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For years it seems as if Bo Winegard—former professor (his contract was not renewed)—does not understand the difference between social constructivism about race (racial constructivism refers to the same thing as social constructivism about race so I will be using these two terms interchangeably) and biological realism about race. It seems like he assumes that racial constructivists say that race isn’t real. But if that were true, how would it make sense to call race a social concept if it doesn’t exist? It also seems to me like he is saying that social constructs aren’t real. Money and language are social constructs, too, so does that mean they aren’t real? It doesn’t make sense to say that.

Quite obviously, if X is a social convention, then X is real, albeit a social reality. So if race is a social convention, then race is real. However, Bo’s ignorance to this debate is seen perfectly with this quote from a recent article he wrote:

Some conservative social constructionists and culture-only theorists (i.e., non race realists) have pushed back against the excesses of racial progressivism

In this article, Bo (rightly) claims that hereditarianism is a subset of race realism (I make a distinction between psychological and racial hereditarianism). But where Bo goes wrong is in not making the distinction between biological and social racial realism, as for example Kaplan and Winther (2014) did. Kaplan and Winther’s paper is actually the best look into how the concepts of bio-genomic cluster/racial realism, socialrace, and biological racial realism are realist positions about race. The AAPA even stated a few years back that “race has become a social reality that structures societies and how we experience the world. In this regard, race is real, as is racism, and both have real biological consequences. Membership in socially-defined (racial) groups can have real-life impacts themselves even if there are no biological races in the human species (Graves, 2015). That is: The social can and does become biological (meaning that the social can manifest itself in biology).

Bo’s ignorance can be further seen with this quote:

there is an alternative position: race realism, which argues that people use the concept of race for the same reason that they use the concept of species or sex

And he also wrote a tweet while explaining his “moderate manifesto”, again pushing the same misconception that social constructivists about race aren’t realists about race:

(2) Modern elite discourse contends that race is illusory, a kind of reified figment of our social imagination. BUT, it also contends that we need to promote race-conscious policies to rectify past wrongs. Race is unreal. But some “races” deserve benefits.

… I should note that race, like many other categories, is partially a social construct. But that does not mean that it’s not real.

Bo makes claims like “race is real”, as if social constructivists don’t think that race is real. That’s the only way for social constructivists to be about race. I think Bo is talking about racial anti-realists like Joshua Glasgow, who claim that race is neither socially nor biologically real. But social constructivists and biological racial realists (this term gets thorny since it could refer to a “realist” like Rushton or Jensen, who have no solid grounding in their belief in race or it could refer to philosophers like Michael Hardimon (like his minimalist/populationist, racialist and socialrace concepts) and Quayshawn Spencer (his Blumenbachian partitions), are both realists about race, but in different ways. Kaplan and Winther’s distinctions are good to set these 2 different camps a part and distinguish between them while still accepting that they are both realists.

I don’t think Bo realizes the meandering he has been doing for years discussing this concept. Race is partially a social construct, but race is real (which hereditarians believe), yet social constructivists about race are talking about something. They are talking about a referent, where a referent for race here is a property name for a set of human population groups (Spencer, 2019). The concept of race refers to a social something, thus it is real since society makes it real. Nothing in that entails that race isn’t real. If Bo made the distinction between biological and social races, then he would be able to say that social constructivists about race believe that race is real (they are realists about race as a social convention), but they are anti-realists about biological races.

Social constructivists are anti-realists about biological races, but they hold that the category RACE is a social and not biological construct. I addressed this issue in my article on white privilege:

If race doesn’t exist, then why does white privilege matter?

Lastly, those who argue against the concept of white privilege may say that those who are against the concept of white privilege would then at the same time say that race—and therefore whites—do not exist so, in effect, what are they talking about if ‘whites’ don’t exist because race does not exist? This is of course a ridiculous statement. One can indeed reject claims from biological racial realists and believe that race exists and is a socially constructed reality. Thus, one can reject the claim that there is a ‘biological’ European race, and they can accept the claim that there is an ever-changing ‘white’ race, in which groups get added or subtracted based on current social thought (e.g., the Irish, Italians, Jews), changing with how society views certain groups.

Though, it is perfectly possible for race to exist socially and not biologically. So the social creation of races affords the arbitrarily-created racial groups to be in certain areas on the hierarchy of races. Roberts (2011: 15) states that “Race is not a biological category that is politically charged. It is a political category that has been disguised as a biological one.” She argues that we are not biologically separated into races, we are politically separated into them, signifying race as a political construct. Most people believe that the claim “Race is a social construct” means that “Race does not exist.” However, that would be ridiculous. The social constructivist just believes that society divides people into races based on how we look (i.e., how we are born) and then society divides us into races on the basis of how we look. So society takes the phenotype and creates races out of differences which then correlate with certain continents.

So, there is no contradiction in the claim that “Race does not exist” and the claim that “Whites have certain unearned privileges over other groups.” Being an antirealist about biological race does not mean that one is an antirealist about socialraces. Thus, one can believe that whites have certain privileges over other groups, all the while being antirealists about biological races (saying that “Races don’t exist biologically”).

Going off Kaplan and Winther’s distinction, there are 3 kinds of racial realism: bio-genomic/cluster realism, biological racial realism, and social constructivism about race (socialraces). These three different racial frameworks have one thing in common: they accept the reality of race, but they merely disagree as to the origins of racial groups. Using these distinctions set forth by Kaplan and Winther, we can see how best to view different racial concepts and how to apply them in real life. Kaplan and Winther (2014: 1042) “are conventionalists about bio-genomic cluster/race, antirealists about biological race, and realists about social race.” And they can state this due to the distinction they’ve made between different kinds of racial realism. (Since I personally am a pluralist about race, all of these could hold under certain contexts, but I do hold that race is a social construct of a biological reality, pushing Spencer’s argument.)

Biological race isn’t socialrace

These 2 race concepts are distinct, where one talks about how race is viewed in the social realm while the other talks about how race is viewed in the biological realm. There is of course the view that race is a social construct of a biological reality (a view which I hold myself).

Biological race refers to the categorization of humans based on genetic traits and ancestry (using this definition, captures the bio-genomic/cluster realism as well). So if biological and socialrace were equivalent concepts, then it would mean that genetic differences that define different racial groups would map onto similar social consequences. So if two people from different racial groups are biologically different, then their social experiences and opportunities in society should also differ. Obviously, the claim here is that if two concepts are identical, then they should produce the same outcomes. But socialrace isn’t merely a reflection of biological race (as race realists like Murray, Jensen, Lynn, an Rushton hold to). Socialrace has been influenced by cultural, social, and political factors and so quite obviously it is socially constructed (constructed by society, the majority believe that race is real, so that makes it real).

There are of course social inequalities related to different racial groups. People of different socialraces find themselves treated differently while experiencing different things, and this then results in disparities in opportunity, privileges and disadvantages. These disparities can be noted in healthcare, criminal justice, education, employment and housing—anywhere individuals from a group can face systemic barriers and discrimination. People from certain racial groups may experience lower access to quality education, reduced job opportunities, increased chance of coming into contact with the law, how they are given healthcare, etc. Sin s these disparities persist even after controlling for SES, this shows how race is salient in everyday life.

The existence of social disparities and inequalities between racial groups shows that socialrace cannot be determined by biological factors. It is instead influenced by social constructs, historical context, and power dynamics in a society. So differences in societal consequences indicate the distinction between the two concepts. Socialrace isn’t a mere extension of biological race. Biological differences can and do exist between groups. But it is the social construction and attribution of meaning to these differences that have shaped the lived experiences and outcomes of individuals in society. So by recognizing that race isn’t solely determined by biology, and by recognizing that socialrace isn’t biological race and biological race isn’t social race (i.e., they are different concepts), we can have a better, more nuanced take on how we socially construct differences between groups. (Like that of “Hispanics/Latinos.) Having said all that, here’s the argument:

(P1) If biological and socialrace are the same, then they would have identical consequences in society regarding opportunities, privileges, and disadvantages
(P2) But there are disparities in opportunities, privileges, and disadvantages based on socialrace in various societies.
(C) So biological race and socialrace aren’t the same.

The claim that X is a social construct doesn’t mean that X is imaginary, fake, or unreal. Social constructs have real, tangible impacts on society and individuals’ lives which influences how they are perceived and treated. Further, historical injustices and systemic racism are more evidence that race is a social construct.

Going back to the distinction between three types of racial realism from Kaplan and Winther, what they phrase biological racial realism (Kaplan and Winther, 2014: 1040-1041):

Biological racial realism affirms that a stable mapping exists between the social groups identified as races and groups characterized genomically or, at least, phenomically.2 That the groups are biological populations explains why the particular social groups, and not others, are so identified. Furthermore, for some, but by no means all, biological racial realists, the existence of biological populations (and of the biologically grounded properties of their constituent individuals) explains and justifies at least some social inequalities (e.g., the “hereditarians”; Jensen 1969; Herrnstein and Murray 1995; Rushton 1995; Lynn and Vanhanen 2002). [This is like Hardimon’s racialist race/socialrace distinction.]

Quite obviously, distinguishing between the kinds of racial realism here points out that biological racial realists are of the hereditarian camp, and so race is an explanation for certain social inequalities (IQ, job market outcomes, crime). Social constructivists, however, have argued that what explains these differences is the social, historical, and political factors (see eg The Color of Mind).

(P1) If race is a social construct, then racial categories are not fixed and universally agreed-upon.
(P2) If racial categories are not fixed and universally agreed-upon, then different societies can define race differently.
(C1) So if race is a social construct, then different societies can define race differently.
(P3) If different societies can define race differently, then race lacks an inherent and biological basis.
(P4) Different societies do define race differently (observation of diverse racial classifications worldwide).
(C2) Thus, race lacks and inherent and biological basis.
(P5) If race lacks and inherent and biological basis, then race is a social construct.
(P6) Race lacks an inherent and biological basis.
(C3) Therefore, race is a social construct.

Premise 1: The concept of race varies across place and time. For example, we once had the one drop rule, which stated that any amount of “black blood” makes one black irregardless of their appearance or background. But Brazil has a more fluid approach to racial classification, like pardo and mullato. So this shows that racial categories aren’t fixed and universally agreed-upon, since race concepts in the US and Brazil are different. It also shows that race categories can change on the basis of social and cultural context and, in the context of Brazil, the number of slaves that were transported there.

Premise 2: Racial categories were strictly enforced in apartheid South Africa and people were placed into groups based on arbitrary criteria. Though this classification system differs from the caste system in India, where caste distinctions are based on a social hierarchy, not racial characteristics, which shows how different societies have different concepts of identity and social distinctions (how and in what way to structure their societies). So Conclusion 1 then follows: The variability in racial categorization across societies shows that the concept of race is not fixed, but is shaped by societal norms and beliefs.

Premise 3: Jim Crow laws and the one drop rule show how racial categorization can shift depending on the times and what is currently going on in the society in question. The example of Jim Crow laws show that historical context and social norms dictated racial classification and the boundary between races. Again, going back to the example of Brazil is informative to explain the point. The Brazilian racial system encompasses a larger range of racial groups which were influenced by slavery and colonization and the interactions between European, African, and indigenous peoples. So this shows how racial identity can and has been shaped by historical happenstance along with the intermixing or racial and ethnic groups.

Premise 4: As I already explained, Brazil and South Africa recognize a broader range of racial categories due to their historical circumstances and diverse social histories and dynamics. So Conclusion 2 follows, since these examples show that race doesn’t have a fixed, inherent and objective biological basis; it shows that race is shaped by social, historical, and cultural contexts.

Premise 5: So due to the variability in racial categorization historically and today, and the changing of racial boundaries in the past. For instance, Irish and Italian Americans were seen as different races in the 1900s, but over time as they assimilated into American society, racial categories began to blur and they then became part of the white race. Racial categories in Brazil are based on how the person is perceived, which leads to multiple different racial groups. Apartheid South Africa has 4 classifications: White, Black, Colored (mixed race) and Indian. These examples highlight the fact that based on changing social conventions and thought, how race can and does change with the times based on what is currently going on in the society in question. This highlights the fluid nature of racial categories. The argument up until this point has provided evidence for Premise 6, so Conclusion 3 follows: race is a social construct. Varying racial categories in different societies across time and place, the absence of an objective biological basis to race, along with the influence of historical, cultural, and social factors all point to the conclusion that race is a social construct.

Conclusion

Quite obviously, there is a distinction between biological and social race. The distinction is important, if we want to reject a concept of biological race while still stating that race is real. But hereditarians like Bo, it seems, don’t understand the distinction at hand. Bo, at least, isn’t alone in being confused about race concepts and their entailments. Murray (2020) stated:

Advocates of “race is a social construct” have raised a host of methodological and philosophical issues with the cluster analyses. None of the critical articles has published a cluster analysis that does not show the kind of results I’ve shown.

But social constructivists need to do no such thing. Why would they need to produce a cluster analysis that shows opposite results to what Murray claims? This shows that Murray doesn’t understand what social constructivists believe. Of course, equating race and biology is the MO of hereditarians, since they argue that some social inequalities between races are due to genetic differences between races.

Social constructivists talking about something real—a dynamic and evolving concept which has profound consequences for society. Rejecting the concept of biological races doesn’t entail that the social constructvist doesn’t believe that human groups don’t differ genetically. It does entail that the genetic diversity found in humans groups doesn’t necessitate the establishment of rigid and fixed racial categories. So in rejecting biological racial realism, social constructivists embrace the view that racial classifications are fixated by social, cultural, and historical contingencies. The examples I’ve given in this article show how racial categorization has changed based on time and place, and this is because race is a social construct.

I should note that I am a pluralist about race, which is “the view that there’s a plurality of natures and realities for race in the relevant linguistic context” (Spencer, 2019: 27), so “there is no such thing as a global meaning of ‘race’ (2019 : 43). The fact that there is no such thing as a global meaning of race entails that different societies across time and place will define racial groups differently, which we have seen, and so race is therefore a social construct (and I claim it is a social construct of a biological reality). Hereditarians like Bo don’t have this nuance, due to their apparent insistence that social constructivists are a kind of anti-realist about race as a whole. This claim, as I’ve exhaustively shown, is false. Different concepts of race can exist with each other based on context, leading to complex and multifaceted understandings of race and it’s place in society.

The second argument I formalized quite obviously gets at the distinction between biological and social racial realism shows the distinction between the two—I have defended the premises and have given examples on societies in different time and place that had different views of the racial groups in this country. This, then, shows that race is a social construct and that social constructivists about race are realists about race—since they are talking about something that has a referent.