absurd result, then it must be false.
So the original statement is false, and a species’ position on a phylogeny doesn’t determine the level of evolution and the superiority of a species. The concept of a linear and hierarchical progression of advancement in a phylogeny is not supported by scientific evidence and assuming the statement in (1) is true leads to a logically absurd outcome. Each species evolves in its unique ecological context, without reaching a final state of evolution or hierarchical scale of superiority. This reductio ad absurdum argument therefore reveals the fallacy in the original statement.
Also, think about the claim that there are species that are “more evolved” than other species. This implies that there are “less evolved” species. Thus, a logical consequence of the claim is that there could be a “most evolved” species.
So if a species is “most evolved”, it would mean that that species has surpassed all others in evolutionary advancement and there are no other species more advanced than it. Following this line of reasoning, there should be no further branching or diversification of this species since it has already achieved the highest level of evolution. But evolution is an ongoing process. Organisms continously adapt to and change their surroundings (the organism-environment system), and change in response to this. But if the “most evolved” species is static, this contradicts what we know about evolution, mainly that it is continuous, ongoing change—it is dynamic. Further, as the environment changes, the “most evolved” species could become less suited to the environment’s conditions over time, leading to a decline in its numbers or even it’s extinction. This would then imply that there would have been other species that are “more evolved.” (It merely shows the response of the organism to its environment and how it develops differently.) Finally, the idea of a “most evolved” species implies an endpoint of evolution, which contradicts our knowledge of evolution and the diversification of life one earth. Therefore, the assumption that there is a “most evolved” species leads to a logical contradiction and an absurdity based on what we know about evolution and life on earth.
The statement possesses scala naturae thinking, which is also known as the great chain of being. This is something Rushton (2004) sought to bring back to evolutionary biology. However, the assumptions that need to hold for this to be true—that is, the assumptions that need to hold for this kind of tree reading to even be within the realm of possibility is false. This is wonderfully noted by Gregory (2008) who states that “The order of terminal noses is meaningless.” Crisp and Cook (2004) also state how such tree-reading is intuitive and this intuition of course is false:
Intuitive interpretation of ancestry from trees is likely to lead to errors, especially the common fallacy that a species-poor lineage is more ‘ancestral’ or ‘diverges earlier’ than does its species-rich sister group. Errors occur when trees are read in a one-sided way, which is more commonly done when trees branch asymmetrically.
There are several logical implications of that statement. I’ve already covered the claim that there is a kind of progression and advancement in evolution—a linear and hierarchical ranking—and the fixed endpoint (“most evolved”). Further, in my view, this leads to value judgments, that some species are “better” or “superior” to others. It also seems to ignore that the branching signifies not which species has undergone more evolution, but the evolutionary relationships between species. Finally, evolution occurs independently in each lineage and is based on their specific histories and interactions between developmental resources, it’s not valid to compare species as “more evolved” than others based on the relationships between species on evolutionary trees, so it’s based on an arbitrary comparison between species.
Finally, I can refute this using Gould’s full house argument.
P1: If evolution is a ladder of progress, with “more evolved” species on higher rungs, then the fossil record should demonstrate a steady increase in complexity over time.
P2: The fossils record does not shit a steady increase in complexity over time.
C: Therefore, evolution is not a ladder of progress and species cannot be ranked as “more evolved” based on complexity.
P1: If the concept of “more evolved” is valid, then there would be a linear and hierarchical progression in the advancement of evolution, wjtcertsin species considered superior to others based on their perceived level of evolutionary change.
P2: If there a linear and hierarchical progression of advancement in evolution, then the fossil record should demonstrate a steady increase in complexity over time, with species progressively becoming more complex and “better” in a hierarchical sense.
P3: The fossils record does not show a steady increase in complexity over time; it instead shows a diverse and branching pattern of evolution.
C1: So the concept of “more evolved” isn’t valid, since there is an absence of a steady increase in complexity in the fossil record and this refutes the notion of a linear and hierarchical progression of advancement in evolution.
P4: If the concept of “more evolved” is not valid, then there is no objective hierarchy of superiority among species based in their positions on an evolutionary tree.
C2: Thus, there is no objective hierarchy of superiority among species based on their positions on an evolutionary tree.
There is one final fallacy contained in that statement: it affirms the consequent. This logical fallacy takes the form of: If P then Q, P is true so Q is true.” Even if the concept of “more evolved” were valid, just because a species doesn’t do any more branching doesn’t mean it’s less evolved. So this reasoning is as follows: If you’re the first branch and you don’t do anymore branching, then you’re less evolved than higher branches (If P and Q, then R). It affirms the consequent like this: You didn’t do anymore branching (Q), so this branch has to be less evolved than the higher branches (R). It incorrectly infers the consequent Q (not doing anymore branching) as a sufficient condition for the antecedent P (being the first branch), which leads to the flawed conclusion (R) that the species is less evolved than higher branches. Just because a species doesn’t do anymore branching doesn’t mean it’s less evolved than another species. There could be numerous reasons why branching didn’t occur and it doesn’t directly determine evolutionary status. The argument infers being less evolved from doing less branching, which affirms the consequent. If a species doesn’t do anymore branching then that branch is less evolved than a higher branch. So since the argument affirms the consequent, it is therefore invalid.
Conclusion
Reading phylogenies in such a manner—in a way that would make one infer the conclusion that evolution is progressive and that there are “more evolved” species—although intuitive is false. Misconceptions like this along with many others while reading evolutionary trees are so persistent that much thought has been put into educating the public on right and wrong ways to read evolutionary trees.
As I showed in my argument ad absurdums where I accepted the claim as true, it leads to logical inconsistenties and goes against everything we know about evolution. Evolution is not progressive, it’s merely local change. That a species changes over time from another species doesn’t imply anything about “how evolved” (“more or less”) it is in comparison to the other. Excising this thinking is tough, but it is doable by understanding how evolutionary trees are constructed and how to read them correctly. It further affirms the consequent, leading to a false conclusion.
All living species have spent the same amount of time evolving. Branching merely signifies a divergence, not a linear scale of advancement. Of course one would think that if evolution is happening and one species evolves into another and that this relationship is shown on a tree that this would indicate that the newer species is “better” in some way in comparison to the species it derived from. But it merely suggests that the species faced different challenges which influenced its evolution; each species adapted and survived in its own unique evolutionary ecology, leading to diversification and the formation of newer branches on the tree. Evolution does not follow a linear path of progress, and there is no inherent hierarchy of superiority among species based on their position on the evolutionary tree. While the tree visually represents relationships between species, it doesn’t imply judgments like “better” or “worse”, “more evolved” or “less evolved.” It merely highlights the complexity and diversity of all life on earth.
Evolution is quite obviously not progressive, and even if it were, we wouldn’t see evolutionary progression from reading evolutionary trees, since such evolutionary relationships between species can be ladderized or not, with many kinds of different branches that may not be intuitive to those who read evolutionary trees as showing “more evolved” species, they nevertheless show a valid evolutionary relationship.
Directed Mutations, Epigenetics and Evolution
2400 words
A mutation can be said to be directed if it arises due to the needs of the developing organism, and they occur at higher frequencies if it is beneficial (Foster, 2000; Saier et al, 2017). If there is some sort of stress, then an adaptive mutation would occur. The existence of this kind of mechanism has been debated in the literature, but its existence spells trouble for neo-Darwinian theory, whose proponents claim that mutations are random and then “selected-for” in virtue of their contributions to fitness. Indeed, this concept challenges a core tenet of neo-Darwinism (Sarkar, 1991). I will argue that directed mutation/non-random mutation/stress-directed adaptation (DM, directed mutation for short) spells trouble for the neo-Darwinian paradigm.
The issue at hand
The possibility of DMs were argued for by Cairns, Overbaugh, and Miller (1988), where they argue that environmental pressure can cause adaptive changes to genes that would be beneficial to the organism. This then spurred a long debate about whether or not such mutations were possible (see Sarkar, 1991; Fox Keller, 1992; Brisson, 2003; Jablonka and Lamb, 2014). Although Cairns, Overbaugh, and Miller were wrong—that is, they were not dealing with mutations that were due to the environmental disturbances they posed (Jablonka and Lamb, 2014: 84)—their paper did bring up the possibility that some mutations could be a direct consequence of environmental disturbances which would then be catapulted by the homeodynamic physiology of the organism.
Saier et al (2017) state the specific issue with DM and its existence:
Recently, strong support for directed mutation has emerged, not for point mutations as independently proposed by Cairns, Hall and their collaborators, but for transposon-mediated mutations (12, 13). If accepted by the scientific community, this concept could advance (or revise) our perception of evolution, allowing increased rates of mutational change in times of need. But this concept goes against the current dogma that states that mutations occur randomly, and only the beneficial ones are selected for (14, 15). The concept of directed mutation, if established, would require the reversal of a long accepted precept.
This is similar to the concept of phenotypic plasticity. It is the phenomenon of a given genotype expressing different phenotypes due to environmental factors. This concept is basically a physiological one. When talking about how plastic a phenotype is, its relation to the physiology of the organism is paramount. We know that physiological changes are homeodynamic. That is, changes in physiology are constantly happening due to the effects of the environment the organism finds itself in. For example, acute changes in heart rate occur due to what happens in the environment, like say a predator chase it’s prey. The heart rates of both predator and prey increases as blood flow increases due to stress hormones. I will discuss phenotypic plasticity on its own in the future, but for now I will just note that genetic and environmental factors influence the plasticity of phenotypes (Ledon-Rettig and Ragsdale, 2021) and that phenotypic plasticity and development play a role in evolution (West-Eberhard, 2003, 2005; Wund, 2015
The fact of the matter is, phenotypic plasticity is directly related to the concept of directed mutation, due to DM being a largely physiological concept. I will argue that this refutes a central Darwinian premise. Namely that since directed mutations are possible, then they are not random. If they are not random, then due to what occurs during the development of an organism, a directed mutation could be adaptive. This, then, is the answer to how phenotypic traits become fixed in the genome without the need for natural selection.
Directed mutations
Sueoka (1988) showed that basically all organisms are subject to directed mutations. It has been noted by mathematicans that on a purely random mutational model, that there would not be enough time to explain all of the phenotypic diversity we see today (Wright, 2000). Doubt is placed on three principles of neo-Darwinism: mutations occur independently of the environment the organism is in (this is empirically false); mutations are due to replication errors (this is true, but not always the case) and mutation rates are constant (Brisson, 2003).
One of the main claims of the neo-Darwinian paradigm is that mutations occur at random, and the mutation is selected-for or against based on its relationship to fitness. Fodor’s argument has refuted the concept of natural selection, since “selection-for” is an intensional context and so can’t distinguish between correlated traits. However, we know now that since physiology is sensitive to the environment, and since adaptive changes to physiology would occur not only in an organism but during its development, it then follows that directed mutations would be a thing, and so they wouldn’t be random as neo-Darwinian dogma would claim.
In her review Stress-directed adaptive mutations and evolution, Wright (2004) concludes:
In nature, where cell division must often be negligible as a result of multiple adverse conditions, beneficial mutations for evolution can arise in specific response to stressors that target related genes for derepression. Specific transcription of these genes then results in localized DNA secondary structures containing unpaired bases vulnerable to mutation. Many environmental stressors can also affect supercoiling and [stress-directed mutation] directly.
But what are the mechanisms of DMs? “Mechanism” in this meaning would “refer to the circumstances affecting mutation rates” (Wright, 2000). She also defines what “random” means in neo-Darwinian parlance: “a mutation is random if it is unrelated to the metabolic function of the gene and if it occurs at a rate that is undirected by specific selective conditions of the environment.” Thus, the existence of DMs would then refute this tenet of neo-Darwinism. Two of the mechanisms of such DMs are transcriptional activation and supercoiling. Transcriptional activation (TA) can cause changes to single-stranded DNA (ssDNA) and also supercoiling (the addition of more coils onto DNA). TA can be caused by either derepression (which is a mechanism which occurs due to the absence of some molecule) or induction (the activation of an inactive gene which then becomes transcribed). Thus, knowing this, “genetic derepression may be the only mechanism by which particular environmental conditions of stress target specific regions of the genome for higher mutation rates (hypermutation)” (Wright, 2000). Such responses rely on a quick response, and this is due to the plastic phenotypes of the organism which then allow such DMs to occur. It then follows that stress-induced changes would allow organisms to survive in new environments, without a need for neo-Darwinian “mechanisms”—mainly natural selection. Thus, the biochemical mechanism for such mutations is transcriptional activation. Such stress-directed mutation could be seen as “quasi-Lamarckian” (Koonin and Wolf, 2009).
In nature, nutritional stress and associated genetic derepression must be rampant. If mutation rates can be altered by the many variables controlling specific, stress-induced transcription, one might reasonably argue that many mutations are to some extent directed as a result of the unique metabolism of every organism responding to the challenges of its environment. (Wright, 2000)
This is noted wonderfully by Jablonka and Lamb (2014: 92) in Evolution in Four Dimensions:
No longer can we think about mutation solely in terms of random failures in DNA maintenance and repair. We now know that stress conditions can affect the operation of the enzyme systems that are responsible for maintaining and repairing DNA, and parts of these systems sometimes seem to be coupled with regulatory elements that control how, how much, and where DNA is altered.
Jablonka and Lamb present solid evidence that mutations are semi-directed. Such mutations, as we have seen, are able to be induced by the environment in response to stress, which is due to our plastic, homeodynamic physiology. They discuss “four dimensions” of evolution which are DNA, epigenetic, behavioral and cultural. Their works (including their Epigenetic Inheritance and Evolution: The Lamarckian Dimension; see Jablonka and Lamb, 2015) provide solid evidence and arguments against the neo-Darwinian view of evolution. The fact of the matter is, there are multiple inheritance systems over and above DNA, which then contribute to nonrandom, directed mutations. The fact of the matter is, Lamarckism wasn’t wrong and Jablonka and Lamb have strongly argued for that conclusion. Epigenetics clearly influences evolution, and this therefore vindicates Lamarckism. Epigenetic variation can be inherited too (Jablonka and Lamb, 1989). Since phenotypic plasticity is relevant in how organisms adapt to their environment, then epigenetic mechanisms contribute to evolution (Ashe, Colot, and Oldroyd, 2021). Such changes that arise due to epigenetic mechanisms can indeed influence mutation (Meyer, 2015), and I would say—more directly—that certain epigenetic mechanisms play a part in how an adaptive, directed mutation would arise during the development of an organism. Stochastic epigenetic variation can indeed become adaptive (Feinberg and Irizarry, 2010).
Non-random mutations have been known to be pretty ubiquitous (Tsunoyama, Bellgard, and Gojobori, 2001). This has even been shown in the plant Arabidopis (Monroe et al, 2022), which shows that basically, mutations are not random (Domingues, 2023). A similar concept to DMs is blind stochasticity. Noble and Noble (2017, 2018; cf Noble, 2017) have shown that organisms harness stochastic processes in order to adapt to the environment—to harness function. A stochastic process is a state of a system that cannot be predicted even knowing the current state of said system.
Even all the way back in 1979, such changes were beginning to be noticed by evolutionists, such as Ho and Saunders (1979) who write that variations in the phenotype
are produced by interactions between the organism and the environment during development. We propose, therefore, that the intrinsic dynamical structure of the epigenetic system itself, in its interaction with the environment, is the source of non-random variations which direct evolutionary change, and that a proper study of evolution consists in the working out of the dynamics of the epigenetic system and its response to environmental stimuli as well as the mechanisms whereby novel developmental responses are canalized.
The organism participates in its own evolution (as considerations from niche construction show), and “evolutionary novelties” can and do arise nonrandomly (Ho, 2010). This is completely at-odds with the neo-Darwinian paradigm. Indeed, the creators of the Modern Synthesis ignored developmental and epigenetic issues when it came to formulating their theory. Fortunately, in the new millennium, we have come to understand and appreciate how development and evolution occur and how dynamic the physiological system itself truly is.
There have been critical takes on the concept of DM (Lenski and Mittler, 2003; Charlesworth, Barton, and Charlesworth, 2017; see Noble and Shapiro, 2021 for critique), like for example Futuyama (2017) who claims that DM is “groundless.” However, James Shapiro’s (1992; 2013, 2014) concept of natural genetic engineering states that cells can restructure their genomes so this “means viewing genetic change as a coordinated cell biological process, the reorganization of discrete genomic modules, resulting in the formation of new DNA structures” (Shapiro, 1993). DNA is harnessed by and for the physiological system to carry out certain tasks. Since development is self-organizing and dynamic (Smith and Thelen, 2003; Saetzler, Sonnenschein, and Soto, 2012) and since development is spurred on by physiological processes, along with the fact that physiology is sensitive to the goings-on of the environment that the developing organism finds itself in, then it follows that mutations can and would arise due to need, which would refute claims from neo-Darwinians who claim that mutations arise due to chance and not need.
Conclusion
It is clear that mutations can be (1) adaptive and (2) environmentally-induced. Such adaptive mutations, clearly, arise due to need and not chance. If they arise due to need and not chance, then they are directed and adaptive. They are directed by the plastic physiology of the organism which constructs the phenotype in a dialectical manner, using genes as its passive products, not active causes. This is because biological causation is multi-leveled, not one-way (Noble, 2012). There is also the fact of the matter that “genetic change is far from random and often not gradual” (Noble, 2013).
As can be seen in this discussion, adaptive, directed mutations are a fact of life, and so, one more domino of neo-Darwinism has fallen. Berkley claims that “The genetic variation that occurs in a population because of mutation is random“; “mutations are random“, but as we’ve seen here, this is not the case. Through the biological process of physiology and its relationship to the ebbs and flows of the environment, the organism’s phenotype that is being constructed by the self-organizing system can respond to changes in the cellular and overall environment and thusly direct changes in the phenotype and genes which would then enhance survival due to the environmental insult.
Lamarckism has been vindicated over the past 25 or so years, and it’s due to a better understanding of epigenetic processes in evolution and in the developing organism. Since what Lamarck is known for is the claim that the environment can affect the phenotype in a heritable manner, and since we now know that DNA is not the only thing inherited but epigenetically-modified DNA sequences are too, it follows that Lamarck was right. What we need to understand development and evolution is the Extended Evolutionary Synthesis, which does make novel predictions and predictions that the neo-Darwinian paradigm doesn’t (Laland et al, 2015).
Such directed changes in the genome which are caused by the physiological system due to the plastic nature of organismal construction refute a main premise of the neo-Darwinian paradigm. This is the alternative to neo-Darwinian natural selection, as Fodor noted in his attack on neo-Darwinism:
The alternative possibility to Darwin’s is that the direction of phenotypic change is very largely determined by endogenous variables. The current literature suggests that alterations in the timing of genetically controlled developmental processes is often the endogenous variable of choice; hence the ‘devo’ in ‘evo-devo’.
Darwin got quite a bit wrong, and it’s of no fault of his own. But those who claim that Darwin discovered mechanisms or articulated the random process of mutations quite obviously need to update their thoughts in the new millennium on the basis of new information informed by systems biologists and epigeneticists. The process of the construction of organisms is dynamic and self-organizing, and this is how phenotypic traits become fixed in populations of organisms. Plasticity is in fact a major driver of evolution along with the concept of genetic assimilation, which results in the canalization of the plastic trait which then eliminates the plastic response from the environment (Sommer, 2020). Phenotypic plasticity can have adaptive traits arise, but natural selection can’t be the mechanism of evolution due to Fodor’s considerations. Development can lead to evolution, not only evolution leading to development (West-Eberhard, 2003). In fact, development in many cases precedes evolution.
The Answer to Hereditarianism is Developmental Systems Theory
4150 words
Introduction
It is claimed that genes (DNA sequences) have a special, privileged role in the development of all traits. But once we understand what genes do and their role in development, then we will understand that the role ascribed to genes by gene-selectionists and hereditarians outright fails. Indeed, the whole “nature vs nurture” debate implies that genes determine traits and that it’s possible to partition the relative contributions to traits in a genetic and environmental way. This, however, is far from reality (like heritability estimates).
DST isn’t a traditional scientific theory—it is more a theoretical perspective on developmental biology, heredity, and evolution, though it does make some general predictions (Griffiths and Hochman, 2015). But aspects of it have been used to generate novel predictions in accordance with the extended evolutionary synthesis (Laland et al, 2015).
Wilson (2018: 65) notes six themes of DST:
Joint determination by multiple causes
Development is a process of multiple interacting sources.
Context sensitivity and contingency
Development depends on the current state of the organism.
Extended inheritance
An organism inherits resources from the environment in addition to genes.
Development as a process of construction
The organism helps shape its own environment, such as the way a beaver builds a dam to raise the water level to build a lodge.
Distributed control
Idea that no single source of influence has central control over an organism’s development.
Evolution as construction
The evolution of an entire developmental system, including whole ecosystems of which organisms are parts, not just the changes of a particular being or population.
Genes (DNA sequences) as resources and outcomes
Hereditarians have a reductionist view of genes and what they do. Genes, to the hereditarian, are causes of not only development but of traits and evolution, too. However the hereditarian is sorely mistaken—there is no a priori justification for treating genes as privileged causes over and above other developmental resources (Noble, 2012). I take Noble’s argument there to mean that strong causal parity is true—where causal parity means that all developmental resources are on par with each other, with no other resource having primacy over another. They all need to “dance in tune” with the “music of life” to produce the phenotype, to borrow Noble’s (2006, 2017) analogy. Hereditarian dogma also has its basis in the neo-Darwinian Modern Synthesis. The modern synthesis has gotten causality in biology wrong. Genes are, simply put, passive, not active, causes:
Genes, as DNA sequences, do not of course form selves in any ordinary sense. The DNA molecule on its own does absolutely nothing since it reacts biochemically only to triggering signals. It cannot even initiate its own transcription or replication. … It would therefore be more correct to say that genes are not active causes; they are, rather, caused to give their information by and to the system that activates them. The only kind of causation that can be attributed to them is passive, much in the way a computer program reads and uses databases. (Noble, 2011)
These ideas, of course, are also against the claim that genes are blueprints or recipes, as Plomin (2018) claims in his most recent book (Joseph, 2022). This implies that they are context-independent; we have known for years that genes are massively context-sensitive. The line of argument that hereditarians push is that genes are context-insensitive, that is they’re context-independent. But since DNA is but one of the developmental resources the physiological system uses to create the phenotype, this claim fails. Genes are not causes on their own.
Behavioral geneticist and evolutionary psychologist J. P. Rushton (1997: 64) claims that a study shows that “genes are like blueprints or recipes providing a template for propelling development forward to some targeted endpoint.” That is, Rushton is saying that there is context-independent “information” in genes, and that genes, in essence, guide development toward a targeted endpoint. Noah Carl (2019) claims that the hereditarian hypothesis “states that these differences [in cognitive ability] are partly or substantially explained by genetics.” When he says the differences are “partly or substantially explained by genetics”, he’s talking about “cognitive ability” being caused by genes. The claim that genes cause (either partly or substantially) cognitive ability—and all traits, for that matter—fails and it fails since genes don’t do what hereditarians think they do. (Nevermind the conceptual reasons.) These claims are laughable, due to what Noble, Oyama, Moore and Jablonka and Lamb have argued. It is outright false that genes are like blueprints or recipes. Rushton’s is reductionist in a sociobiology-type way, while Plomin’s is reductionist in a behavioral genetic type way.
In The Dependent Gene, David Moore (2002: 81) talks about the context-dependency of genes:
Such contextual dependence renders untenable the simplistic belief that there are coherent, long-lived entities called “genes” that dictate instructions to cellular machinery that merely constructs the body accordingly. The common belief that genes contain context-independent “information”—and so are analogous to “blueprints” or “recipes”—is simply false.
Genes are always expressed in context and cannot be divorced from said context, like hereditarians attempt using heritability analyses. Phenotypes aren’t “in the genes”, they aren’t innate. They develop through the lifespan (Blumberg, 2018).
Causal parity and hereditarianism
Hereditarianism can be said to be a form of genetic reductionism (and mind-brain identity). The main idea of reductionism is to reduce the whole to the sum of its parts and then analyze those parts. Humans (the whole) are made up of genes (the parts), so to understand human behavior, and humans as a whole, we must then understand genes, so the story goes.
Cofnas (2020) makes several claims regarding the hereditarian hypothesis and genes:
But if we find that many of the same SNPs predict intelligence in different racial groups, a risky prediction made by the hereditarian hypothesis will have passed a crucial test.
…
But if work on the genetics and neuroscience of intelligence becomes sufficiently advanced, it may soon become possible to give a convincing causal account of how specific SNPs affect brain structures that underlie intelligence (Haier, 2017). If we can give a biological account of how genes with different distributions lead to race differences, this would essentially constitute proof of hereditarianism. As of now, there is nothing that would indicate that it is particularly unlikely that race differences will turn out to have a substantial genetic component. If this possibility cannot be ruled out scientifically, we must face the ethical question of whether we ought to pursue the truth, whatever it may be.
Haier is a reductionist of not only the gene variety but the neuro variety—he attempts to reduce “intelligence” to genes and neurology (brain physiology). I have though strongly criticized the use of fMRI neuroimaging studies regarding IQ; cognitive localizations in the brain are untenable (Uttal, 2001, 2011) and this is because mind-brain identity is false.
Cofnas asks “How can we disentangle the effects of genes and environment?” and states the the behavioral geneticist has two ways—correlations between twins and adoptees and GWAS. Unfortunately for Cofnas, twin and adoption studies show no such thing (see Ho, 2013), most importantly because the EEA is false (Joseph, 2022a, b). GWAS studies are also fatally confounded (Janssens and Joyner, 2019) and PGS doesn’t show what behavioral geneticists need it to show (Richardson, 2017, 2022). The concept of “heritability” is also a bunk notion (Moore and Shenk, 2016). (Also see below for further discussion on heritability.) At the end of the day, we can’t do what the hereditarian needs to be done for their explanations to hold any water. And this is even before we look at the causal parity between genes and other developmental resources. Quite obviously, the hereditarian hypothesis is a gene-centered view, and it is of course a reductionist view. And since it is a reductionist, gene-centered view, it is then false.
Genetic, epigenetic, and environmental factors operate as a system to form the phenotype. Since this is true, therefore, both genetic and epigenetic determinism is false (also see Wagoner and Uller, 2015). It’s false because the genes one is born with, or develops with, don’t dictate or determine anything, especially not academic achievement as hereditarian gene-hunters would so gleefully claim. And one’s early experience need not dictate an expected outcome, since development is a continuous process. Although, that does not mean that environmental maladies that one experiences during childhood won’t have lasting effects into adulthood due to possibly affecting their psychology, anatomy or physiology.
The genome is responsive, that is, it is inert before it is activated by the physiological system. When we put DNA in a petri dish, it does nothing. It does nothing because DNA cannot be said to be a separate replicator from the cell (Noble, 2018). So genes don’t do anything independent of the context they’re in; they do what they do DUE TO the context they’re in. This is like Gottlieb’s (2007) probabilistic epigenesis, where the development of an organism is due to the coaction of irreducible bidirectional biological and environmental influences. David S. Moore, in The Developing Genome: An Introduction to Behavioral Epigenetics states this succinctly:
Genes—that is, DNA segments—are always influenced by their contexts, so there is never a perfect relationship between the presence of a gene and the ultimate appearance of a phenotype. Genes do not determine who we become, because nongenetic factors play critical roles in trait development; genes do what they do at least in part because of their contexts.
What he means by “critical roles in trait development” is clear if one understands Developmental Systems Theory (DST). DST was formulated by Susan Oyama (1985) in her landmark book “The Ontogeny of Information. In the book, she argues that nature and nurture are not antagonistic to each other, they are cooperative in shaping the development of organisms. Genes do not play a unique informational role in development. Thus, nature vs. nurture is a false dichotomy—it’s nature interacting with nurture, or GxE. This interactionism between nature and nurture—genes and environment—is a direct refutation of hereditarianism. What matters is context, and the context is never independent from what is going on during development. Genes aren’t the units of selection, the developmental system is, as Oyama explains in Evolution’s Eye:
If one must have a “unit” of evolution, it would be the interactive developmental system: life cycles of organisms in their niches. Evolution would then be change in the constitution and distribution of these systems (Oyama, 2000b)
Genes are important, of course, for the construction of the organism—but so are other resources. Without genes, there would be nothing for the cell to read to initiate transcription. However, without the cellular environment, we wouldn’t have DNA. Lewontin puts this wonderfully in the introduction to the 2000 edition of Ontogeny:
There are no “gene actions” outside environments, and no “environmental actions” can occur in the absence of genes. The very status of environment as a contributing cause to the nature of an organism depends on the existence of a developing organism. Without organisms there may be a physical world, but there are no environments. In like manner no organisms exist in the abstract without environments, although there may be naked DNA molecules lying in the dust. Organisms are the nexus of external circumstances and DNA molecules that make these physical circumstances into causes of development in the first place. They become causes only at their nexus, and they cannot exist as causes except in their simultaneous action. That is the essence of Oyama’s claim that information comes into existence only in the process of Ontogeny. (2000, 15-16)
Genes aren’t causes on their own, they are resources for development. And being resources for development, they have no privileged level of causation over other developmental resources, such as “methylation patterns, membrane templates, cytoplasmic gradients, centrioles, nests, parental care, habitats, and cultures” (Griffiths and Stotz, 2018). All of these things, and more of course, need to work in concert with each other.
Indeed, this is the causal parity argument—the claim that genes aren’t special developmental resources, that they are “on par” with other developmental resources (Griffiths and Gray, 1994; Griffiths and Stotz, 2018). Gene knockout studies show that the loss of a gene can be compensated by other genes—which is known as “genetic compensation.” None of the developmental resources play a more determinative role than other resources (Noble, 2012; Gamma and Liebrenz, 2019). This causal parity, then, has implications for thinking about trait ontogeny.
The causal parity of genes and other developmental factors also implies that genes cannot constitute sufficient causal routes to traits, let alone provide complete explanations of traits. Full-blown explanations will integrate various kinds of causes across different levels of organizational hierarchy, and across the divide between the internal and the external. The impossibly broad categories of nature vs. nurture that captured the imagination of our intellectual ancestors a century ago are no longer fit for the science of today. (Gamma and Liebrenz, 2019)
Oyama (2000a 40) articulates the casual parity thesis like this:
What I am arguing for here is a view of causality that gives formative weight to all operative influences, since none is alone sufficient for the phenomenon or for any of its properties, and since variation in any or many of them may or may not bring about variation in the result, depending on the configuration of the whole.
While Griffiths and Hochman (2015) formulate it like this:
The ‘parity thesis’ is the claim that if some role is alleged to be unique to nucleic acids and to justify relegating nongenetic factors to a secondary role in explaining development, it will turn out on closer examination that this role is not unique to nucleic acids, but can be played by other factors.
Genes are necessary pre-conditions for trait development, just as the other developmental resources are necessary pre-conditions for trait development. No humans without genes—this means that genes are necessary pre-conditions. If genes then humans—this implies that genes are sufficient for human life, but they are but one part of what makes humans human, when all of the interactants are present, then the phenotype can be constructed. So all of the developmental resources interacting are sufficient.
The nature vs. nurture dichotomy can be construed in such a way that they are competing explanations. However, we now know that the dichotomy is a false one and that the third way—interactionism—is how we should understand development. Despite hereditarian protestations, DST/interactionism refutes their claims. The “information” in the genes, then, cannot explain how organisms are made, since information is constructed dialectically between the resources and the system. There are a multiplicity of causal factors that are involved in this process, and genes can’t be privileged in this process. Thus the phrase “genetic causation” isn’t a coherent concept. Moreover, DNA sequences aren’t even coherent outside of cellular context (Noble, 2008).
Griffiths and Stotz (2018) put the parity argument like this:
In The Ontogeny of Information Oyama pioneered the parity argument, or the ‘parity thesis’, concerning genetic and environmental causes in development (see also Griffiths and Gray 1994; Griffiths and Gray 2005; Griffiths and Knight 1998; Stotz 2006; Stotz and Allen 2012). Oyama relentlessly tracked down failures of parity of reasoning in earlier theorists. The same feature is accorded great significance when a gene exhibits it, only to be ignored when a non-genetic factor exhibits it. When a feature thought to explain the unique importance of genetic causes in development is found to be more widely distributed across developmental causes, it is discarded and another feature is substituted. Griffiths and Gray (1994) argued in this spirit against the idea that genes are the sole or even the main source of information in development. Other ideas associated with ‘parity’ are that the study of development does not turn on a single distinction between two classes of developmental resources, and that the distinctions useful for understanding development do not all map neatly onto the distinction between genetic and non-genetic.
Shea (2011) tries to argue that genes do have a special role, and that is to transport information. Genes are, of course, inherited, but so is every other part of the system (resources). Claiming that there is information “in the genes” is tantamount to saying that there is a special role for DNA in development. But, as I hope will be clear, this claim fails due to the nature of DNA and its role in development.
This line of argument leads to one clear conclusion—genes are followers, they are not leaders; most evolution begins with environmentally-mediated phenotypic change, and then genetic changes occur (West-Eberhard, 2003). Ho and Saunders (1979) state that variation in organisms is constructed during development due to an interaction between genetic and non-genetic factors. That is, they follow what is needed to do by the developmental system, they aren’t leading development, they are but one party in the whole symphony of development. Development can be said to be irreducible, so we cannot reduce development to genes or anything else, as all interactants need to be present for development to be carried out. Since genes are activated by other factors, it is incoherent to talk of “genetic causes.” Genes affect the phenotype only when they are expressed, and other resources, too, affect the phenotype this is, ultimately, an argument genes against as blueprints, codes, recipes, or any other kind of flowery language one can used to impute what amounts to intention to inert DNA.
Even though epigenetics invalidates all genetic reductionism (Lerner and Overton, 2017), genetic reductionist ideas still persist. They give three reasons why genetic reductionist ideas still persist despite the conceptual, methodological, and empirical refutations. (1) Use of terms like “mechanism”, “trait”, and “interaction”; (2) constantly shifting to other genes once their purported “genes for” traits didn’t workout; and (3) they “buried opponents under repetitive results” (Panofsky, quoted in Lerner and Overton, 2017). The fact of the matter is, there are so many lines of evidence and argument that refute hereditarian claims that it is clear the only reason why one would still be a hereditarian in this day and age is that they’re ignorant—that is racist.
Genes, that is, are servants, not masters, of the development of form and individual differences. Genes do serve as templates for proteins: but not under their own direction. And, as entirely passive strings of chemicals, it is logically impossible for them to initiate and steer development in any sense. (Richardson, 2016)
DST and hereditarian behavioral genetics
I would say that DST challenges three claims from hereditarian behavioral genetics (HBG hereafter):
(1) The claim that we can neatly apportion genes and environment into different causes for the ontogeny of traits;
(2) Genes are the only thing that are inherited and that genes are the unit of selection and a unique—that is, special and privileged cause over and above other resources;
(3) That genes vs environment, blank skate vs human nature, are a valid dichotomy.
(1) HBG needs to rely on the attempting to portion out causes of traits into gene and environmental causes. The heritability statistic presumes additivity, thy is, it assumes no interaction. This is patently false. Charney (2016) gives the example of schizophrenia—it is claimed that 50 percent of the heritability of schizophrenia is accounted for by 8000 genes, which means that each SNP accounts for 1/8000 of the half of the heritability. This claim is clearly false, as genetics aren’t additive, and the additivity assumption precludes the interaction of genes with genes, and environment, which create new interactive environments. Biological systems are not additive, they’re interactive. Heritability estimates, therefore, are attempts at dichotomizing what is not dichitomizable (Rose, 2005).
An approach that partitions variance into independent main effects will never resolve the debate because, by definition, it has no choice but to perpetuate it. (Goldhaber, 2012)
This approach, of course, is the approach that attempts to partition variance into G and E components. The assumption is that G and E are additive. But as DST theorists have argued for almost 40 years, they are not additive, they are interactive and so not additive, therefore heritability estimates fail on conceptual grounds (as well as many others). Heritability estimates have been—and continue to today—been at the heart of the continuance of the nature vs nurture distinction, the battle, if you will. But if we accept Oyama’s causal parity argument—and due to the reality of how genes work in the system, I see no reason why we shouldn’t—then we should reject hereditarianism. Hereditarians have no choice but to continue the false dichotomy of nature vs nurture. Their “field” depends on it. But despite the fact that the main tool for the behavioral geneticist lies on false pretenses (twin and adoption studies), they still try to show that heritability estimates are valid in explaining trait variation (Segalowitz, 1999; Taylor, 2006, 2010).
(2) More than genes are inherited. Jablonka and Lamb (2005) argue that there are four dimensions—interactants—to evolution: genetic, epigenetic, behavioral, and symbolic. They show the context-dependency of the genome, meaning that genotype does not determine phenotype. What does determine the phenotype, as can be seen from the discussion here, is the interacting of developmental resources in development. Clearly, there are many other inheritance systems other than genes. There is also the fact that the gene as popularly conceived does not exist—so it should be the end of the gene as we know it.
(3) Lastly, DST throws out the false dichotomy of genes and environment, nature and nurture. DST—in all of its forms—rejects the outright false dichotomy of nature vs nurture. They are not in a battle with each other, attempting to decide who is to be the determining factor in trait ontogeny. They interact, and this interaction is irreducible. So we can’t reduce development to genes or environment (Moore, 2016) Development isn’t predetermined, it’s probabilistic. The stability of phenotypic form isn’t found in the genes (Moore and Lickliter, 2023)
Conclusion
Genes are outcomes, not causes, of evolution and they are not causes of trait ontogeny on their own. The reality is that strong causal parity is true, so genes cannot be regarded as a special developmental resource from other resources—that is, genes are not privileged resources. Since they are not privileged resources, we need to, then, dispense with any and all concepts of development that champion genes as being the leader of the developmental process. The system is, not genes, with genes being but one of many of the interactants that shape phenotypic development.
By relying on the false narrative that genes are causes and that they cause not only our traits but our psychological traits and what we deem “good” and “bad”, we would then be trading social justice for hereditarianism (genetic reductionism).
These recommended uses of bad science reinforce fears of institutionalized racism in America and further the societal marginalization of minority groups; these implications of their recommendations are never publicly considered by those who promulgate these flawed extensions of counterfactual genetic reductionism. (Lerner, 2021)
Such [disastrous societal] applications can only rob people of life chances and destroy social justice. Because developmental science has the knowledge base to change the life course trajectories of people who are often the targets of genetic reductionist ideas, all that remains to eradicate genetic reductionism from scientific discussion is to have sufficient numbers of developmental scientists willing to proclaim loudly and convincingly that the naked truth is that the “emperor” (of genetic reductionism) has no clothes. (Lerner, 2021: 338)
Clearly, hereditarians need the nature vs nurture debate to continue so they can push their misunderstandings about genes ans psychology. However, given our richer understanding of genes and how they work, we now know that hereditarianism is untenable, and DST conceptions of the gene and development as a whole have led us to that conclusion. Lerner (2017) stated that as soon as the failure of one version of genetic reductionism is observed, another one pious up—making it like a game of whack-a-mole.
The cure to hereditarian genetic reductionism is a relational developmental systems (RDS) model. This model has its origins with Uri Bronfenbrenner’s ecological systems theory (Bronfenbrenner and Ceci, 1994; Ceci, 1996; Patel, 2011; Rosa and Tudge, 2013. Development is about the interacting and relation between the individual and environment, and this is where RDS theory comes in. Biology, physiology, culture, and history are studied to explain human development (Lerner, 2021). Hereditarian ideas cannot give us anything like what models derived from developmental systems ideas can. An organism-environment view can lead to a more fruitful, and the organism and environment are inseparable (Jarvilehto, 1998; Griffiths and Gray, 2002). And it is for these reasons, including many, many more, that hereditarian genetic reductionist ideas should become mere sand in the wind.
Having said all that, here’s the argument:
P1: If hereditarianism is true, then strong causal parity is false.
P2: Strong causal parity is true.
C: Therefore hereditarianism must be false.
Evolutionary Psychology Does Not Explain Differences Between Rightists and Leftists
2000 words
Unless you’ve been living under a rock since the new year, you have heard of the “coup attempt” at the Capitol building on Wednesday, January 6th. Upset at the fact that the election was “stolen” from Trump, his supporters showed up at the building and rushed it, causing mass chaos. But, why did they do this? Why the violence when they did not get their way in a fair election? Well, Michael Ryan, author of The Genetics of Political Behavior: How Evolutionary Psychology Explains Ideology (2020) has the answer—what he terms “rightists” and “leftists” evolved at two different times in our evolutionary history which, then, explains the trait differences between the two political parties. This article will review part of the book—the evolutionary sections (chapters 1-3).
EP and ideology
Explaining why individuals who call themselves “rightists and leftists” behave and act differently than the other is Ryan’s goal. He argues, at length, that the two parties have two different personality profiles. This, he claims, is due to the fact that the ancestors of rightists and leftists evolved at two different times in human history. He calls this “Trump Island” and “Obama Island”—apt names, especially due to what occurred last week. Ryan claims that what makes Trump different from, say, Obama, is that his ancestors evolved at a different place in a different time compared to Obama’s ancestors. He further claims using the Stanford Prison Experiment that “we may not all be capable of becoming Nazis, after all. Just some, and conservatives especially so” (pg 12).
In the first chapter he begins with the usual adaptationism that Evolutionary Psychologists use. Reading between the lines in his implicit claims, he is arguing that “rightists and leftists” are natural kinds—that is, they are *two different kinds of people.* He explains some personality differences between rightists and leftists and then says that such trait differences are “rooted in biology and governed by genes” (pg 17). Ryan then makes a strong adaptationist claim—that traits are due to adaptation to the environment (pg 17). What makes you and I different from Trump, he claims, is that our ancestors and his ancestors evolved in different places at different times where different traits would be imperative to survival. So, over time, different traits got selected-for in these two populations leading to the trait differences we see today. So each environment led to the fixation of different adaptive traits which explains the differences we see today between the two parties, he claims.
Ryan then shifts from the evolution of personality differences to… The evolution of the beaks of Darwin’s finches and Tibetan adaptation to high-altitude living (pg 18), as if the evolution of physical traits is anything like the evolution of psychological traits. His folly is assuming that these physical traits can then be likened to personality/mental traits. The ancestors of rightists and leftists, like Darwin’s finches Ryan claims, evolved on different islands in different moments of evolutionary time. They evolved different brains and different adaptive behaviors on the basis of the evolution of those different brains. Trump’s ancestors were authoritarian, and this island occurred early in human history “which accounts for why Trump’s behavior seems so archaic at times” (pg 18).
The different traits that leftists show in comparison to rightists is due to the fact that their island came at a different point in evolutionary time—it was not recent in comparison to the so-called archaic dominance behavior portrayed by Trump and other rightists. Ryan says that Obama Island was more crowded than Trump Island where, instead of scowling, they smiled which “forges links with others and fosters reciprocity” (pg 19). So due to environmental adversity, they had a more densely populated “island”—in this novel situation, compared to the more “archaic” earlier time—the small bands needed to cooperate, rather than fight with each other, to survive. So this, according to Ryan, explains why studies show more smiling behavior in leftists compared to rightists.
Some of our ancestors evolved traits such as cooperativeness the aided the survival of all even though not everyone acquired the trait … Eventually a new genotype or subpopulation emerged. Leftist traits became a permanent feature of our genome—in some at least. (pg 19-20)
So the argument goes: Differences between rightists and leftists show us that the two did not evolve at the same points in time since they show different traits today. Different traits were adaptive at different points in time, some more archaic, some more modern. Since Trump Island came first in our evolutionary history, those whose ancestors evolved there show more archaic behavior. Since Obama Island came first, they show newer, more modern behaviors. Due to environmental uncertainty, those on Obama Island had to cooperate with each other. The trait differences between these two subpopulations were selected for in their environment that they evolved in, which is why they are different today. Now today, this led to the “arguing over the future direction of our species. This is the origin of human politics” (pg 20).
Models of evolution
Ryan then discusses four models of evolution: (1) the standard model, where “natural selection” is the main driver of evolutionary change; (2) epigenetic models like Jablonka’s and Lamb’s (2005) in Evolution in Four Dimensions; (3) where behavioral changes change genes; and (4) where organisms have phenotypic plasticity and is a way for the organism to respond to sudden environmental changes. “Leftists and rightists“, writes Ryan, “are distinguished by their own versions of phenotypic plasticity. They change behavior more readily than rightists in response to changing environmental signals” (pg 29-30).
In perhaps the most outlandish part of the book, Ryan articulates one of my now-favorite just-so stories. The passage is worth quoting in-full:
Our direct ancestor Homo erectus endured for two million years before going extinct 400,000 years ago when earth temperatures dropped far below the norm. Descendants of erectus survived till as recently as 14,000 years ago in Asia. The round head and shovel-shaped teeth of some Asians, including Vladimir Putin, are an erectile legacy. Archeologists believe erectus was a mix of Ted Bundy and Adolf Hitler. Surviving skulls point to a life of constant violence and routine killing. Erectile skulls are thick like a turtle’s, and the brow’s are ridged for protection from potentially fatal blows. Erectus’ life was precarious and violent. To survive, it had to evolve traits such as vigilant fearfulness, prejudice against outsiders, bonding with kin allies, callousness toward victims, and a penchant for inflexible habits of life that were known to guarantee safety. It had to be conservative. 34 Archeologists suggest that some of our most characteristic conservative emotions such as nationalism and xenophobia were forged at the time of Homo erectus. 35 (pg 33-34)
It is clear that Ryan is arguing that rightists have more erectus-like traits whereas leftists have more modern, Sapiens traits. “The contemporary coexistence of a population with more “modern” traits and a population with more “archaic” traits came into being” (pg 37). He is implicitly assuming that the two “populations” he discusses are natural kinds and with his “modern” “archaic” distinction (see Crisp and Cook 2005 who argue against a form of this distinction) he is also implying that there is a sort of “progress” to evolution.
Twin studies, it is claimed, show “one’s genetically informed psychological disposition” (Hatemi et al, 2014); they “suggest that leftists and rightists are born not made” while a so-called “consensus has emerged amongst scientists: political behavior is genetically controlled and heritable” (pg 43). But, Beckway and Morris (2008), Charney (2008), and Joseph (2009; 2013) argue that twin studies can do no such thing due to the violation of the equal environments assumption (Joseph, 2014; Joseph et al, 2015). Thus, Ryan’s claims of the “genetic origins” of political behavior rest on studies that cannot prove or disprove “genetic causation” (Shulitziner, 2017)—but since the EEA is false we must discount “genetic causation” for psychological traits, not least because it is impossible for genes to cause/influence psychological traits (see argument (iii)).
The arguments he provides are a form of inference to best explanation (IBE) (Smith, 2016). However, this is how just-so stories are created: the conclusion is already in mind, and then the story is crafted using “natural selection” to explain how a trait came to fixation and why it currently exists today. The whole book is full of such adaptive stories. Claiming that we have the current traits we do in the distributions they are in in the “populations” because they were, at a certain point in our evolutionary history, adaptive which then led to the individuals with those traits passing on more of their genes, eventually leading to trait fixation. (See Fodor and Piattelli-Palmarini, 2010).
Ryan makes such outlandish claims such as “Rightists are more likely than leftists to keep their desks neat. If in the distant past you knew exactly where the weapons were, you could find them quickly and react to danger more effectively. 26” (pg 45). He talks about how “time-consuming and effort-demanding accuracy of perception [were] more characteristic of leftist cognition … leftist cognition is more reflective” while “rightist cognition is intuitive rather than reflective” (pg 47). Rightists being more likely to endorse the status quo, he claims, is “an adaptive trait when scarce resources made energy management essential to getting by” (pg 48) Rightist language, he argues, uses more nouns since they are “more concrete, an anxious personalities prefer concrete to abstract language because it favors categorial rigidity and guarantees greater certainty” while leftists “use words that suggest anxiety, anger, threats, certainty, resistance to change, power, security, and conformity” (pg 49). There is “a connection between archaic physiology and rightist moral ideology” (pg 52). Certain traits that leftists have were “adaptive traits [that] were suited to later stage human evolution” (pg 53). Ryan just cites studies that show differences between rightists and leftists and then uses some great leaps and mental gymnastics to try to mold the findings as being due to evolution in the two different time periods he describes in chapter 1 (Trump and Obama Island).
Conclusion
I have not read one page in this book that does not have some kind of adaptive just-so story attempting to explain certain traits/behaviors between rightists and leftists in evolutionary terms. Ryan uses the same kind of “reasoning” that Evolutionary Psychologists use—have your conclusion in mind first and then craft an adaptive story to explain why the traits you see today are there. Ryan outright says that “[t]raits are the result of adaptation to the environment” (pg 17), which is a rare—strong adaptationist—claim to make.
His book ticks off all of the usual EP things: strong adaptationism, just-so storytelling, the claim that traits were selected-for due to their contribution in certain environments at different points in time. The strong adaptationist claims, for example, are where he says that erectus’ large brow “are rigid for protection from potentially fatal blows” (pg 34). Such strong adaptationist claims imply that Ryan believes that all traits are the result of adaptation and that they, as a result, are still here today because they all serve a function in our evolutionary past. His arguments are, for the most part, all evolutionary and follow the same kinds of patterns that the usual EP arguments do (see Smith, 2016 for an explication of just-so stories and what constitutes them). Due to the problems with evolutionary psychology, his adaptive claims should be ignored.
The arguments that Ryan provides are not scientific and, although they give off a veneer of being scientific by invoking “natural selection” and adaptationism, they are anything but. It is just a long-winded explanation for how and why rightists and leftists—liberals and conservatives—are different and why they cannot change, since these differences are “encoded” into our genome. The implicit claim of the book, then, that rightists and leftists are two different—natural—kinds, lies on the false bed of EP and, therefore, the arguments provided in the book fail to sway anyone that does not believe such fantastic storytelling masquerading as science. While he does discuss other evolutionary theories, such as epigenetic ones from Jablonka and Lamb (2005), the book is largely strongly adaptationist using “natural selection” to explain why we still have the traits we do in different “populations” today.
Gould, Bradbury, and Evolutionary Contingency
1800 words
I have been an avid reader and interested in astronomy/space ever since I could remember. I remember really loving Stephen Hawking and his documentaries on black holes. I would read anything I could find on constellations and stars. From there I went on to reading sci-fi. I then recall seeing The Martian Chronicles by Ray Bradbury and from then on I had become interested in sci-fi writing. But, as I grew older, I drifted away from sci-fi and now only read non-fiction. Then when I got older I got into ‘HBD’ (chronicled here) and along with it evolution—but, unlike other ‘HBDers’ I became enamored with the work of Gould, while some of my favorite books come from him. Gould wrote a lot about evolutionary contingency—the degree to which an outcome could be different. Evolutionary contingency is a big topic in philosophy of biology, and Bradbury has a great short story on this type of contingency.
Ray Bradbury is an interesting author—one who has many short stories and regular books. One of my favorite stories from Bradbury is one called A Sound of Thunder which chronicled a time machine company who let people go back in time to hunt any animal they’d like—if you want to take down the ancestor of a whale before it became aquatic, just name the place and they will send you there. They were told to only stay on the path laid out by the time machine company—animals they could shoot were marked with red paint, presumably those animals would have died anyway so killing them would not change any outcomes. The text from Bradbury is worth quoting in full, as it wonderfully captures the thought of evolutionary contingency:
He indicated a metal path that struck off into green wilderness, over streaming swamp, among giant ferns and palms. “And that,” he said, “is the Path, laid by Time Safari for your use, It floats six inches above the earth. Doesn’t touch so much as one grass blade, flower, or tree. It’s an anti-gravity metal. Its purpose is to keep you from touching this world of the past in any way. Stay on the Path. Don’t go off it. I repeat. Don’t go off. For any reason! If you fall off, there’s a penalty. And don’t shoot any animal we don’t okay.”
“Why?” asked Eckels.
They sat in the ancient wilderness. Far birds’ cries blew on a wind, and the smell of tar and an old salt sea, moist grasses, and flowers the color of blood.
“We don’t want to change the Future. We don’t belong here in the Past. The government doesn’t like us here. We have to pay big graft to keep our franchise. A Time Machine is finicky business. Not knowing it, we might kill an important animal, a small bird, a roach, a flower even, thus destroying an important link in a growing species.”
“That’s not clear,” said Eckels.
“All right,” Travis continued, “say we accidentally kill one mouse here. That means all the future families of this one particular mouse are destroyed, right?”
“Right”
“And all the families of the families of the families of that one mouse! With a stamp of your foot, you annihilate first one, then a dozen, then a thousand, a million, a billion possible mice!”
“So they’re dead,” said Eckels. “So what?”
“So what?” Travis snorted quietly. “Well, what about the foxes that’ll need those mice to survive? For want of ten mice, a fox dies. For want of ten foxes a lion starves. For want of a lion, all manner of insects, vultures, infinite billions of life forms are thrown into chaos and destruction. Eventually it all boils down to this: fifty-nine million years later, a caveman, one of a dozen on the entire world, goes hunting wild boar or saber-toothed tiger for food. But you, friend, have stepped on all the tigers in that region. By stepping on one single mouse. So the caveman starves. And the caveman, please note, is not just any expendable man, no! He is an entire future nation. From his loins would have sprung ten sons. From their loins one hundred sons, and thus onward to a civilization. Destroy this one man, and you destroy a race, a people, an entire history of life. It is comparable to slaying some of Adam’s grandchildren. The stomp of your foot, on one mouse, could start an earthquake, the effects of which could shake our earth and destinies down through Time, to their very foundations. With the death of that one caveman, a billion others yet unborn are throttled in the womb. Perhaps Rome never rises on its seven hills. Perhaps Europe is forever a dark forest, and only Asia waxes healthy and teeming. Step on a mouse and you crush the Pyramids. Step on a mouse and you leave your print, like a Grand Canyon, across Eternity. Queen Elizabeth might never be born, Washington might not cross the Delaware, there might never be a United States at all. So be careful. Stay on the Path. Never step off!”
“I see,” said Eckels. “Then it wouldn’t pay for us even to touch the grass?”
“Correct. Crushing certain plants could add up infinitesimally. A little error here would multiply in sixty million years, all out of proportion. Of course maybe our theory is wrong. Maybe Time can’t be changed by us. Or maybe it can be changed only in little subtle ways. A dead mouse here makes an insect imbalance there, a population disproportion later, a bad harvest further on, a depression, mass starvation, and finally, a change in social temperament in far-flung countries. Something much more subtle, like that. Perhaps only a soft breath, a whisper, a hair, pollen on the air, such a slight, slight change that unless you looked close you wouldn’t see it. Who knows? Who really can say he knows? We don’t know. We’re guessing. But until we do know for certain whether our messing around in Time can make a big roar or a little rustle in history, we’re being careful. This Machine, this Path, your clothing and bodies, were sterilized, as you know, before the journey. We wear these oxygen helmets so we can’t introduce our bacteria into an ancient atmosphere.”
This passage from Bradbury wonderfully illustrates evolutionary—historical—contingency. Things could have been different—this is the basis of the contingency argument. The universe does not repeat itself—if we were to replay the tape of life we would get a completely different outcome—Lane (2015) states maybe octopi would rule the earth? We could replay the tape of life, have it go exactly as it did to lead up to today, change ONE SEEMINGLY MINISCULE THING (say, stepping on a bug that did not die) which would then cascade throughout history leading to a change in the future. Evolution is full of passive trends, with no indication that—for example with body plans—that there is a drive to become more complex—it is passive (Gould, 1996: 207):
All the tests provide evidence for a passive trend and no drive to complexity. McShea found twenty-four cases of significant increases or decreases in comparing the range of modern descendants with an ancestor (out of a potential sample of ninety comparisons, or five groups of mammals, each with six variables measured in each of three ways; for the other comparison, average descendants did not differ significantly from ancestors). Interestingly, thirteen of these significant changes led to decreases in complexity, while only nine showed an increase. (The difference between thirteen and nine is not statistically significant, but I am wryly amused, given all traditional expectation in the other direction, that more comparisons show increasing rather than decreasing complexity.
Gould first put forth his contingency argument in Wonderful Life—any replay would be different then the next. Gould critiqued the increasing complexity claim, arguing that diversification is always accompanied by decimation—once a mass extinction (say, an asteroid impact) occurs, there will then be subsequent diversification after the decimation.
We have no idea why certain organisms persisted over others after periods of decimation—and ‘adaptation’ to environments cannot be the whole story. Out of all of Gould’s writing that I have read in my life, this passage is one of my favorites as it perfectly captures the problem at hand:
Wind the tape of life back to Burgess times, and let it play again. If Pikaia does not survive in the replay, we are wiped out of future history—all of us, from shark to robin to orangutan. And I don’t think that any handicapper, given Burgess evidence as known today, would have granted very favorable odds for the persistence of Pikaia.
And so, if you wish to ask the question of the ages—why do humans exist?—a major part of the answer, touching those aspects of the issue that science can treat at all, must be: because Pikaia survived the Burgess decimation. This response does not cite a single law of nature; it embodies no statement about predictable evolutionary pathways, no calculation of probabilities based on general rules of anatomy or ecology. The survival of Pikaia was a contingency of “just history.” I do not think that any “higher” answer can be given, and I cannot imagine that any resolution could be more fascinating. We are the offspring of history, and must establish our own paths in this most diverse and interesting of conceivable universes—one indifferent to our suffering, and therefore offering us maximal freedom to thrive, or to fail, in our own chosen way. (Gould, 1989: 323)
Contingency is about counterfactuals—what could have happened, what could have been, or what would have been had some certain condition changed, with everything before that occurring as usual. Bradbury’s A Sound of Thunder wonderfully illustrates the contingency of the evolutionary process—change one seemingly small, minuscule thing in the past and this could snowball and cascade to huge changes in the future—we may never have existed or we would have existed but have been radically different. If we could go back in time and, say, crush a butterfly and see the changes it would have made, we could say that the event that caused the future to change was the crushing of that butterfly—this could have, eventually, led to the non-existence of a certain group of people or a certain group of animals which would have radically changed the outcome of the world—both the natural and human world.
So, if we could replay life’s tape from the very beginning, I do believe that life as we know it would be different—for if we played it from the beginning, we could have a scenario as described by Bradbury—everything could go exactly the same with one small seemingly minuscule change snowballing into a world that we would barely recognize.
Just-so Stories: The Brain Size Increase
1600 words
The increase in brain size in our species over the last 3 million years has been the subject of numerous articles and books. Over that time period, brain size increased from our ancestor Lucy, all the way to today. Many stories are proposed to explain how and why it exactly happened. The explanation is the same ol’ one: Those with bigger heads, and therefore bigger brains had more children and passed on their “brain genes” to the next generation until all that was left was bigger-brained individuals of that species. But there is a problem here, just like with all just-so stories. How do we know that selection ‘acted’ on brain size and thusly “selected-for” the ‘smarter’ individual?
Christopher Badcock, an evolutionary psychologist, as an intro to EP published in 2001, where he has a very balanced take on EP—noting its pitfalls and where, in his opinion, EP is useful. (Most may know my views on this already, see here.) In any case, Badcock cites R.D. Martin (1996: 155) who writes:
… when the effects of confounding variables such as body size and socio-economic status are excluded, no correlation is found between IQ and brain size among modern humans.
Badcock (2001: 48) also quotes George Williams—author of Adaptation and Natural Selection (1966; the precursor to Dawkins’ The Selfish Gene) where he writes:
Despite the arguments that have been advanced, I cannot readily accept the idea that advanced mental capabilities have ever been directly favored by selection. There is no reason for believing that a genius has ever been likely to leave more children than a man of somewhat below average intelligence. It has been suggested that a tribe that produces an occasional genius for its leadership is more likely to prevail in competition with tribes that lack this intellectual resource. This may well be true in the sense that a group with highly intelligent leaders is likely to gain political domination over less gifted groups, but political domination need not result in genetic domination, as indicated by the failure of many a ruling class to maintain its members.
In Adaptation and Natural Selection, Williams was much more cautious than adaptationists today, stating that adaptationism should be used only in very special cases. Too bad that adaptationists today did not get the memo. But what gives? Doesn’t it make sense that the “more intelligent” human 2 mya would be more successful when it comes to fitness than the “less intelligent” (whatever these words mean in this context) individual? Would a pre-historic Bill Gates have the most children due to his “high IQ” as PumpkinPerson has claimed in the past? I doubt it.
In any case, the increase in brain size—and therefore increase in intellectual ability in humans—has been the last stand for evolutionary progressionists. “Look at the increase in brain size”, the progressionist says “over the past 3mya. Doesn’t it look like there is a trend toward bigger, higher-quality brains in humans as our skills increased?” While it may look like that on its face, in fact, the real story is much more complicated.
Deacon (1990a) notes many fallacies that those who invoke the brain size increase across evolutionary history make, including: the evolutionary progression fallacy; the bigger-is-smarter fallacy; and the numerology fallacy. The evolutionary progression fallacy is simple enough. Deacon (1990a: 194) writes:
In theories of brain evolution, the concept of evolutionary progress finds implicit expression in the analysis of brain-size differences and presumed grade shifts in allometric brain/body size trends, in theories of comparative intelligence, in claims about the relative proportions of presumed advanced vs. primitive brain areas, in estimates of neural complexity, including the multiplication and differentiation of brain areas, and in the assessment of other species with respect to humans, as the presumed most advanced exemplar. Most of these accounts in some way or other are tied to problems of interpreting the correlates of brain size. The task that follows is to dispose of fallacious progressivist notions hidden in these analyses without ignoring the questions otherwise begged by the many enigmatic correlations of brain size in vertebrate evolution.
Of course, when it comes to the bigger-is-smarter fallacy, it’s quite obviously not true that bigger IS always better when it comes to brain size, as elephants and whales have larger brains than humans (also see Skoyles, 1999). But what they do not have more of than humans is cortical neurons (see Herculano-Houzel, 2009). Decon (1990a: 201) describes the numerology fallacy:
Numerology fallacies are apparent correlations that turn out to be artifacts of numerical oversimplification. Numerology fallacies in science, like their mystical counterparts, are likely to be committed when meaning is ascribed to some statistic merely by virtue of its numeric similarity to some other statistic, without supportive evidence from the empirical system that is being described.
While Deacon (1990a: 232) concludes that:
The idea, that there have been progressive trends of brain evolution, that include changes in the relative proportions of different structures (i.e., enlarging more “advanced” areas with respect to more primitive areas) and increased differentiation, interconnection, and overall complexity of neural circuits, is largely an artifact of misunderstanding the complex internal correlates of brain size. … Numerous statistical problems, arising from the difficulty of analyzing a system with so many interdependent scaling relationships, have served to reinforce these misconceptions, and have fostered the tacit assumption that intelligence, brain complexity, and brain size bear a simple relationship to one another.
Deacon (1990b: 255) notes how brains weren’t directly selected for, but bigger bodies (bigger bodies means bigger brains), and this does not lean near the natural selection fallacy theory for trait selection since this view is of the organism, not its trait:
I will argue that it is this remarkable parallelism, and not some progressive selection for increasing intelligence, that is responsible for many pseudoprogressive trends in mammalian brain evolution. Larger whole animals were being selected—not just larger brains—but along with the correlated brain enlargement in each lineage a multitude of parallel secondary internal adaptations followed.
Deacon (1990b: 697-698) notes that the large brain-to-body size ratio in humans compared to other primates is an illusion “a surface manifestation of a complex allometric reorganization within the brain” and that the brain itself is unlikely to be the object of selection. The correlated reorganization of the human brain, to Deacon, is what makes humans unique; not our “oversized” brains for our body. While Deacon (1990c) states that “To a great extent the apparent “progress” of mammalian brain evolution vanishes when the effects of brain size and functional specialization are taken into account.” (See also Deacon, 1997: chapter 5.)
So is there really progress in brain evolution, which would, in effect, lend credence to the idea that evolution is progressive? No, there is no progress in brain evolution; so-called size increases throughout human history are an artifact; when we take brain size and functional specialization into account (functional specialization is the claim that different areas in the brain are specialized to carry out different functions; see Mahon and Cantlon, 2014). Our brains only seem like they’ve increased; when we get down to the functional details, we can see that it’s just an artifact.
Skoyles and Sagan (2002: 240) note that erectus, for example, could have survived with much smaller brains and that the brain of erectus did not arise for the need for survival:
So how well equipped was Homo erectus? To throw some figures at you (calculations shown in the notes), easily well enough. Of Nariokotome boy’s 673 cc of cortex, 164 cc would have been prefrontal cortex, roughly the same as half-brained people. Nariokotome boy did not need the mental competence required by cotemporary hunter-gatherers. … Compared to that of our distant ancestors, Upper Paleolithic technology is high tech. And the organizational skills used in hunts greatly improved 400,000 years ago to 20,000 years ago. These skills, in terms of our species, are recent, occurring by some estimates in less than the last 1 percent of our 2.5 million year existence as people. Before then, hunting skills would have required less brain power, as they were less mentally demanding. If you do not make detailed forward plans, then you do not need as much mental planning abilities as those who do. This suggests that the brains of Homo erectus did not arise for reasons of survival. For what they did, they could have gotten away with much smaller, Daniel Lyon-sized brains.
In any case—irrespective of the problems that Deacon shows for arguments for increasing brain size—how would we be able to use the theory of natural selection to show what was selected-for, brain size or another correlated trait? The progressionist may say that it doesn’t matter which is selected-for, the brain size is still increasing even if the correlated trait—the free-rider—is being selected-for.
But, too bad for the progressionist: If the correlated non-fitness-enhancing trait is being selected-for and not brain size directly, then the progressionist cannot logically state that brain size—and along with it intelligence (as the implication always is)—is being directly selected-for. Deacon throws a wrench into such theories of evolutionary progress in regard to human brain size. Though, looking at erectus, it’s not clear that he really “needed” such a big brain for survival—it seems like he could have gotten away with a much smaller brain. And there is no reason, as George Williams notes, to attempt to argue that “high intelligence” was selected-for in our evolutionary history.
And so, Gould’s Full House argument still stands—there is no progress in evolution; bacteria occupy life’s mode; humans are insignificant to the number of bacteria on the planet, “big brains”, or not.
Rampant Adaptationism
1500 words
Adaptationism is the main school of evolutionary change, through “natural selection” (NS). That is the only way for adaptations to appear, says the adaptationist: traits that were conducive to reproductive success in past environments were selected-for their contribution to fitness and therefore became fixated in the organism in question. That’s adaptationism in a nutshell. It’s also vacuous and tells us nothing interesting. In any case, the school of thought called adaptationism has been the subject of much criticism, most importantly, Gould and Lewontin (1972), Fodor (2008) and Fodor and Piatteli-Palmarini (2010). So, I would say that adaptationism becomes “rampant” when clearly cultural changes are conflated as having an evolutionary history and are still around today due to being adaptations.
Take Bret Weinstein’s recent conversation with Richard Dawkins:
Weinstein: “Understood through the perspective of German genes, vile as these behaviors were, they were completely comprehensible at the level of fitness. It was abhorrent and unacceptable—but understandable—that Germany should have viewed its Jewish population as a source of resources if you viewed Jews as non-people. And the belief structures that cause people to step onto the battlefields and fight were clearly comprehensible as adaptations of the lineages in question.”
Dawkins: “I think nationalism may be an even greater evil than religion. And I’m not sure that it’s actually helpful to speak of it in Darwinian terms.”
I find it funny that Weinstein is more of a Dawkins-ist than Dawkins himself is (in regard to his “selfish gene theory”, see Noble, 2011). In any case, what a ridiculous claim. “Guys, the Nazis were bad because of their genes and their genes made them view Jews as non-people and resources. Their behaviors were completely understandable at the level of fitness. But, Nazis bad!”
What a ridiculous claim. I like how Dawkins quickly shot the bullshit down. This is just-so storytelling on steroids. I wonder what “belief structures that cause people to step onto battlefields” are “adaptations of the lineages in question”? Do German belief structure adaptations different from any other groups? Can one prove that there are “belief structures” that are “adaptations to the lineages in question”? Or is Weinstein just telling just-so stories—stories with little evidence and that “fit” and “make sense” with the data we have (despicable Nazi behavior towards Jews after WWI and before and during WWII).
There is a larger problem with adaptationism, though: adaptationist confuse adaptiveness with adaptation (a trait can be adaptive without being an adaptation), they overlook nonadaptationist explanations, and adaptationist hypotheses are hard to falsify since a new story can be erected to explain the feature in question if one story gets disproved. That’s the dodginess of adaptationism.
An adaptationist may look at an organism, look at its traits, then construct a story as to why they have the traits they do. They will attempt to think of its evolutionary history by thinking of the environment it is currently in and what the traits in question that it has are useful for now. But there is a danger here. We can create many stories for just one so-called adaptation. How do we distinguish between which stories explain the fixation of the trait and which do not? We can’t: there is no way for us to know which of the causal stories explains the fixation of the trait.
Gould and Lewontin (1972) fault:
the adaptationist programme for its failure to distinguish current utility from reasons for origin (male tyrannosaurs may have used their diminutive front legs to titillate female partners, but this will not explain why they got so small); for its unwillingness to consider alternatives to adaptive stories; for its reliance upon plausibility alone as a criterion for accepting speculative tales; and for its failure to consider adequately such competing themes as random fixation of alleles, production of nonadaptive structures by developmental correlation with selected features (allometry, pleiotropy, material compensation, mechanically forced correlation), the separability of adaptation and selection, multiple adaptive peaks, and current utility as an epiphenomenon of nonadaptive structures.
[…]
One must not confuse the fact that a structure is used in some way (consider again the spandrels, ceiling spaces, and Aztec bodies) with the primary evolutionary reason for its existence and conformation.
Of course, though, adaptationists (e.g., evolutionary psychologists) do confuse structure for function. This is fallacious reasoning. That a trait is useful in a current environment is in no way evidence that it is an adaptation nor is it evidence that that’s why the trait evolved (e.g., a trait being useful and adaptive in a current environment).
But there is a problem with looking to the ecology of the organism in question and attempting to construct historical narratives about the evolution of the so-called adaptation. As Fodor and Piatteli-Palmarini (2010) note, “if evolutionary problems are individuated post hoc, it’s hardly surprising that phenotypes are so good at solving them.” So of course if an organism fails to secure a niche then that means that the niche was not for that organism.
That organisms are so “fit” to their environment, like a puzzle piece to its surrounding pieces, is supposed to prove that “traits are selected-for their contribution to fitness in a given ecology”, and this is what the theory of natural selection attempts to explain. Organisms fit their ecologies because its their ecologies that “design” their traits. So it is no wonder that organisms and their environments have such a tight relationship.
Take it from Fodor and Piatelli-Palmarini (2010: 137):
You don’t, after all, need an adaptationist account of evolution in order to explain the fact that phenotypes are so often appropriate to ecologies, since, first impressions to the contrary notwithstanding, there is no such fact. It is just a tautology (if it isn’t dead) a creature’s phenotype is appropriate for its survival in the ecology that it inhabits.
So since the terms “ecology” and “phenotype” are interdefined, is it any wonder why an organism’s phenotype has such a “great fit” with its ecology? I don’t think it is. Fodor and Piatteli-Palmarini (2010) note how:
it is interesting and false that creatures are well adapted to their environments; on the other hand it’s true but not interesting that creatures are well adapted to their ecologies. What, them, is the interesting truth about the fitness of phenotypes that we require adaptationism in order to explain? We’ve tried and tried, but we haven’t been able to think of one.
So the argument here could be:
P1) Niches are individuated post hoc by reference to the phenotypes that live in said niche.
P2) If the organisms weren’t there, the niche would not be there either.
C) Therefore there is no fitness of phenotypes to lifestyles that explain said adaptation.
Fodor and Piatteli-Palmarini put it bluntly about how the organism “fits” to its ecology: “although it’s very often cited in defence of Darwinism, the ‘exquisite fit’ of phenotypes to their niches is either true but tautological or irrelevant to questions about how phenotypes evolve. In either case, it provides no evidence for adaptationism.”
The million-dollar question is this, though: what would be evidence that a trait is an adaptation? Knowing what we now know about the so-called fit to the ecology, how can we say that a trait is an adaptation for problem X when niches are individuated post hoc? That right there is the folly of adaptationism, along with the fact that it is unfalsifiable and leads to just-so storytelling (Smith, 2016).
Such stories are “plausible”, but that is only because they are selected to be so. When such adaptationism becomes entrenched in thought, many traits are looked at as adaptations and then stories are constructed as to how and why the trait became fixated in the organism. But, just like EP which uses the theory of natural selection as its basis, so too does adaptationism fail. Nevermind the problem of the fitting of species to ecologies to render evolutionary problems post hoc; nevermind the problem that there is no identifying criteria for identifying adaptations; do mind the fact that there is no possible way for natural selection to do what it does: distinguish between coextensive traits.
In sum, adaptationism is a failed paradigm and we need to dispense with it. The logical problems with it are more than enough to disregard it. Sure, the fitness of a phenotype, say, the claws of a mole do make sense in the ecology it is in. But we only claim that the claws of a mole are adaptations after the fact, obviously. One may say “It’s obvious that the claws of a mole are adaptations, look at how it lives!” But this betrays a notion that Gould and Lewontin (1972) made: do not confuse structure with an evolutionary reason for its existence, which, unfortunately, many people do (most glaringly, evolutionary psychologists). Weinstein’s ridiculous claims about Nazi actions during WWII are a great example of how rampant adaptationism has become: we can explain any and all traits as an adaptation, we just need to be creative with the stories we tell. But just because we can create a story that “makes sense” and explains the observation does not mean that the story is a likely explanation for the trait’s existence.